The death toll from the twin earthquakes that struck Venezuela’s coastal state of La Guaira on June 24 has passed 4,333, with a further 16,740 people injured and an estimated 1.3 million people requiring urgent aid. The back-to-back shocks — a 7.2-magnitude tremor followed 39 seconds later by a 7.5 — were the largest to hit Venezuela in more than a century, collapsing entire apartment blocks and destroying an estimated 58,000 buildings. The UN has issued an emergency appeal for roughly $300 million while estimating total physical damage at approximately $37 billion. Rescue operations have officially concluded; family members continue searching ruins independently. Interim President Delcy Rodríguez has called on creditor nations and the United Kingdom to release Venezuelan assets frozen under international sanctions — including approximately 30 tons of gold held in London — to fund what would be one of the most complex reconstruction efforts in Latin American history.
The received wisdom
The humanitarian case for releasing frozen assets in a disaster context is almost self-evident, and most serious international lawyers would support some form of emergency carve-out. The progressive framing goes further: the entire architecture of Western sanctions on Venezuela has been a failure. It did not dislodge the Maduro government; it did not prompt free elections; what it did accomplish was to deepen the economic misery of ordinary Venezuelans who had already lived through hyperinflation, the collapse of oil output, and a migration crisis that dispersed more than seven million people across South America. Now, with a 7.5-magnitude earthquake having levelled major coastal districts and the government’s fiscal reserves effectively locked out of reach, the argument for immediate asset release looks unanswerable on humanitarian grounds. Punishing a country in the act of burying its dead seems, on that reading, an almost indefensible position.
A different read
The humanitarian urgency is real. But the call for asset release without conditions imports its own risks — and the history of Venezuelan governance under both Maduro and his successors suggests those risks are not hypothetical.
The core problem is that the frozen assets and sanctions regime exist precisely because previous Venezuelan governments systematically looted reconstruction funds, diverted international aid, and used emergency conditions to entrench political control. The Maduro government’s relationship with NGOs — previously subjected to registration requirements, surveillance, and direct repression — means that the civil society infrastructure needed to ensure aid reaches disaster survivors rather than regime-adjacent intermediaries is severely compromised. As Al Jazeera’s reporting from the disaster zone makes clear, anger at the government’s initial response was widespread among survivors before international teams arrived.
This is not an argument against releasing assets for humanitarian purposes. It is an argument for the kind of conditioned, monitored release that places independent international agencies — the UN, the ICRC, established NGOs — in the distribution chain rather than routing funds through the Venezuelan government’s own budget. The distinction matters enormously in practice. When Haiti received international reconstruction funding after the 2010 earthquake, billions flowed through processes the Haitian government had limited capacity to administer; the result was, by most accounts, a reconstruction failure measured in years. Venezuela’s state capacity is considerably worse than Haiti’s was in 2010, and its government has demonstrated both the will and the mechanism to divert aid flows.
Rodríguez’s request to King Charles for the release of 30 tons of gold is worth examining carefully. The gold is held under UK sanctions imposed for electoral fraud and human rights violations. The current Venezuelan administration has made changes at the margin but has not addressed the structural conditions — free elections, rule of law, independent judiciary — that the sanctions were designed to incentivise. The earthquake does not retroactively resolve those questions. What it does is create a legitimate humanitarian exception that should be negotiated with robust accountability mechanisms, not surrendered as an unconditional gesture.
There is also a broader lesson here about the design of sanctions regimes. When Western governments impose financial restrictions on authoritarian states, they rarely build in emergency relief mechanisms that would allow targeted humanitarian disbursements without full sanctions removal. The result, in cases like Venezuela’s, is that a binary choice gets imposed at the worst possible moment: either the regime gets full access to frozen resources without conditions, or disaster survivors are left waiting while lawyers argue over Treasury licences. Building humanitarian carve-outs into sanction frameworks at the design stage — rather than improvising them after a catastrophe — would produce better outcomes on both governance and humanitarian grounds.
The 4,333 confirmed dead are not an abstraction. But neither are the structural incentives that make Venezuelan governments more likely to capture aid than distribute it.
What to watch
- Whether the UK government agrees to release Venezuelan gold reserves under a monitored framework — a decision that would set a significant precedent for how Western governments handle sanctions-versus-humanitarian-access dilemmas in future crises.
- The pace and integrity of international aid distribution; independent assessments of whether UN agencies and established NGOs have meaningful operational access or are being channelled through government structures.
- Venezuela’s political situation: the earthquake may accelerate internal pressure on the Rodríguez administration either toward reform or toward increased authoritarian consolidation as the government attempts to control the reconstruction narrative.
- Regional response from Colombia and Brazil, both of which host large Venezuelan diaspora communities and have leverage with Caracas that Western governments lack.
— J