Israeli cabinet ministers and parliamentarians joined a march toward Gaza on Sunday to demand the rebuilding of Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territory, defying a military order that restricted the route at the last minute amid concerns that participants might cross the fence. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, and more than two dozen other ministers and legislators participated, according to Israeli media. The march was organised by Nachala, a settler group led by Daniella Weiss, under the banner “returning home after 21 years,” referencing the three Gaza settlements — Elei Sinai, Dugit, and Nisanit — evacuated when Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005. Nachala claimed more than 10,000 attended; Israeli media estimates put the number at a few hundred. Some marchers bypassed military checkpoints through nearby hillsides to reach the Gaza border fence; Al Jazeera’s verification unit confirmed video showing dozens gathered at the fence. Likud, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s own party, was listed among the rally’s official sponsors — despite Netanyahu’s repeated insistence that Gaza will not be resettled.
The received wisdom
The liberal and left-progressive framing of this march is unambiguous: it represents the mainstreaming of a movement that was, not long ago, confined to the settler fringe. Smotrich and Ben-Gvir are not backbench firebrands but serving cabinet ministers, and their presence at an event explicitly demanding the annexation and resettlement of Gaza — territory that is under Israeli military control but has not been formally annexed — signals a dangerous drift toward the kind of maximalist territorial claim that international law prohibits and that would make any future political settlement impossible. The invocation of “returning home” is particularly charged given the ongoing conflict and the displacement of Gaza’s Palestinian population. The fact that even the Israeli army created a restricted military zone to prevent participants from crossing the border suggests official discomfort with where some marchers intended to go. International observers are watching Israel’s domestic politics with mounting alarm.
A different read
The standard international framing — outrage, alarm, condemnation — has been the consistent response to Israeli settlement politics for forty years, and it has consistently failed to alter the trajectory. The settlement enterprise has expanded through Labour and Likud governments alike, through periods of international goodwill and periods of intense pressure, through Oslo and after Oslo’s collapse. The useful analytical question is not whether the march is alarming — it is — but why this political tendency keeps winning inside Israel’s democratic system, and what that tells us about where Israeli politics is actually going.
The answer begins with the gap between Netanyahu’s stated position and the company he keeps. Likud’s sponsorship of a rally whose explicit goal is the resettlement of Gaza, alongside a Prime Minister who says Gaza will not be resettled, is not a contradiction Netanyahu finds intolerable. It is, rather, the central mechanism of his political survival: tolerate and legitimise the maximalist right in order to maintain coalition discipline, while making rhetorical concessions to international audiences that carry no operational weight. This is not uniquely Israeli; it is the logic of coalition politics under proportional representation systems where veto players hold disproportionate leverage. But in a conflict context, the gap between the PM’s stated position and his coalition’s operational agenda has real-world consequences.
The march also illustrates how the Gaza conflict has reconfigured the Israeli political centre of gravity. The demand to rebuild settlements in Gaza was genuinely marginal before 2023; it has become, in the three years since, a position endorsed by serving cabinet ministers, backed by Likud’s party apparatus, and attracting mass public support. This is a transformation in Israeli political culture, not merely a shift among existing far-right factions. The security traumas of October 2023 produced a political environment in which territorial maximalism carries new emotional resonance with mainstream Israeli voters who previously had little interest in Gaza settlements.
What the international community finds most uncomfortable to acknowledge is that this shift is occurring within a functioning democracy. Ben-Gvir and Smotrich are not illegitimately empowered — they are there because Israeli voters put them there, in a context shaped by genuine and acute security trauma. The habit of treating Israeli domestic politics as though it can be externally corrected by sanctions, condemnation, or diplomatic isolation ignores the democratic legitimacy of these outcomes even while correctly identifying their legal and strategic problems. The harder work is engaging with the actual psychology and political economy that has produced this shift — which requires taking Israeli security concerns seriously rather than dismissing them as pretexts.
The strategic question is what resettlement would actually require. Smotrich’s call to not miss a “historic opportunity” assumes that Palestinian presence in Gaza is malleable in ways that military force has consistently failed to demonstrate over decades of conflict. Gaza’s population is among the densest on earth; the idea that a few hundred settlers marching to the border fence represents the beginning of a viable settlement enterprise tests credulity. But political movements do not need to be viable in order to reshape political reality: they need only be sufficiently well-organised to prevent alternatives from being pursued. That is precisely what this movement is doing.
What to watch
- Whether Netanyahu formally distances Likud from the march’s goals — his silence thus far is the most meaningful signal.
- Whether the European states that have sanctioned Smotrich and Ben-Gvir take any additional steps in response to their participation, or whether sanctions remain a symbolic instrument without escalatory capacity.
- Whether the Israeli military’s creation of a closed military zone signals that the security establishment is beginning to view the settler movement’s Gaza ambitions as an operational liability, not merely a political complication.
- Whether any formal annexation legislation is introduced in the Knesset — introduction alone, even if defeated, would mark a new threshold in the normalisation of the resettlement agenda.
— J