Oil at $100 and the Iran war's expanding cost

Oil crossed $100 a barrel for the first time since May on Thursday as US and Iranian forces exchanged strikes for a thirteenth consecutive night, with Iran targeting American assets in Bahrain, Jordan, and Kuwait while the US hit targets inside Iran. Houthi rebels — armed and directed by Tehran — attacked two Saudi tankers in the Red Sea, and a Romanian fighter jet shot down a suspected Russian drone near the Ukrainian border, hinting at the conflict’s broader tremors. Oman’s government flew a delegation to Tehran to discuss managing traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the chokepoint through which roughly one-fifth of global oil supply passes. Reports also emerged that President Trump had been forced to switch aircraft during a recent Turkey visit after intelligence of a threat from Iranian proxy forces.

The received wisdom

The administration’s advocates argue this is exactly the kind of maximum-pressure campaign that Western strategists have theorised about for years but never had the nerve to execute. Iran’s nuclear programme has long sat in an ambiguous zone — too advanced to ignore, not yet weaponised enough to trigger a decisive response. By striking hard and fast, the argument goes, Trump has changed the calculus in Tehran, forced the mullahs to spend down their missile stocks, degraded their proxy networks, and demonstrated that American deterrence is not merely rhetorical. Progressive critics and traditional realists alike, they say, consistently underestimate what resolve can achieve when it isn’t hobbled by second-guessing from Brussels or the State Department’s career class. The Houthis, Hezbollah, and the Revolutionary Guard have been on a slow-boil offensive for years. Meeting that with force is not escalation — it is a belated correction.

A different read

The strongest version of the hawks’ argument is worth taking seriously. It is also, by now, visibly insufficient as a guide to what comes next.

The core problem is not whether the strikes have degraded Iranian capabilities — they almost certainly have — but whether the administration has a theory of termination. Guardian reporting on Iran’s missile systems describes how Chinese technology and adapted Russian tactics have made Iran’s attacks increasingly accurate, revealing “weaknesses in stretched defences across the region.” That is a sentence worth lingering on. Stretched defences are not a sign of an adversary on the verge of capitulation; they are a sign of a war that is consuming resources faster than strategy is being replenished.

Oil at $100 a barrel is not merely a fuel-pump problem. It is a tax on every Western economy that runs on energy, which is to say every Western economy. UK petrol prices are rising sharply as crude climbs, and UK mortgage rates have hit their highest level in a month as financial markets price in Middle East risk premium. The knock-on through inflation and borrowing costs is not abstract: it is the mechanism by which a regional military confrontation becomes a global economic one.

Historically, the precedents are not reassuring. The 1973 Arab oil embargo, triggered by a war the United States had not planned to sustain, rewired Western economies for a decade. The 1980–88 Iran-Iraq war — in which US support for Iraq contributed to the very Revolutionary Guard culture that now targets American forces — is a reminder of how quickly proxy strategies acquire costs their architects did not budget for. Neither analogy is exact. But both suggest that the variable most likely to end a conflict is not the side with more missiles; it is the side with a clearer sense of what “winning” looks like and what price it is prepared to pay to stop.

Trump’s dismissal of concerns that the Iran war could affect midterm elections — “elections take care of themselves,” he reportedly said — may be politically savvy or politically reckless; that jury is still out. But the Houthi threat to target Saudi vessels in vital shipping routes raises a more immediate question: if Riyadh’s oil infrastructure comes under sustained attack, the $100 barrel becomes a $130 barrel, and the strategic logic of the original intervention collapses under its own weight.

The Oman channel is the most important piece of the puzzle right now. Muscat has played honest broker between Washington and Tehran before — most notably in the back-channel diplomacy that preceded the 2015 nuclear deal. The fact that an Omani delegation is in Tehran discussing Hormuz is not reassuring in itself, but it is at least evidence that someone is thinking about the off-ramp. The administration’s credibility will ultimately rest on whether it can translate tactical pressure into a negotiated pause before the oil price does the negotiating for it.

What to watch

  • Hormuz closure signals: Any Iranian move to formally restrict tanker passage through the Strait would be a step-change, not an escalation within the current framework. Watch Oman’s public statements.
  • US carrier group positioning: The deployment or withdrawal of additional carrier strike groups is the clearest public indicator of whether the Pentagon is preparing for a longer campaign or managing down.
  • Oil futures curve: Contango steepening (markets pricing sustained high prices, not a spike) would signal that traders believe this is structural, not temporary — a far more serious economic signal.
  • Congressional authorisation: The administration has been conducting sustained military operations without a formal war authorisation. Pressure from both parties to invoke or resist the War Powers Act will be the domestic political flashpoint.

— J