US and Canadian authorities have charged 37 people in connection with the 2023 assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canadian Sikh activist killed outside a gurdwara in Surrey, British Columbia. The Guardian reports that the charges link the killing to the Lawrence Bishnoi gang — an organised criminal network whose leader is currently imprisoned in India — under what authorities are calling “Operation Hard Ball.” Seven of those charged are currently fugitives being sought in the United States. The charges do not directly indict Indian state actors by name, but the operational connection between the Bishnoi network and elements of India’s intelligence apparatus has been the central — and contested — claim underlying the Canada-India diplomatic rupture that began when Prime Minister Trudeau made his initial allegations in the Canadian parliament in September 2023.
The received wisdom
The mainstream Western foreign policy position, particularly as articulated by Five Eyes security establishments, is that the Nijjar case represents one of the most significant documented instances of transnational repression attempted by a US-allied democracy, and that the failure to extract full accountability from New Delhi has created a dangerous precedent. Canada expelled Indian diplomats, India expelled Canadian ones, and the relationship has been in formal diplomatic deep-freeze for nearly three years. The US government, which initially handled the case with conspicuous delicacy given the strategic value of India as a counterweight to China, has now leaned into the legal process — the 37 charges represent a significant escalation of American official engagement with what had been treated as primarily a bilateral Canada-India dispute.
Under this reading, Operation Hard Ball is a vindication of the rule-of-law approach: patient investigation, multilateral coordination, public charges that create legal accountability regardless of whether India cooperates with extradition. The democratic world cannot maintain its credibility as a defender of liberal norms if it silently tolerates assassinations on its own soil by allies it finds geopolitically useful. The charges are correct and appropriate, whatever their diplomatic fallout.
A different read
That argument is right as far as it goes, but it stops short of the harder questions — questions that bear on not just this case but on the entire framework through which Western governments are managing the rise of India as a major power.
Start with the nature of the charges themselves. Linking the killing to the Bishnoi gang is legally significant but strategically ambiguous. The Bishnoi gang is an organised crime network with known connections to a range of criminal operations. The Guardian’s reporting notes that these connections to Indian intelligence services have been the contested core of the diplomatic dispute — Canada’s position was that the killing was state-directed; India’s position was that it was an independent criminal act. Charging 37 members of a criminal network is not the same as charging the Indian state. It is a legally precise step that may also be politically convenient for everyone involved: it allows the US and Canada to demonstrate seriousness without forcing the final confrontation with New Delhi that a direct charge against serving Indian intelligence officers would require.
This matters because transnational repression is a state problem, not merely a criminal one. The mechanism by which a government eliminates dissidents abroad typically involves a combination of state direction, criminal proxy networks, and local facilitators — the same structure used by Saudi Arabia in the Khashoggi killing, by Russia in the Salisbury poisonings, by China against Uyghur activists in Europe and North America. In each of those cases, the use of proxies or deniable intermediaries was part of the operational design. Prosecuting the intermediaries without establishing state accountability allows the employing state to observe, recalibrate, and continue — deploying more insulated networks next time.
The geopolitical context is worth being honest about. India is the world’s largest democracy and a country that Western governments have invested enormous strategic capital in cultivating as a partner — in the Quad, in intelligence sharing, in defence procurement, in technology supply chains. The calculation that has governed Western handling of the Nijjar case since 2023 is essentially a hedging calculation: express concern, allow legal processes to proceed, avoid the direct confrontation that would fracture the strategic relationship. That calculation may be defensible as realpolitik; it is not defensible as a consistent application of the rule-of-law principles that Western governments routinely invoke against Russia and China.
There is a long-term cost to this inconsistency that tends to be underweighted in the immediate diplomatic accounting. The US and its allies have built their alliance system on the premise that what distinguishes them from authoritarian powers is not merely capability but conduct — the willingness to be bound by rules that constrain their own behaviour as much as their adversaries’. Every time a democracy is given effective impunity for extrajudicial killing abroad, that premise erodes. The erosion is not dramatic; it accumulates in the perceptions of the Global South governments and the diaspora communities who are watching what rules actually apply to whom.
India’s government faces a mirror-image version of this problem. Its global aspirations — a permanent UN Security Council seat, recognition as an indispensable partner in the international order — depend on other countries accepting that India is a responsible stakeholder. Authorising or tolerating the assassination of a Canadian citizen on Canadian soil is incompatible with that aspiration. The question for Indian civil society and for the Indian government’s long-term strategic calculus is whether the short-term suppression of Sikh political activism abroad is worth the long-term cost to India’s international legitimacy. The evidence of the past three years suggests New Delhi has not taken that question seriously enough.
What to watch
Watch whether extradition requests follow the charges — if the US formally requests extradition of the seven fugitives from India, the diplomatic temperature rises significantly and India must make a public choice about cooperation. Watch the Canadian government’s response: the Trudeau era is over and the new government’s posture toward India will signal whether Canada has absorbed the lesson that consistency matters more than convenience. Watch whether any of the 37 defendants cooperate and what they reveal about the chain of command. And watch India’s domestic political reaction — Modi’s government has significant incentive to frame any cooperation with Western prosecutions as a capitulation to foreign pressure, and the domestic politics of that framing will constrain whatever instinct toward accommodation may exist within the Indian foreign ministry.
— J