Trump's forced-labour tariffs and the rules-based order

The United States imposed a new wave of tariffs on dozens of countries this week, citing forced labour concerns. The levies replace a temporary global duty that had been in force since earlier in the administration’s tenure. Allied governments were among those affected: Australia’s trade minister called the tariffs “unjustified and inconsistent” with existing trade agreements, while US allies broadly objected to the forced-labour rationale, with the European Union among those pushing back. Within hours, two US small businesses filed a federal lawsuit arguing the tariff authority required court scrutiny. Separately, Trump threatened additional “substantial” tariffs on the EU over its fines of American technology companies, vowing to investigate Brussels for “robbing” US firms after Google was fined €890 million. Meanwhile, Scotch whisky tariffs were lifted as part of a separate deal, and UK analysis suggested Britain’s earlier trade arrangement no longer looks world-beating compared with newer agreements other countries have secured.

The received wisdom

Defenders of the administration’s approach frame these tariffs as long-overdue enforcement of trade rules that polite multilateralism had allowed to atrophy. The forced-labour rationale, whatever its inconsistent application, addresses a real problem: supply chains running through authoritarian states have systematically underpriced labour by using coercion rather than markets. The progressive critique of global trade has for years been that it sacrificed workers — at home in manufacturing towns, abroad in sweatshops — on the altar of cheap goods and smooth corporate logistics. The Trump administration, this argument runs, is simply acting on that critique more aggressively than its predecessors dared. If allied governments object, it is partly because they have also benefited from arrangements that looked the other way. The rules-based order was never as rule-governed as its European custodians liked to claim.

A different read

That argument is half right, which makes it more dangerous than if it were simply wrong.

It is true that supply-chain labour standards have been under-enforced. It is true that multilateral institutions have proved sluggish and that free-trade orthodoxy carried social costs its proponents often elided. But the forced-labour tariff mechanism as deployed here has a structural problem: it is not actually a labour-standards instrument. It is a tariff instrument dressed in labour-standards language. The difference matters enormously.

A genuine forced-labour policy would involve transparent supply-chain auditing, consistent criteria applied equally regardless of a country’s geopolitical relationship with Washington, and — crucially — some mechanism for compliance and certification that removes the tariff once practices improve. None of those elements are visible in the current wave. Australia does not operate forced labour in any meaningful sense; the EU’s fines of American tech companies are not a labour issue at all. When the same legal authority that penalises Uyghur cotton supply chains is used to threaten the European Union over competition enforcement, the “forced labour” rationale has become a rhetorical container for an entirely different project.

That project appears to be using trade law as a generalized coercive instrument — one that can punish allies for regulatory independence, reward them for political compliance (Scotch whisky tariffs lifted after a bilateral deal), and maintain a permanent state of uncertainty that structurally advantages the United States as the largest single market. This is not free trade. It is not even fair trade. It is, in the historic tradition of great powers, simply power.

The Canadian experience is instructive: Canada marked the opening of the Gordie Howe Bridge without US participation after the trade war deepened, cancelling the planned cross-border ribbon-cutting ceremony. A piece of infrastructure designed to symbolise North American integration became a monument to its disintegration. The British case is subtler but equally telling: the UK secured an early deal with Washington that was celebrated as a diplomatic triumph, only to find that other countries have since negotiated better terms. Being the first to fold in a trade dispute, it turns out, does not earn you gratitude — it establishes you as the baseline for what can be extracted from everyone else.

The conservative tradition worth defending here is not unilateral economic nationalism; it is the rule of law and the principle that agreements mean what they say. When one party to a treaty can unilaterally redefine its obligations through executive action and novel legal theories, the treaty is no longer a treaty. It is a statement of intent, subject to revision whenever political circumstances change. That is a world in which the strong eat the weak and call it principle.

What to watch

  • WTO dispute filings: Whether the EU and Australia formally challenge these tariffs at the WTO will test whether that institution retains any practical authority or has become a forum for registering complaints without consequence.
  • Congressional pushback: The lawsuit by small US businesses signals that the domestic coalition for these tariffs is narrower than presented. Watch whether Republican senators from import-dependent agricultural states break ranks.
  • EU retaliation scope: Threats of “substantial” tariffs on the EU over tech fines could accelerate EU counter-measures. The tech-regulation dispute and the trade dispute are becoming entangled in ways that could escalate quickly.
  • UK renegotiation: New Prime Minister Burnham may seek to revisit the UK’s deal given that it now looks less favourable than arrangements secured by others. How Washington responds will reveal the terms of the bilateral relationship under new management.

— J