The European Union has proposed slowing down the pace of mandatory carbon emission cuts for businesses under its flagship Emissions Trading System, according to reporting published this week. Separately, Europe’s most effective tool for cutting greenhouse gas emissions faces the risk of being significantly weakened, according to environmental economists and policy analysts who have tracked the ETS since its establishment in 2005. The proposals, which have not yet been formally tabled, have drawn immediate criticism from green groups who argue that Europe is retreating from its climate commitments at exactly the moment when the science demands acceleration. Brussels insists the changes are temporary adjustments to prevent industrial flight rather than a fundamental rethinking of climate ambition. The timing is awkward: the EU is simultaneously trying to position itself as the global standard-setter for climate regulation in the face of American withdrawal.
The received wisdom
The environmentalist critique is stark: the EU ETS is, by most measurements, the world’s most developed carbon market and the primary instrument through which Europe has achieved its post-Kyoto emissions reductions. Weakening it now — when carbon prices have already been volatile and when European industry is lobbying furiously for relief — would betray the system’s integrity, undermine investor confidence in the long-term policy signal, and hand a propaganda victory to every government that has used “European deindustrialisation” as an argument against ambitious climate targets at home. The argument from mainstream climate economics is that the ETS has worked precisely because it has been credible: business investment in low-carbon technology responds to the expectation of a sustained carbon price, and that expectation requires policy consistency.
There is also a geopolitical framing: with the US under Trump having withdrawn from Paris and dismantled domestic climate regulation, Europe weakening its own instruments would leave the global stage entirely empty.
A different read
The environmentalist position contains a real insight but elides the political economy of why this is happening.
The EU ETS has not, in practice, functioned as smoothly as its architects hoped. Carbon prices have been subject to dramatic volatility — collapsing to near-zero during the 2008-09 financial crisis, languishing for years at prices too low to drive investment, before finally rising to levels that have materially affected European industrial competitiveness only in the last several years. The system has been repeatedly modified through political intervention — free allowances for industrial sectors, market stability reserves, and various exemptions negotiated at member-state level — because the pure market logic runs into the reality that European voters will not accept their energy-intensive industries relocating to jurisdictions with no carbon price.
This is not a trivial concern. The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the EU’s attempt to prevent carbon leakage by imposing import levies on carbon-intensive goods, has been bitterly contested by trading partners and faces significant implementation challenges. If the CBAM does not function as expected, then raising domestic carbon prices without equivalent competitive pressure on imports genuinely does risk accelerating industrial relocation — not to other European countries, but to Asia and the Americas. The hollowing-out of European steel, chemicals, and cement manufacturing would reduce European emissions while increasing global ones, a net zero for the planet but a net loss for European workers.
The broader lesson is about the limits of technocratic price mechanisms when deployed in a world of geopolitical fragmentation. The ETS was designed in an era when globalisation was assumed to be broadly beneficial and durable, and when the EU could plausibly imagine that a sufficiently ambitious carbon price would eventually be matched by global competitors. Neither assumption holds in 2026. China has a nominal national ETS but at carbon prices far below Europe’s. The United States has effectively abandoned federal climate pricing. In that environment, the EU faces a genuine dilemma: maintain price integrity and accept industrial flight, or compromise price integrity and maintain the industrial base. There is no clever technocratic solution that dissolves this trade-off.
The right-of-centre case is not that climate change is imaginary or that carbon pricing is inherently misguided — it is that grand top-down pricing schemes impose concentrated costs on specific industries and regions, and that political systems respond to concentrated costs by seeking relief. The EU ETS has been a useful laboratory, but its struggles should inform humility about the limits of market-based climate policy when the market in question is bounded by political jurisdictions but the externality is not.
What to watch
- ETS price response: If the proposed slowdown is formalised, watch how carbon futures prices respond. A significant price drop would indicate that market participants see the policy change as material.
- Industrial lobbying: European steel, cement, and chemicals sectors have been the loudest advocates for ETS relief. Their reaction to whatever is eventually proposed will indicate whether Brussels has offered enough.
- CBAM implementation: The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism is the structural answer to leakage concerns. Its actual functioning — particularly whether it survives WTO challenge — determines whether weakening the ETS is rational self-protection or simple capitulation.
- German political cycle: Germany’s position is decisive. With the coalition government facing its own internal tensions over industrial policy and fiscal discipline, Berlin’s stance will shape what Brussels can actually agree.
— J