Cuba is edging toward breakdown according to reporting from the Guardian, with prolonged power cuts affecting daily life across the island and a deepening economic dysfunction that has accelerated emigration — particularly among the young and skilled — to historically high levels. The report describes a society under simultaneous pressure from structural economic failure inherited from the command economy, the effects of tightened US sanctions under multiple administrations, and a governing Communist Party that has lost the ideological legitimacy it could once claim among even its domestic supporters. Separately, Cuban dissident artist Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara was cleared to travel to the United States — a small but notable signal of continued civil society resistance within Cuba and engagement from outside it. The Indian hunger striker forcibly hospitalised after 20 days of fasting — a separate story of state response to individual resistance — provides an inadvertent parallel worth noting: states under pressure have a persistent tendency to medicalise political dissent.
The received wisdom
The standard progressive framing of Cuba’s crisis blames the US embargo above all else. Sixty-plus years of economic sanctions, trade restrictions, and periodic efforts at regime change have, on this view, prevented Cuba from developing the economic relationships and access to capital markets that would have allowed the Revolution’s genuine social achievements — in healthcare, literacy, and social equality — to be sustained without Soviet-era subsidies. American policy has been not merely ineffective but actively responsible for civilian suffering, and the ongoing sanctions constitute a form of collective punishment of ordinary Cubans for a political choice their government made before most of them were born.
This is not a frivolous argument. The embargo has real costs, and US policy toward Cuba has at various points included genuinely counterproductive measures — including support for exile groups that discredited themselves through violence and dishonesty. The Obama-era opening of 2015-16 produced measurable improvements in the economic situation before being reversed. There is a serious case that normalisation would serve American interests as well as Cuban civilian welfare.
A different read
The embargo-first explanation, while containing truth, has always functioned partly as a deflection from the structural problems of the Cuban economic model itself. Venezuela, a country subject to far less sustained international pressure and with vast oil revenues, underwent a similar trajectory of socialist economic collapse — hyperinflation, emigration wave, infrastructure failure — in a period when oil prices were often high. Nicaragua under the Ortega-Murillo government, Bolivia under extended MAS rule: the pattern of Latin American socialist economies encountering structural ceiling effects is not primarily explained by American interference, even when American interference is real and documented.
The power cuts in Cuba are not a mystery. Cuba’s electrical grid depends on aging Soviet-era infrastructure, imported fuel, and a maintenance system that has been progressively underfunded as the economy has deteriorated. The deterioration has multiple causes — sanctions reduce fuel access, yes, but the fundamental inefficiency of a state-monopoly energy sector that cannot attract investment, adopt modern pricing mechanisms, or respond to distributed energy opportunities is an own-goal. Vietnam, another single-party communist state, made the decision in the 1990s to open its economy to foreign investment while retaining political control. Cuba’s leadership has consistently refused variants of that bargain. The consequences are visible in the dark.
The emigration dimension is the most revealing. Cuba is experiencing one of the largest per-capita emigration waves in its history — including from groups that were previously the Revolution’s most loyal supporters: medical professionals, teachers, skilled workers. When a society loses its educated middle class at this rate, the loss is not merely economic. The social capital that sustains institutions — the informal networks of competence, civic trust, and professional norms — dissolves. Rebuilding it takes a generation even under favourable conditions. Cuba is not currently experiencing favourable conditions.
The US policy dilemma is genuine. Maintaining sanctions preserves the political position of Cuban-American hardliners in Florida — a constituency with disproportionate electoral weight in a swing state — while doing little to change the Cuban government’s behaviour and real costs to ordinary Cubans. But removing sanctions without conditions would constitute a gift to a government that has jailed poets, forcibly hospitalised hunger strikers, and shot protesters in the street. The Obama framework — conditional engagement, gradual normalisation in exchange for reciprocal opening — was never given long enough to test whether it could produce genuine political liberalisation or merely economic stabilisation with continued repression. That question remains unanswered.
What is clear is that Cuba’s current trajectory ends badly. The emigration of skilled workers, the infrastructure decay, the loss of ideological legitimacy — these are the conditions that produce either managed transition or chaotic collapse. The historical precedent of Eastern Europe’s 1989 transitions — abrupt, largely peaceful, and often driven by the hollowing out of ideological commitment rather than external pressure — suggests that change, when it comes, may come faster than observers expect. American policy should be designed for that contingency, rather than for the assumption of permanent stasis.
What to watch
- Emigration rates: The scale of Cuban emigration is the clearest real-time indicator of the regime’s domestic condition. Border crossing data and remittance flows from the Cuban diaspora are the proxies to watch.
- Power infrastructure: Whether Cuba can restore reliable electricity supply through the hurricane season will determine whether the current crisis is manageable or tips into acute humanitarian emergency.
- Otero Alcántara’s trajectory: His permitted travel to the US — unusual given his history of house arrest and imprisonment — may signal a limited tactical opening by the Cuban government, or may simply reflect diminished state capacity to enforce previous restrictions. His public statements will be closely watched.
- Burnham’s Cuba policy: The new UK government, with fewer domestic constraints than Washington on Cuba policy, has the opportunity to take a different approach to engagement. Whether Burnham’s foreign policy instincts extend to supporting civil society in Cuba — as distinct from supporting the Communist government — will be an early indicator of his administration’s values priorities.
— J