Three consecutive nights of US air strikes on Iranian port cities, a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and now an explicit threat to hit Iranian power plants unless Tehran agrees to terms — the American military campaign against Iran has moved, within the space of a week, from surgical strikes on nuclear facilities to threats against civilian infrastructure. Iran has responded by launching missiles and drones at Bahrain and Jordan, with Bahrain’s air defences reporting intercepts. The Trump administration simultaneously dropped its proposed 20% Hormuz transit fee after what it described as “highly productive conversations with Middle East leadership,” replacing it with investment and trade deals with Gulf Arab states. US inflation fell to 3.5% in June, partly on lower energy costs — a number that could reverse sharply if the Hormuz conflict extends another fortnight.
The received wisdom
The dominant framing in most progressive and centrist commentary is that Trump has stumbled into an unwinnable war of choice, driven by maximal-pressure ideology and a congenital inability to accept diplomatic half-measures. The fear is well-founded in its specifics: no US administration has successfully coerced Iran through force alone since the 1979 revolution, and the Islamic Republic has spent four decades building redundant deterrence precisely to survive exactly this kind of campaign. Striking power infrastructure — hospitals go dark, dialysis patients die, water treatment fails — would cross a threshold that would isolate Washington diplomatically and radicalize Iranian public opinion against any settlement. The argument that Trump abandoned the Hormuz toll “after productive conversations” suggests he can be talked back from ledges, which is faintly reassuring; but the pattern of escalation — each ratchet leading to a new ultimatum — fits a dynamic that historical analysis calls the “commitment trap,” where both sides’ credibility becomes hostage to the next move.
A different read
The received criticism is not wrong about the risks, but it papers over several things that the pessimistic narrative leaves out.
First, the strategic reality before these strikes was also unsustainable. Iran had continued uranium enrichment to near-weapons-grade levels throughout the previous administration’s tenure, and the JCPOA framework was clinically dead. The question was never whether pressure would come — it was whether it would come on American or Iranian terms. Trump’s critics rarely answer what the alternative to maximum pressure actually was; “diplomacy” in the abstract is not a policy when the other side has spent two years refusing substantive talks.
Second, the abandonment of the Hormuz toll — widely mocked as a capitulation — is better read as a deliberate reset. Trump floated the toll, extracted trade commitments and diplomatic alignment from Gulf states who feared the chaos it would cause, then pocketed the gains and dropped the threat. It is a negotiating pattern familiar from his first term’s trade wars: announce a maximalist position, let allies and adversaries scramble, harvest concessions, declare victory. Clumsy, yes. But not irrational.
Third, the power-plant threat is almost certainly a bargaining chip rather than a genuine operational order. The US has form here: President Biden threatened similar “red lines” over Ukrainian infrastructure strikes that were never enforced, and the Trump team is sophisticated enough to know that actually executing a strike on Iranian electrical grids would require congressional authorisation it does not have and allied support it would not receive. The threat is calibrated to impose psychological pressure without the costs of execution — a technique as old as Eisenhower’s nuclear brinkmanship against China over Taiwan in 1954 and 1958.
What genuinely worries analysts is not the explicit threats but the escalation trap dynamic identified by Gulf security researchers: once both sides have taken casualties and made public commitments, backing down without a face-saving formula becomes structurally very hard. Iran retaliating against Bahrain — a Sunni monarchy with a large Shia population and host to the US Fifth Fleet — is a signal that Tehran is prepared to widen the theatre. Jordan’s targeting is even more provocative: Jordan is a formal US defence partner and an Abraham Accords-adjacent state. If Jordan’s government feels compelled to request US protection, the coalition implications multiply rapidly.
The historical parallel worth reaching for is not Iraq 2003 — the structural differences are enormous — but the 1988 “Tanker War” Operation Praying Mantis, in which the US destroyed roughly half of Iran’s operational naval capacity in a single day in response to a mine that disabled a US frigate. Iran accepted a ceasefire within months. The lesson the Trump team appears to have drawn is that concentrated force can compel Iranian de-escalation faster than prolonged negotiations. The lesson that was actually learned from 1988 — that Iran accepted a pause, not a settlement, and that the Revolutionary Guards emerged politically stronger from martyrdom narratives — is notably absent from the current playbook.
What to watch
Four signals will determine whether this remains a contained coercive campaign or tips into something more durable. First, watch Iran’s response to Bahrain and Jordan strikes: if Tehran escalates further into Gulf state territory, the US will face pressure from Saudi Arabia and the UAE that changes Washington’s political calculus. Second, US oil price trajectory: Brent crude above $110 for more than two weeks would push the June inflation print back up and politically constrain Trump’s room for manoeuvre. Third, congressional authorisation: Senate Democrats have already blocked a defence bill over Iran provisions; a formal AUMF request would reveal exactly how thin bipartisan support for this campaign actually is. Fourth, watch Iranian public opinion proxies — Friday mosque attendance rhetoric and bazaar closure patterns — which historically signal whether the regime feels domestically stabilised or pressured toward a deal.
— J