Srebrenica at 31: memory against forgetting

Thousands gathered at the Potočari memorial centre on July 11 to mark the 31st anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide, the systematic murder of more than 8,000 Bosniak Muslim men and boys by Bosnian Serb forces under General Ratko Mladić between July 11 and 22, 1995. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Court of Justice have both ruled that the killings constituted genocide. This year’s commemoration took place under the theme “We Are Here”, honouring the resilience of survivors. Newly identified remains were laid to rest alongside those interred in previous years; forensic teams estimate that perhaps 1,000 victims remain unaccounted for. The ceremony drew heads of state and diplomats from across Europe, though notably not from the government of Republika Srpska.

The received wisdom

The progressive-liberal framing of Srebrenica’s anniversary is one of remembrance as resistance. The argument is that commemorating the genocide annually, insisting on the juridical term, and naming the perpetrators is itself a political act against revisionism — and an increasingly necessary one. Across the region, politicians in Serbia and Republika Srpska have for years promoted historical narratives that minimise the death toll, deny the genocide finding, or re-frame Srebrenica as one atrocity among many in a mutually brutal war. The International Court of Justice found in 2007 that Serbia had failed to prevent and punish the genocide, even while stopping short of finding Serbia directly responsible. International institutions — the UN, the EU, the ICTY’s successor tribunals — matter precisely because domestic politics in the Western Balkans have repeatedly failed to produce accountability. On this reading, any weakening of international commitment to the Srebrenica verdict creates space for revisionism to fill.

This is a serious argument. The pattern of denial following twentieth-century genocides — from the Armenian case through the Rwandan — shows that impunity and revisionism are self-reinforcing. The Srebrenica precedent exists as a legal and political fact precisely because of sustained international pressure, and it is not self-sustaining.

A different read

Where the mainstream framing becomes less analytically useful is in its tendency to treat the anniversary as a moral occasion rather than a strategic one — a ritual of condemnation that substitutes for the harder work of regional political architecture. Thirty-one years on, the conditions that made Srebrenica possible — the structural weakness of the Bosnian state, the political entrenchment of ethnically defined entities, the dependency of peace enforcement on rotating international presences — have not fundamentally changed. Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a dysfunctional consociational arrangement in which the Dayton Agreement’s architecture, designed to end a war rather than build a state, has calcified into permanent semi-paralysis. The High Representative still wields colonial-style powers to override democratically elected institutions when they threaten to collapse the settlement.

The more uncomfortable truth is that the international community’s approach to the Western Balkans has been a mixture of performative commitment and structural neglect. EU accession, the carrot that was supposed to incentivise good governance and reconciliation, has been perpetually deferred — Serbia began accession negotiations in 2014; it is no closer to membership in 2026 than it was a decade ago. The message this sends is that the strategic prize of EU membership is available regardless of whether regional governments make serious progress on the rule of law, minority rights, or — most pointedly — acceptance of international court findings on genocide.

Meanwhile, the revisionist politicians who deny Srebrenica are not operating in a vacuum. Republika Srpska’s President Milorad Dodik has spent years cultivating relationships with Moscow and Beijing, and has explicitly positioned denial of the genocide verdict as an assertion of Bosnian Serb sovereignty against Western institutional overreach. This framing — in which genocide denial becomes a form of anti-colonialism — is gaining traction beyond the Balkans in precisely those parts of the world where the West has spent the post-Cold War decades accumulating resentment without delivering the promised dividends of integration.

There is a harder lesson here for those who believe strongly in the importance of memory and accountability — which I do. The institutional mechanisms for enforcing that accountability only function within a broader geopolitical order that is willing to sustain them. When that order fractures, the memory work of anniversary commemorations is necessary but not sufficient. The real test of commitment to Srebrenica’s legacy is not the annual ceremony at Potočari; it is whether the EU and NATO are willing to make Balkans accession a genuine strategic priority rather than a perpetual aspiration.

What to watch

— Republika Srpska’s institutional secession: Dodik has threatened to withdraw Republika Srpska from shared Bosnian institutions. Watch for any accelerating steps toward parallel structures, particularly in security and judiciary.

— EU enlargement credibility: The European Commission’s next Western Balkans progress report will signal whether accession conditionality is still operative or has effectively collapsed.

— Serbia-Kosovo normalisation: The Brussels Agreement on normalisation has been repeatedly stalled. Any breakdown in talks creates a regional contagion effect that strengthens hardliners in Bosnia simultaneously.

— ICTY successor tribunal funding: The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, which handles remaining ICTY business, faces ongoing political pressure on its budget. Reduced resources directly constrain the remaining prosecutions.

— J