The first direct diplomatic contact between Russian and Ukrainian delegations in more than two years ended in Abu Dhabi on Wednesday without a ceasefire agreement, a framework for negotiations, or even an agreed communiqué. NPR reported that the two sides did agree to a prisoner exchange — a modest humanitarian achievement that both governments can claim — but the BBC confirmed that “post-war security” discussions ended without breakthrough. US envoys met separately with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelenskyy in a format that the Guardian described as parallel rather than triangular — each leader briefed an American intermediary, but the two delegations negotiated in different rooms. This is, at minimum, a framework for talking about talking. Whether it is anything more than that remains genuinely unclear.
The received wisdom
The progressive-internationalist reading of Abu Dhabi is cautiously optimistic: any direct contact is better than none, a prisoner exchange signals residual good faith on both sides, and the involvement of American envoys represents a constructive re-engagement by an administration that had previously seemed content to let the conflict drag indefinitely. On this view, the talks represent the first green shoots of a peace process that, if tended carefully, could produce a ceasefire by 2027. The war-weariness of European publics, the strains on Ukraine’s mobilisation base, and Russia’s own economic pressures from prolonged sanctions all point in the same direction: eventually, both sides will be ready to stop shooting. Abu Dhabi was a beginning.
There is something to this. Wars that end at the negotiating table almost always begin with exactly these kinds of inconclusive, confidence-building preliminary contacts. The path from the 1972 Paris back-channel to the 1973 Paris Peace Accords on Vietnam ran through years of parallel and indirect meetings not unlike what happened in Abu Dhabi this week. To dismiss the talks as theatre is to ignore how slowly peace processes actually move.
A different read
The optimism, however, requires one to bracket the substance of what Russia is actually asking for — and that substance has not changed. The BBC’s reporting from inside the front-line city of Avdiivka makes clear that Russia continues to seek Ukrainian territorial concessions that would formalise its annexation of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts — including territory it does not yet physically control. Zelenskyy has said repeatedly, and the Ukrainian constitutional order requires, that he cannot cede sovereign territory to an aggressor. These are not positions that can be split down the middle.
The history of “frozen conflict” settlements in the former Soviet space is not encouraging. The Minsk I and Minsk II agreements of 2014 and 2015, celebrated at the time as diplomatic achievements, proved to be instruments that Russia used to rearm and regroup while preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. The lesson of that experience — seared into Ukrainian institutional memory — is that a ceasefire without security guarantees is merely a better-resourced resumption of hostilities. What Ukraine needs is not a pause in fighting but a durable guarantee against re-invasion, which means some form of NATO or NATO-equivalent security architecture. Russia’s absolute red line is precisely that: it will not accept any such architecture. That deadlock did not evaporate in Abu Dhabi.
The parallel-talks format also reveals something uncomfortable about American strategy. Meeting Putin and Zelenskyy separately, rather than brokering direct engagement, allows Washington to present itself as a peace broker while avoiding the harder question of what it is actually prepared to guarantee. The Guardian asked explicitly whether the Democratic midterm wave represented a turning point for European security — and the honest answer is: not yet. A Congress is not a treaty, and a congressional majority that campaigned on domestic investment is not the same thing as a Congress prepared to extend hard security commitments to Kyiv.
Ukraine, meanwhile, continues to suffer the practical consequences of the conflict: drone attacks on front-line cities, energy grid attrition, and a demographic haemorrhage that a prisoner exchange, however welcome, does nothing to reverse. Peace talks that produce prisoners but no peace may, over time, generate the false impression of progress — normalising the conflict just enough to reduce Western urgency without producing the security architecture that would justify the normalisation.
What to watch
- The security guarantee question: Whether the US or European powers are prepared to table a concrete guarantee proposal is the single most important variable. Watch for any statement from NATO foreign ministers.
- Territorial preconditions: If Russia tables a map in the next round of talks, the question of which lines are negotiable will move from the theoretical to the concrete.
- Ukraine’s mobilisation: Ukraine’s ability to sustain military pressure affects its negotiating position directly; watch manpower legislation in the Rada.
- The Indonesian precedent: Ukraine’s capture of an Indonesian prisoner of war amid a surge in Russian recruitment from non-traditional sources suggests Moscow’s manpower constraints are worse than admitted — a fact that may or may not improve its negotiating disposition.
— J