A senior Moroccan intelligence official has revealed the widespread use of NSO Group’s Pegasus hacking software within the country’s security apparatus, in an account that represents one of the most detailed insider confirmations yet of how commercial surveillance technology has been deployed against political opponents, journalists, and civil society figures. The disclosure comes several years after Citizen Lab and Amnesty International first documented apparent Pegasus infections on Moroccan targets, and after NSO Group faced significant legal and regulatory pressure in the United States, including sanctions and litigation from Apple and WhatsApp. Morocco has consistently denied using Pegasus against domestic targets. The insider’s account, which includes specific operational details, suggests that the denials were false and that the deployment was systematic rather than incidental.
The received wisdom
The human rights framing is clear: Pegasus represents an existential threat to civil society in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian contexts. When a government can silently compromise the phones of lawyers, journalists, and opposition politicians — accessing encrypted messages, activating cameras and microphones, exfiltrating contacts — the practical space for dissent collapses. This is the argument made by Amnesty, Citizen Lab, and a broad coalition of digital rights organisations, and it is substantially correct. The Morocco revelations are one more data point in a pattern documented across at least forty-five countries: Saudi Arabia (in connection with the Jamal Khashoggi killing), India, the UAE, Rwanda, Azerbaijan, Hungary, and Mexico, among others. The common thread is that commercial surveillance technology has lowered the barrier to mass targeted surveillance to the point where mid-level authoritarian states can afford capabilities once exclusive to the NSA or GCHQ.
The European Parliament’s PEGA committee spent the better part of 2022 documenting the use of Pegasus against EU member state politicians and concluded that the situation represented a systemic threat to European democracy. The findings were largely shelved.
A different read
The standard framing is correct about the scale of the problem but unhelpfully vague about what to do, and it tends to ignore the harder version of the question: why have governance frameworks consistently failed to keep pace?
The answer is partly about the structural incentives of the surveillance technology market. NSO Group is an Israeli company, and its operations have benefited from the fact that Israel — for understandable reasons — treats intelligence and cyber technology as instruments of strategic diplomacy. Sales of Pegasus have, in at least some cases, reportedly facilitated Israeli-Arab normalisation diplomacy: the technology was offered as part of a package that included diplomatic recognition and security cooperation. That is not a niche observation; it is the stated finding of multiple investigative journalists and policy researchers. When surveillance technology is bundled with geopolitical deliverables, the pressure on governments to regulate it becomes politically costly in ways that pure human rights advocacy does not fully account for.
The legal architecture is also weak. The Wassenaar Arrangement, the multilateral export control regime that governs dual-use technologies, has been consistently slow to adapt to commercial surveillance software. The EU has tightened its export control rules for cyber-surveillance tools, but enforcement is patchwork and the extraterritorial reach is limited. The US has listed NSO Group on its Entity List, but the company has restructured, and the underlying technology continues to be developed and sold through successor arrangements. Whack-a-mole regulation does not work when the technology is modular and the vendors are agile.
There is also a domestic political economy problem on the receiving end. Morocco is a significant Western security partner in North Africa — a hub for counterterrorism cooperation, a transit point for migration management, and a relatively stable state in a volatile region. Western governments that know about Pegasus deployments in Morocco face a choice: press the issue and risk the relationship, or look away. The consistent revealed preference has been to look away. This is not unique to Morocco; it is the standard response to surveillance abuses by security partners.
The uncomfortable implication is that the problem is not primarily technical — it is political. Pegasus is not a rogue technology that escaped its creators’ control. It was sold with full knowledge of where it was going and how it would be used, on terms negotiated between governments and mediated by strategic interests. Until Western democracies are willing to make concrete costs attach to surveillance abuses by allies — rather than delivering démarches and publishing reports — the insider testimony and the leaked phone logs will continue to accumulate without consequence.
What to watch
- NSO Group successor entities: Watch for whether restructured versions of NSO or its technology continue to reach the same markets through new corporate vehicles. The technology does not disappear when the company is sanctioned.
- EU enforcement: The European Commission has committed to stricter export controls for cyber-surveillance tools. Whether member states actually enforce those controls, particularly vis-à-vis allies, will be the test.
- Moroccan political response: The insider has taken a significant personal risk. Whether the Moroccan government pursues prosecution or harrassment will indicate how confident it is in its deniability.
- Apple and WhatsApp litigation: The US legal cases against NSO Group remain ongoing. Discovery in those proceedings has produced some of the best-documented evidence of Pegasus deployments; further rulings may surface additional information.
— J