The United States launched a new wave of strikes against Iran overnight Wednesday, with explosions reported in Bandar Abbas, Chabahar, and Ahvaz. President Trump told reporters he had not yet decided whether to “finish off” Iran, while Tehran’s president declared any earlier peace framework void and vowed to defend “every inch” of Iranian territory. BBC reporting confirmed Trump had warned Tehran it “better behave,” a formulation that managed simultaneously to project dominance and strategic ambiguity. The Islamic Republic, for its part, is framing the conflict not as a limited exchange but as an existential struggle — a rhetorical escalation that constrains both sides’ ability to de-escalate without appearing to capitulate.
The received wisdom
The mainstream reading of this conflict, as advanced by most foreign-policy commentators sympathetic to the White House’s posture, goes roughly like this: Iran has spent decades developing ballistic missiles, funding proxy forces across the region, and edging toward nuclear capability. The Obama-era JCPOA gave Tehran sanctions relief and time without eliminating the underlying threat. The Biden years were too tentative. Trump’s maximum-pressure doctrine — tightened sanctions, targeted strikes, explicit threats — is finally forcing Iran to reckon with the real costs of its regional adventurism. If the mullahocracy wobbles or the population turns against a regime that has delivered poverty and war, that is a feature, not a bug.
There is something to this. Iran’s government is genuinely unpopular at home; its economy has been battered; its proxy network in Lebanon and Syria has been significantly degraded. The strategic logic of imposing costs is not inherently flawed.
A different read
The problem with maximum pressure as strategy is that it is an engine, not a steering wheel. It accelerates toward some outcome — regime collapse, capitulation, or escalation — without clearly specifying which one is desirable, what a satisfactory endpoint looks like, or how to get there without the war broadening beyond all original intentions.
History is not encouraging here. The sanctions campaign against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq through the 1990s imposed enormous costs — on the Iraqi population especially — without producing either regime change or reliable compliance. The North Korea case is even more instructive: decades of pressure, multiple rounds of “maximum” sanctions, periodic military threats, and Pyongyang has emerged with a de facto nuclear deterrent and a leadership more entrenched than it was in 1993. Pressure without a negotiated off-ramp tends to produce entrenchment rather than surrender.
Iran’s framing — fighting an “existential war” — matters whether we take it literally or not. If the regime genuinely believes its survival is at stake, rational-actor models of coercion break down. Governments facing what they perceive as existential threats do not typically make prudent concessions; they double down, disperse assets, and rally nationalist sentiment. The Islamic Republic, whatever its many failures, has thirty years of experience doing exactly that. Strikes on port facilities and energy infrastructure, while militarily significant, do not obviously translate into leverage over a government that has made martyrdom a founding mythology.
The “finish off” construction Trump deployed is worth examining closely. It could mean many things — regime change, destruction of nuclear programme, permanent occupation — but it almost certainly means none of them in a precise operational sense. Signalling that one might do everything is often indistinguishable from having no coherent plan. Strategically, it puts Tehran in the position of having to prepare for the worst-case scenario even if that scenario is not actually intended, which forecloses the kinds of face-saving off-ramps that historically allow adversaries to stand down without domestic humiliation.
There is a more sober right-of-centre case for limited, targeted action against Iranian capabilities — one grounded in Bismarckian realism rather than Wilsonian transformation. That case accepts Iran’s government as a fact for the foreseeable future, seeks to constrain its nuclear programme through negotiation backed by credible force, and defines success as deterrence rather than regime change. The problem is that “finish off” language is not that case. It risks crossing the threshold where Iran’s calculations shift from “how do we manage this pressure?” to “how do we survive this at any cost?” — and in that territory, the Gulf allies who have been helpful, the oil markets that are already strained by this conflict, and the American public’s appetite for yet another Middle Eastern war all face serious tests.
What to watch
Watch whether Gulf states — Saudi Arabia, the UAE — begin signalling discomfort with the trajectory privately even while maintaining public alignment with Washington. Their oil infrastructure is the most exposed asset in a wider conflict. Watch also Iran’s next move: a strike on Gulf energy infrastructure would be a qualitative escalation that forces regional actors off the fence. The nomination process for Todd Blanche as Attorney General and its outcome in the Senate will matter for how much independent institutional check on executive war-making authority survives this administration. And watch the oil price: heating oil compensation schemes already being discussed in Britain suggest downstream consumer effects that have political lives of their own.
— J