Reform UK would have received just 15 per cent of its actual donations last year had a proposed £100,000 annual cap on political contributions been in force, according to analysis shared with the Guardian. Using Electoral Commission data for the period April 2025 to March 2026 — and assuming that union affiliation payments would remain exempt from any cap, in line with the Phillips review’s recommendations — the analysis by Friends of the Earth found that Reform would have raised £4.1 million rather than the £26.7 million it actually received. The party’s registered average donation was £137,496, almost six times higher than Labour’s comparable figure. The proposed cap, which forms part of a broader political-funding review, would leave Reform UK no longer the best-funded party in British politics. The analysis was produced by Friends of the Earth using publicly available Electoral Commission records and shared in advance of what is expected to be a significant Commons debate on political finance.
The received wisdom
The progressive case for capping political donations rests on a principled argument with a distinguished intellectual pedigree. Large donations from wealthy individuals, the argument runs, distort democracy by allowing a small number of plutocrats to purchase political influence disproportionate to their numbers. The United States serves as the cautionary tale: a system with few effective limits on political spending has produced an electoral environment dominated by billionaire donors and super-PACs, to the measurable detriment of ordinary voters’ influence. In Britain, the concern about individual mega-donors — whether on the right or left — is genuine, and the Phillips review that undergirds the current proposal was a serious piece of work. Capping donations at £100,000, on this view, is simply good democratic hygiene, and the fact that it would disproportionately affect Reform is incidental — the rules apply to everyone equally.
A different read
The equal-application argument would be considerably more persuasive if the proposed cap actually applied equally.
It does not. The critical exemption for union affiliation payments — which the analysis rightly acknowledges, since the Phillips review recommended it — ensures that Labour’s principal funding mechanism is untouched. Trade union affiliation payments are not comparable to individual donations in economic terms, but they are comparable in political terms: they are large blocks of money transferred to a political party by organisations with specific interests, in exchange for political access and influence. The argument that union payments are structurally different because they represent aggregated member contributions is partially true but ignores the documented pattern of union leaderships directing political funds without meaningful member mandate. The Unite union’s funding of the Corbyn project, for instance, did not involve a detailed democratic consultation of Unite members about their preferred interpretation of Labour party direction.
What the proposed cap would achieve, if enacted with the union exemption intact, is a permanent structural advantage for Labour over its principal electoral challenger. Reform UK is currently, by some polling metrics, the most popular single party in Britain. It attracted millions of votes at the last general election. Whether one welcomes that fact or deplores it, the idea that a governing party should design campaign finance rules that would reduce its main opponent’s funding by 85 per cent while leaving its own primary funding source intact is not democratic hygiene — it is incumbent protection dressed in reformist clothing.
The uncomfortable historical parallel is worth noting. Sitting governments that design electoral rules with their own perpetuation as the primary variable have a poor record of producing durable democratic settlements. The proposal to exempt union payments while capping individual donations does not pass a basic symmetry test. If the principle is that large concentrations of political money distort democracy, then union block grants — which in Labour’s case run to tens of millions annually — should face the same scrutiny as Nigel Farage’s wealthy backers. The fact that they do not tells us something about whose democracy this particular reform is designed to protect.
A genuine reform would cap all donations, including union affiliation, at the same limit, and pair it with a modest increase in state funding to ensure that political parties remain viable. That would be painful for everyone and would therefore indicate that the architects were serious about the stated principle rather than the partisan outcome.
What to watch
Watch the parliamentary arithmetic: whether Labour backbenchers who have trade union sponsorship push back against any proposal that includes union affiliation in the cap. If they do, it will confirm that the carve-out is load-bearing to the coalition behind the policy. Second, track whether the Electoral Commission issues any formal view on the symmetry question — its independence makes its opinion politically significant. Third, observe whether the Liberal Democrats and Conservatives support or oppose the union exemption; if both object, the government faces a cross-bench majority that could force an amendment. Finally, watch Nigel Farage’s response: the donation cap gives him a potent narrative about the establishment closing ranks against populist insurgency, and he will use it.
— J