One Nation in Farrer, and the Liberals' lost river

Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party won the Farrer byelection in the New South Wales Riverina on Saturday, taking what had been a safe Liberal seat since the party’s foundation and giving One Nation its first lower-house seat in twenty-eight years. Hanson called the result “a historic parliamentary win” and signalled that One Nation would now contest “those other seats.” The Liberal leader Sussan Ley, in a remarkably candid concession, told her own party to “accept the loss with humility,” noting that “voters never get it wrong.” The result follows a year in which the federal Liberal-National Coalition has been reduced to its lowest primary vote since the early 1940s and the Albanese Labor government has lost altitude on cost of living, the energy transition, and immigration policy.

The received wisdom

The standard Australian-political-class reading is that Farrer is a one-off: a low-turnout byelection in an irrigation-belt seat with specific local grievances over Murray-Darling water allocations, contested by a Liberal candidate parachuted in from Sydney against a One Nation operative who had been working the ground for two years. On this account, the result is a Riverina story, not a national one, and it should not be over-read. The further version of this reading — the one being briefed by Liberal head office on Sunday — is that the lesson is one of candidate selection rather than direction, and that any drift toward One Nation positioning by federal Liberals would alienate the metropolitan moderate vote that the party also needs to recover. The two halves of that argument are in tension; the briefers would like nobody to notice.

A different read

Farrer is not a one-off. It is the Australian instalment of the same realignment that produced Reform UK’s Sunderland breakthrough on Thursday, the continued strength of the AfD in eastern Germany, and the steady consolidation of right-populist parties in the Nordic and Mediterranean systems. The pattern is consistent enough to require explanation rather than denial: regional, economically protective, culturally settled electorates with no enthusiasm for either the progressive cultural agenda of the centre-left or the deregulatory economic agenda of the centre-right are voting, in seat after seat, for the option that takes their material grievances seriously without demanding they apologise for their settled preferences.

The conservative point worth making here — and Liberal Party officials who have spent the weekend rehearsing arguments against it should hear it cleanly — is that One Nation’s victory does not require Hanson to be respectable; it requires the Liberals to be useless. Andrew Sullivan made the analogous case about UKIP in 2014: the issue was not that Nigel Farage was a serious figure, the issue was that the British political class had stopped speaking about borders, family formation, and economic security in any vocabulary that recognisably belonged to ordinary voters. The same critique applies in Australia, with one extra wrinkle. The Liberal Party has spent the last decade trying to fight a two-front war — defending the Albanese government’s net-zero settlement to the metropolitan press while signalling scepticism about it to the regions — and lost both fronts. The Nationals, the supposed regional partner, have been reduced in seat count and in voice. Farrer is the moment the Riverina decided it would rather have a representative of its own preferences than a junior partner of someone else’s. Peggy Noonan would call this a “the dam broke” election; the Sunderland comparison is the more exact one.

The historical parallel that ought to interest right-of-centre Australians is the 1998 election, when One Nation polled 8% nationally and the Howard government chose to triangulate hard on border policy rather than denounce Hanson as morally beyond the pale. That decision is now treated by progressive historians as a stain; it is more honestly described as the moment the Liberal Party absorbed the right-populist insurgency and held the centre-right together for a decade. The contrary path — the one taken by the European centre-right since roughly 2015 — is to treat the populist alternative as untouchable, lose seats to it, and then govern in coalition with what is left of the centre-left while the right-populist vote share continues to grow. Sussan Ley’s “voters never get it wrong” line is, intentionally or not, the first hint that some part of the Liberal hierarchy has noticed which path produced what.

There is a broader strategic dimension that should not be lost in the domestic noise. Australia is a US treaty ally and a Pacific power being courted by Beijing at the same time that its main political parties are losing the confidence of their own electorates. A federal political system that cannot maintain a coherent governing coalition is not a reliable counterweight in the Indo-Pacific. The Solomon Islands and Vanuatu watch what Canberra does; what they will see in Farrer is a country that does not yet know what it wants. That is a foreign-policy problem dressed up as a byelection result.

What to watch

First, whether One Nation now moves on the seats Hanson named — the rural Queensland and northern NSW Coalition holdings — and whether the Liberal-National conference responds with selection reform or doubles down on candidate centralisation. Second, the Nationals’ leadership: a leadership ballot before the next federal election is now plausible, and the choice will tell us whether the party intends to compete with One Nation or merge with it. Third, Albanese’s response: a Labor government that runs a “stop the One Nation surge” line will find it works once and then stops working. Fourth, whether any sitting Liberal MP defects — the threshold event that would turn a byelection win into a national story.

— J