A new Pew Research Center survey has found that more people around the world now favour China over the United States, with global confidence in Xi Jinping outpacing confidence in Donald Trump in the same polling. The shift is driven, Pew analysts noted, by a combination of improved perceptions of China and declining views of the United States — NPR summarised the dynamic as “improved perceptions of China and declining views of the US”. The survey’s geographic breadth is significant: the trend appears in regions — Africa, Latin America, parts of Southeast Asia — where American influence has historically been considered durable. The findings arrive as the US is conducting active military strikes on Iran, has imposed sweeping tariffs on most major trading partners, and is in the middle of a presidential administration that has made explicit its scepticism of the multilateral institutions the US itself built after 1945.
The received wisdom
The liberal internationalist response to polls like this is predictable and not entirely wrong: American soft power built on democratic values, the rule of law, and multilateral institutions is being squandered by an administration that dismisses alliance obligations, imposes tariffs arbitrarily, attacks domestic institutions, and flirts with authoritarian aesthetics. Other countries are noticing. The solution, on this reading, is to return to the internationalist consensus — rebuild NATO commitments, re-enter multilateral frameworks, restore dignity to the State Department — and the polling numbers will recover. America’s underlying advantages: a dynamic economy, world-class universities, a free press, the dollar’s reserve status, a network of alliances — remain intact. This is a reputational problem, not a structural one.
There is genuine force to this. American soft power was not inevitable; it was constructed over decades of careful institution-building, and it can be reconstructed if the political will exists.
A different read
The difficulty is that the liberal internationalist diagnosis, while not wrong about the damage, is too comfortable about the cure. It assumes a default position to which America can return. But soft power is not a reservoir that refills automatically when the tap is turned back on — it is a relationship that takes generations to build and can be disrupted by shorter cycles of unreliability.
The more structurally significant finding in the Pew data is the regional distribution. In Africa and Southeast Asia, preferences are shifting not because Xi Jinping is personally admired but because China has shown up: with infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative, with vaccine supply chains during COVID without conditionality, with diplomatic engagement that does not involve lectures about governance. One can hold a clear-eyed view of the BRI’s debt-trap dynamics and still acknowledge that “China builds roads; America gives speeches about democracy” is the operational reality in too many countries. American foreign aid and development finance — the concrete tools that translate values into relationships — have been cut or constrained by exactly the fiscal austerity arguments that conservatives have been making for thirty years. The result is a soft-power vacuum that China has partially filled.
The irony is that this is not primarily a story about China’s appeal. Chinese domestic governance is deeply unattractive to people in most of the surveyed countries who care about personal freedom, religious expression, or political pluralism. The Pew data reflects something more corrosive: indifference and disappointment. Countries that once looked to Washington as a stabilising reference point have stopped trusting the consistency of American commitments. The tariff whiplash, the alliance rhetoric, the spectacle of domestic institutional warfare — these do not inspire confidence in a power that wants others to hitch their wagons to its system.
A serious right-of-centre response to this would argue that genuine realism — defining American interests clearly, maintaining credible alliances, investing in development finance as a strategic tool, not as charity — is exactly what the current administration claims but does not practice. Tariffs as leverage without a coherent trading architecture; strikes on Iran without a theory of political resolution; NATO scepticism without an alternative security architecture — these are not realism. They are improvisation dressed up in realist language.
The historical parallel worth invoking is British soft power in the early twentieth century: structurally dominant, long assumed to be self-sustaining, and then eroded with surprising speed when the underlying economic and military foundations shifted. The process took decades, not years, but it was not reversible once it reached a certain threshold. The Pew survey should be read as an early-warning signal, not a crisis — but early warnings that go unheeded have a way of becoming crises on someone else’s watch.
What to watch
Watch whether the next US aid budget sustains or deepens the cuts to development finance and State Department capacity — the concrete infrastructure of soft power. Watch how multilateral institutions like the IMF and World Bank respond to pressure from both the US and China to align with their respective positions. Watch the trajectory in African Union diplomacy, where China has been steadily more present. And watch whether Trump’s primetime address Thursday — described by Al Jazeera as concerning voting restrictions and 2020 revisionism — produces the kind of domestic institutional spectacle that further accelerates the international perception of American democratic fragility.
— J