Israeli forces carried out airstrikes on at least two residential neighbourhoods in Gaza City on Saturday, July 18, killing at least eight Palestinians according to medical sources. Al Jazeera reported that a warplane destroyed an apartment in the al-Nasr district, killing five people, while artillery fire struck the al-Zeitoun district, killing three. Israeli media reported this week that the military now controls close to 70 percent of Gaza, well beyond the roughly half it was expected to hold under the US-brokered ceasefire agreement reached in October 2025. According to Gaza’s Health Ministry, at least 1,127 Palestinians have been killed since the ceasefire began, including at least 260 children. Five Israeli soldiers have been killed in the same period. At least 73,000 Palestinians have been killed since the war began in October 2023. The latest strikes came as Israel pushed beyond the so-called “Yellow Line” — the de facto buffer zone its forces were meant to hold under the ceasefire terms.
The received wisdom
The mainstream framing of the Gaza ceasefire situation is one of profound frustration: an agreement exists, American diplomatic capital was spent securing it, and Israel is simply ignoring it. The ceasefire was supposed to pave the way for reconstruction and political transition; instead, the death toll has continued to climb, civilian infrastructure has been degraded further, and the territory is being fragmented into disconnected enclaves that make anything resembling normal life impossible. From this perspective, the United States bears particular responsibility for the outcome — it brokered the deal, it provides Israel with military aid and diplomatic cover, and its failure to enforce its own agreement’s terms has made Washington complicit in what critics describe as a slow-motion annexation. European governments, meanwhile, are seen as too timid to apply meaningful pressure: a point underscored by Belgium’s separate decision to ban imports from Israeli settlements, a symbolic measure that drew attention to how little material consequence the broader international community has imposed.
A different read
The frustration is warranted, but the analysis that flows from it — that more assertive American pressure would produce a different outcome — rests on an optimistic theory of leverage that the past thirty years of Middle East diplomacy consistently fails to support.
Consider what the ceasefire actually was. It was reached in October 2025 as part of what Al Jazeera described as “a broader plan put forward by President Donald Trump to end the war and begin rebuilding.” That framing already contains the difficulty: the Trump administration, whatever its other foreign policy instincts, has consistently been more solicitous of Israeli security concerns than any recent American government. A ceasefire negotiated under Trump’s auspices was never going to come with the kind of enforcement mechanisms — credible arms-supply conditionality, formal international monitoring with investigative authority — that might have constrained Israeli military action. It was a framework that managed the optics of ongoing hostilities, not an agreement that actually stopped them.
The 70-percent control figure is striking. An Israeli military presence covering 70 percent of Gaza “well beyond” what was agreed is not a minor deviation from ceasefire terms — it is a structural transformation of the territory’s situation, one that is “shrinking” and “fragmenting” Gaza into smaller disconnected areas in which, as Al Jazeera’s correspondent reported, movement between areas is “very difficult.” The practical consequence is the progressive elimination of the conditions for any future Palestinian political entity with territorial coherence. Whether that is an intended outcome or an emergent one from military logic is a question the evidence cannot fully resolve — but the effect is the same either way.
The historical parallel that haunts this situation is the Oslo process in its final decade: an agreement formally intact, negotiations periodically relaunched, settlement construction continuing regardless, and the two-state solution’s physical prerequisites gradually extinguished. The lesson Oslo offers is not that diplomacy failed because the wrong people were in office. It is that agreements which lack enforcement mechanisms and that one party has structural incentives to defect from will eventually be defected from. The current ceasefire has both of those features.
What complicates a straightforward condemnation of Israel’s conduct is the genuine security problem that Gaza’s governance poses. Hamas has not been dissolved. Its capacity to plan and execute attacks — however degraded — has not been eliminated. The Israeli government’s stated objective, the destruction of Hamas as a governing and military force, has not been achieved; and the population of southern Israel, which experienced October 7, 2023, has not consented to accepting a reconstituted armed force on its border as the price of diplomatic normalcy. These are not imaginary concerns invented by the Israeli government’s communications apparatus. They are real political facts about what Israeli voters and affected communities have demanded of their government. The difficulty is that the military operations conducted in their name have produced outcomes — 73,000 dead, a society in ruins — that reasonable people across the political spectrum should find morally unacceptable, whatever the legal and strategic arguments about proportionality.
What to watch
Watch whether the Israeli government moves formally to announce new settlements in Gaza, a step that would represent a legal and diplomatic rupture with even the symbolic terms of the ceasefire framework. Watch whether the Trump administration publicly responds to the Yellow Line violations, or continues to treat the ceasefire as nominally intact regardless of what happens on the ground. Watch whether any Gulf state — which has economic normalisation agreements with Israel at stake — applies private pressure that produces any behavioural change. And watch what incoming UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham does in the face of the thousands who rallied in London demanding he take action on Gaza — one of his first and most consequential foreign policy tests.
— J