A car drove into crowds attending Berlin’s Christopher Street Day Pride parade on Saturday, killing at least one person and injuring dozens more. German police shot dead the suspect, identified by interior minister Alexander Dobrindt as Abdul Ballout, a German-born man of Lebanese heritage. Dobrindt described the attack as a probable “Islamic terror attack”, making him among the first senior German ministers to use that framing publicly and immediately. A manhunt had briefly followed before police cornered and killed Ballout during a subsequent operation. Germany’s political class now faces the same conversation it has been carefully sidestepping since at least 2015.
The received wisdom
The mainstream response to attacks like Saturday’s in Berlin follows a familiar and not entirely dishonest script. Security services are praised for their rapid response. Politicians call for unity against hatred. Vigils are held; rainbow flags are waved with extra defiance. Commentators warn against collective blame, noting — correctly — that the vast majority of Muslim residents in Germany condemn such violence, and that the far right exploits tragedy to smear an entire community.
There is genuine wisdom in this caution. Scapegoating produces backlash, alienates moderate Muslims whose cooperation police most need, and historically has created more radicalisation than it prevents. Germany’s own twentieth century gives it uniquely good reasons to resist mob thinking. Interior ministers across Europe have spent years calibrating their language to avoid inflaming what they call “community tensions.” The worry, in short, is that naming the ideology too loudly will do more harm than the ideology itself.
A different read
This caution, once prudent, is now doing active damage — and has been for some time.
The pattern is familiar enough by now that it can be stated without hysteria. A sequence of attacks in Western Europe — the 2016 Berlin Christmas market truck attack, the Stockholm 2017 vehicle attack, the Vienna 2020 shootings, the Würzburg 2021 knife attack — have targeted open, secular, symbolically Western spaces. Pride events, Christmas markets, concert halls, newspaper offices. The targeting is not random. Jihadist ideology — in its various Salafi-Wahhabi, Islamic State, and freelance iterations — contains an explicit hierarchy of enemies, with LGBTQ visibility near its apex. To describe the Berlin attack as a “likely Islamic terror attack,” as Dobrindt did, is not a slur against a community. It is an accurate description of a documented ideological tradition.
The cost of refusing to name that ideology clearly is not merely rhetorical. It has practical consequences. Deradicalisation programmes that refuse to engage with the specific theological content of Salafi-jihadism — preferring generic “extremism” frameworks — have had mixed results at best. Counter-terrorism cooperation with Muslim community organisations is harder when the framing prevents frank conversation about what is being resisted. And, perhaps most importantly, young Muslim men who are on the edge are denied the one thing that might actually help: a clear account from their own community, loudly amplified by the state, of why the theology they are being fed is wrong on its own terms.
Germany’s specific political difficulty is compounded by its migration history. Since 2015, Germany has accepted well over a million asylum seekers, a significant proportion from countries — Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq — where Salafi networks are deeply embedded in the social fabric. Integration has been uneven. The Verfassungsschutz (domestic intelligence) has repeatedly warned of Islamist networks operating within migrant communities. The political class’s response has been to treat these warnings as a problem of public communication rather than of policy substance.
There is a deeper irony here. The Pride community — broadly aligned with the progressive left — has been perhaps the most vocal in resisting the “Islamophobia” frame that prevents frank discussion of anti-gay violence in conservative Muslim communities. Gay men in Germany are statistically more likely to be assaulted by men from certain backgrounds than from others; this is not a secret in the communities most affected, even when it is kept out of official discourse. The wilful blindness has not protected LGBTQ people. It has simply ensured that the reckoning, when it comes, arrives via political figures — like Dobrindt — who are far less careful about nuance.
Dobrindt’s rapid framing will be criticised as inflammatory. Some of that criticism will be valid. But the alternative — the seventeen years of “we must wait for the investigation” non-answers — has not made anyone safer.
What to watch
- Whether the German government produces a serious policy response — enhanced monitoring of Salafi networks, reform of integration requirements — or settles for a vigil-and-unity-speech cycle.
- Whether Ballout’s connections to known networks are made public, and what they reveal about deradicalisation failures.
- The electoral effect: Germany’s federal politics has been trending toward AfD in part because the centre has refused to hold frank conversations. The Berlin attack will intensify that dynamic.
- How European leaders square their genuine commitment to LGBTQ rights with their reluctance to name the ideology most consistently targeting LGBTQ people in public spaces.
— J