Yemen’s Houthi movement announced a “maritime embargo” against Saudi Arabia on Monday, with its military spokesman Yahya Sarea declaring it would take effect immediately as retaliation for a Saudi blockade of ports and airports in Houthi-controlled north-western Yemen, according to BBC News. A Houthi media official specified that the group was closing the Bab al-Mandab Strait — the 32-kilometre-wide waterway at the southern end of the Red Sea, connecting the Gulf of Aden to Suez — to Saudi vessels. Saudi Arabia’s foreign ministry condemned what it called a false allegation and pledged to take “all necessary measures to protect its ships in accordance with international law.” The announcement followed a week of renewed Houthi-Saudi escalation: the Houthis had launched missiles at Abha airport in south-western Saudi Arabia after strikes on Sanaa’s airport that they blamed on the kingdom, which were in turn claimed by the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. The timing is acute. The Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf has been effectively closed by the US-Iran conflict, forcing Saudi Arabia to reroute the vast majority of its crude exports through the Red Sea port of Yanbu. According to data from Kpler and Signal Ocean cited by BBC, roughly 4 million barrels per day have been shipped from Yanbu in recent weeks — compared with about 973,000 bpd a year earlier. Total petroleum volumes through Bab al-Mandab rose to 7.4 million barrels per day in June, roughly 7 percent of global output.
The received wisdom
The liberal-humanitarian reading of the Houthi embargo will emphasise, with good reason, the underlying causes. Yemen has been devastated by a civil war that began in 2014, escalated into a Saudi-led military campaign in 2015, and has produced more than 150,000 dead and over 22 million people in need of humanitarian assistance, according to UN estimates cited by BBC. The Houthis’ grievance — that Saudi Arabia has imposed a comprehensive blockade on Houthi-controlled Yemen by land, sea and air — is not invented. Aid organisations have documented the severe restrictions on fuel, food and medicine entering Hodeidah port and other Houthi-controlled entry points throughout the conflict. If the Houthis are framing their maritime embargo as “an eye for an eye,” there is a factual basis to the grievance that cannot simply be dismissed. The argument that the Houthis are Iranian proxies acting on Tehran’s behalf — true as far as it goes — does not exhaust the analysis of why significant parts of the Yemeni population have given them support and why the Saudi-led intervention, for all its military superiority, failed to dislodge them in a decade of fighting.
A different read
Grant the humanitarian argument its full weight, and then step back to look at what is actually happening in global energy markets.
The Strait of Hormuz, which normally carries about 20 percent of the world’s oil and 25 percent of its liquefied natural gas, has been effectively closed since the resumption of US-Iran hostilities this month. Brent crude has climbed to approximately $90.92 a barrel, according to Guardian reporting, and US retail gasoline is now just over $4 a gallon — almost a dollar more than a year earlier. Saudi Arabia responded to the Hormuz closure by executing precisely the contingency plan it has spent billions developing: redirecting crude through its trans-Arabian Yanbu pipeline to the Red Sea and shipping from there. That redirect has been, to a remarkable degree, working. Four million barrels per day through Yanbu in recent weeks, versus under a million a year ago, is a genuine logistical achievement.
A Houthi maritime embargo that closes Bab al-Mandab to Saudi shipping does not merely threaten Saudi export revenues. It threatens to complete the encirclement of Arabian Peninsula energy exports by simultaneously blocking both maritime exits: Hormuz to the east, and now Bab al-Mandab to the west. The Red Sea has been the last functioning major exit for Gulf hydrocarbon exports. If the Houthis can credibly interdict Saudi tankers at Bab al-Mandab — and their previous Red Sea campaign beginning in October 2023 demonstrated that their missile and drone capabilities were sufficient to force most commercial insurers to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope — the price spike from Hormuz could be amplified by a factor that energy analysts have, thus far, not fully incorporated into their models.
The precedent of the 2023-2024 Houthi Red Sea campaign is instructive. The Houthis sank four ships, killed nine crew members, and forced commercial traffic through Bab al-Mandab to record lows within months of beginning operations. The US and UK responded with airstrikes on Houthi military facilities in Yemen, and a multinational naval taskforce — Operation Prosperity Guardian — attempted to provide convoy escorts. None of it stopped the Houthis. Their willingness to absorb military punishment in exchange for strategic disruption was, and remains, the central challenge that no Western counter-response has solved.
What is different this time is the Iranian connection. Iran, which has coordinated Houthi operations throughout the broader regional conflict, now has a direct interest in Bab al-Mandab — both as a pressure point on Saudi Arabia, which Riyadh perceives as at least a passive participant in the anti-Iran coalition, and as a demonstration that the costs of the US-Iran war extend well beyond the Strait of Hormuz. Mohammed Albasha of the Basha Report risk advisory firm told Reuters that even without direct attacks, the announcement alone would disrupt shipping and create uncertainty for Saudi ports.
What to watch
- Whether Houthi forces actually move from announcement to action — attacking or boarding Saudi-flagged or Saudi-bound vessels. The gap between rhetoric and operational reality has existed before.
- Insurance market response: if war-risk premiums on Red Sea voyages spike as they did in late 2023, commercial rerouting will resume around the Cape, adding roughly two weeks and significant cost to European energy deliveries.
- Saudi Arabia’s response: Riyadh has its own air force and a history of striking Houthi infrastructure. Whether it escalates or seeks de-escalation will shape the next phase.
- Oil price trajectory: if Bab al-Mandab effectively closes to Saudi crude at the same time as Hormuz remains restricted, the combination would represent the most severe energy supply disruption since the 1973 Arab oil embargo.
— J