Lebanon's army enters the south, carefully

Lebanese army engineering units entered the village of Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh in Nabatieh district on Tuesday morning, beginning the first deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) into southern territory under a US-brokered agreement signed at the end of June, according to BBC reporting. The deployment is described as a “pilot zone” operation under the Trilateral Framework agreed by Israel, Lebanon and the United States, which links Israeli military withdrawal from occupied southern Lebanon to the disarmament of Hezbollah and the extension of Lebanese government control. Hours later, Israeli forces fired warning shots after some Lebanese units apparently crossed approximately 150 metres into Israel’s declared “security zone” — a 10-kilometre-deep strip of occupied Lebanese territory that the Israel Defense Forces say they will hold until Hezbollah is fully disarmed. No casualties were reported. The deployment came as Lebanese President Joseph Aoun met US President Donald Trump at the White House — the first visit by a Lebanese head of state in nearly 17 years — where Aoun requested political support and direct aid to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Trump expressed what he called “concrete plans” to help Lebanon disarm Hezbollah, without providing details, and said he would speak directly with Hezbollah representatives if Aoun requested it. More than 4,300 people have been killed in Lebanon during the conflict, including nearly 800 children, women and medics, the Lebanese health ministry reported. Israel puts its own losses at 37 soldiers and four civilians.

The received wisdom

The mainstream framing of Tuesday’s events is cautiously optimistic, and with some justification. The Lebanese army has historically been one of the few institutions capable of commanding cross-sectarian respect in a country whose political system is built on managed fragmentation. Its deployment to the south — however tentative, however limited to a single pilot village — represents the first concrete movement toward filling the security vacuum that has existed since Hezbollah built its state-within-a-state there over four decades. The Trilateral Framework, whatever its imperfections, is a US-brokered agreement that has produced tangible, observable action. Aoun’s White House visit is symbolically important: Lebanon has not had a president for nearly three years and has now, within a short time, installed a head of state, secured a framework agreement with its most powerful adversary, and begun deploying its army in areas previously under Hezbollah’s exclusive control. Trump’s offer to speak with Hezbollah representatives, meanwhile, suggests the administration understands that the disarmament goal requires political engagement, not merely military pressure. The optimistic reading concludes that this is a process, that processes are messy, and that the warning shots should not obscure the fundamental fact that Lebanese soldiers are now in Zawtar al-Gharbiyeh.

A different read

The warning shots matter. Not because they caused casualties — they did not — but because of what they reveal about the operational reality underneath the diplomatic architecture.

The Trilateral Framework is, at its core, an agreement about sequencing: Israel withdraws from the security zone in exchange for Lebanese army deployment and Hezbollah disarmament. The problem is that all three elements are supposed to happen simultaneously, and none of the parties has any reason to move first. Israel has said it will remain in the security zone — which it has now largely demolished, with human rights groups documenting what they describe as systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure — until Hezbollah is fully disarmed. Hezbollah has rejected the framework entirely, saying its provisions linking Israeli withdrawal to the group’s disarmament cross “all red lines.” The Lebanese army, for its part, cannot disarm Hezbollah — it has neither the force nor the political authority to do so, and any attempt would risk a civil conflict that the LAF is institutionally designed to avoid.

This is the structural trap at the heart of the agreement. The United States has constructed a framework that asks Lebanon to deliver something it cannot deliver — the disarmament of a militia that is simultaneously a political party, a welfare state, a social movement and an Iranian proxy — as a precondition for Israel doing something Israel is reluctant to do anyway. The historical precedent is not encouraging. UN Security Council Resolution 1701, passed after the 2006 war, also called for Hezbollah disarmament south of the Litani River, also created a UNIFIL monitoring presence, and also produced initial Lebanese army deployments that eventually stalled. Twenty years later, Hezbollah had more weapons, more territory and more political power than before. The pilot zone deployment is a first step, but a first step into a structure that has failed before.

Trump’s offer to speak with Hezbollah is interesting precisely because it departs from the traditional American position that Hezbollah is a terrorist organisation with which no administration negotiates. It suggests that Washington understands, at some level, that the disarmament-before-withdrawal sequencing cannot be achieved without engaging the armed group directly. Whether that represents sophisticated diplomacy or mere improvisation is an open question.

The Lebanese state deserves credit for what it has achieved since the war effectively cleared the battlefield and created an opening that did not exist before. Aoun is a credible figure. The army has performed well in the limited roles it has been given. But the framework it has been handed contains within it the seeds of the same failure that has attended every previous attempt to normalise southern Lebanon — the expectation that Lebanon will solve a problem that is, in its deepest roots, a problem of Iranian regional strategy that no Lebanese actor alone can resolve.

What to watch

  • Whether the pilot zone deployment expands to the other two villages — Froun and Srifa — where US officials say operations have already begun, and whether Israeli warning shots continue.
  • Hezbollah’s response: the group has so far condemned the framework but not directly attacked Lebanese army units. If that restraint holds, the pilot zone may be sustainable. If it breaks, the entire framework collapses.
  • Whether Trump’s offer to engage Hezbollah is formalised into actual negotiations, and what the Lebanese government’s position on such talks would be.
  • The pace and terms of any US military and financial assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces — the LAF’s capacity to project authority depends entirely on resources it currently does not have.

— J