Proud Boys dismissal and the limits of the judiciary

A federal judge has dismissed seditious conspiracy charges against four Proud Boys members — Ethan Nordean, Joseph Biggs, Zachary Rehl, and Dominic Pezzola — with prejudice, meaning the cases cannot be revived. Judge Timothy J. Kelly, a Trump appointee, granted the government’s motion for dismissal but made clear in his ruling that he was acting on constitutional grounds concerning separation of powers rather than expressing any agreement with the executive branch’s decisions. Kelly wrote that “the attack on the Capitol on January 6, 2021 was a perilous event… an attack on the Constitution’s mechanism to facilitate the peaceful transfer of power from one president to the next.” He explicitly noted: “No one should mistake the Court’s granting of the Government’s motion for its agreement with those decisions.” Nordean, Biggs, and Rehl had been convicted of seditious conspiracy in May 2023 and sentenced to between ten and eighteen years; Trump pardoned all four on his first day in office in January 2025. Friday’s ruling converts those pardons into a permanent legal closure: the cases are extinguished, with prejudice, as a matter of federal record.

The received wisdom

The liberal and civil libertarian case against this outcome is powerful and largely correct on the narrow facts. The Proud Boys members were convicted by a jury of their peers of seditious conspiracy — one of the most serious charges in the American criminal code — for their organised role in the assault on the Capitol during the certification of electoral votes. The sentences handed down were proportionate to the gravity of the offences. For an executive to pardon those convictions, and for the Justice Department then to seek their dismissal with prejudice, is to use the constitutional mechanisms of the rule of law to extinguish a rule-of-law reckoning. The approximately 1,600 people charged in connection with January 6 under the Biden DOJ represented one of the largest domestic terrorism prosecutions in American history; the systematic reversal of those prosecutions via executive order is, on this reading, itself an assault on democratic accountability.

A different read

Judge Kelly’s ruling deserves to be read in full, because it is both legally correct and politically courageous. Courts cannot compel the executive branch to prosecute. This is not a novel doctrine invented for the occasion; it is a foundational principle of the constitutional separation of powers, applied in cases from across the political spectrum. A judge who ordered the DOJ to continue a prosecution over the executive’s objection would be stepping outside the judicial role in a manner that would be just as destabilising to democratic norms as the pardons themselves. Kelly knew this. His ruling is a precise statement that the constitution provides him no tool to reverse what the executive has done — while making unmistakably clear what he thinks of what the executive has done.

That clarity matters. It is worth contrasting Kelly’s conduct with the behaviour of judges who have used procedural mechanisms to effectively override executive decisions they found distasteful without acknowledging the constitutional limits of their authority. Kelly did the opposite: he followed the law as written while placing on the record, in language that will be cited for decades, his characterisation of January 6 as “an attack on the Constitution’s mechanism to facilitate the peaceful transfer of power.” He added: “Moving forward, if this Nation’s experiment in self-government is to last another 250 years, the American people — no matter their partisan preferences — will have to act together to preserve, protect and defend that miracle through our constitutional framework.” This is a sitting judge, a Trump appointee, writing language that belongs in a civics textbook.

The deeper problem this case exposes is not judicial but constitutional. The pardon power, as designed by the Framers, was intended as a clemency mechanism — a release valve for unjust convictions, a tool for national reconciliation in the aftermath of civil conflict. Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 74 argued that “in seasons of insurrection or rebellion, there are often critical moments when a well-timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity of the commonwealth.” He clearly contemplated mercy offered after democratic stability was restored, not mercy offered to the perpetrators of an attack on certification whose leader subsequently won re-election. The Framers did not build a constitutional mechanism to prevent a president from pardoning his own political supporters — because they did not seriously contemplate that scenario. The result is a gap between the constitutional text and the democratic purpose the text was meant to serve.

This is the same gap that has opened up in other areas of American constitutional design as political polarisation has intensified: mechanisms designed for a political culture of good faith operate badly when good faith is absent. The Senate advice-and-consent process, impeachment, and now the pardon power have all been stress-tested and found to be only as strong as the political actors operating them. The conservative case for strong institutional design has historically acknowledged this risk — it is why figures from Madison to Burke have emphasised the importance of constitutional culture, not just constitutional text. Friday’s ruling is a reminder of what happens when the culture corrodes faster than the text can compensate.

What to watch

  • Whether any of the remaining approximately 1,600 January 6 prosecutions — those involving lesser charges and defendants who received pardons rather than commutations — face similar dismissal motions, completing the systematic unraveling of the entire accountability effort.
  • Legal scholarship responses to Kelly’s ruling: the judge’s constitutional reasoning and his explicit record-making about January 6 will be closely parsed by scholars examining the question of whether courts have any residual tools to respond to pardon abuse.
  • The political trajectory of the Proud Boys and allied organisations after having their legal liability extinguished; there is a deterrence question about whether the elimination of criminal consequences affects the calculation of similar groups going forward.
  • Whether Congress revisits the question of pardon-power limits, which has been proposed but not seriously advanced in either chamber.

— J