US inflation refuses to cooperate with the narrative

US inflation came in higher than expected in October, the latest government data shows, complicating the Federal Reserve’s rate outlook and reigniting questions about whether the much-anticipated “soft landing” was ever as secure as the political class wished to believe. While gas prices dipped below four dollars, underlying “core” inflation — which excludes the volatile energy and food categories — remained sticky, driven by persistent services price inflation in housing, healthcare, and insurance. The figures arrived against a backdrop of widespread financial anxiety across the economic spectrum, and as the average price of a new vehicle hit a record high above $51,000. The midterm elections earlier this month reflected this unease; now the economic data is catching up with the political reality.

The received wisdom

The mainstream economic commentary has a relatively benign framing of the October figures. The headline argument is that one month of hotter data does not a trend make, that disinflation is a non-linear process with natural pauses, and that the overall trajectory since the 2022 peak remains favourable. The Fed, under this reading, should hold steady, avoid panicking markets with premature hawkish pivots, and trust that the structural forces driving goods deflation — improved supply chains, Chinese export competition, the continued technological deflationary effect on durable goods — will eventually pull services inflation down too. There is also an optimistic reading of the gas price data: cheaper energy relieves household budgets and may dampen future services price pressures by reducing business operating costs.

A different read

The uncomfortable truth that the “one bad month” framing papers over is that core services inflation has now been sticky for two years. This is not a supply-chain blip that resolves once shipping containers stop piling up in Los Angeles harbour. It reflects something more structurally embedded in the American economy: a labour market that remains tighter than pre-pandemic norms in services industries, an enormous expansion in federal transfer payments that has permanently elevated the floor of household spending power, and a housing market in which supply constraints are so deeply structural — zoning law, permitting timelines, construction labour costs — that no plausible interest rate path is sufficient to resolve them.

The new vehicle price figure is particularly telling. $51,000 as an average price is not explained by transitory supply chain disruption; it reflects the longer-run consequences of an industry that used the inflation surge to restructure away from entry-level vehicles toward high-margin trucks and SUVs, a shift enabled by the consumer credit infrastructure that zero interest rates built. The inflation surge didn’t just raise prices — it restructured markets in ways that will persist long after the CPI headline returns to two percent.

The political consequences deserve attention. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic ran an essentially identical strategy after 2020: large fiscal expansions to cushion pandemic shocks, accompanied by assurances that the resulting inflation was “transitory.” When inflation proved durable rather than transitory, the assurances were quietly retired and replaced with new assurances about disinflation. The populations bearing the cost of that inflation — disproportionately lower-income households, renters, and workers in sectors with limited wage-bargaining power — have not forgotten. The midterms were in part a verdict on this track record.

There is a deeper fiscal issue lurking behind the current inflation data. The United States is running structural federal deficits of six percent of GDP or more, with no serious bipartisan plan to reduce them. At this level of fiscal stimulus, the Fed is essentially trying to drain a bathtub while someone leaves the tap running at full pressure. The historical record on using monetary policy to offset fiscal stimulus of this scale is poor. The 1970s stagflation episode, routinely invoked but imperfectly understood, involved a similar dynamic: loose fiscal policy plus supply shocks plus a central bank reluctant to inflict the pain of genuine tightening. The resolution required a Fed chair willing to cause a sharp recession, and a president willing to let him. Neither ingredient appears to be in abundant supply today.

The Washington consensus on the fiscal question runs as follows: any serious deficit reduction involving either revenue increases or entitlement reform is politically impossible, therefore it won’t happen, therefore we should not discuss it as a practical option. This is a self-fulfilling prophecy dressed up as sophisticated realism. The cost of indefinite fiscal stimulus is paid by the people who can least afford a prolonged period of elevated prices.

What to watch

Watch whether the Fed’s December meeting produces a hawkish surprise — any signal of delayed rate cuts would be significant, since markets have priced in a relatively benign rate path. Watch the November inflation print, which will arrive before the next FOMC decision; a second consecutive beat would materially change the central bank’s political room to manoeuvre. Watch the new Congress’s appetite for any fiscal consolidation measures — the arithmetic of a Republican House majority suggests entitlement reform will remain off the table, but discretionary spending fights are coming. And watch housing starts data: a sustained uptick in supply-side construction would be the most plausible structural fix for the biggest driver of core services inflation.

--- J