Israel enters Syria and rewrites its own doctrine

Israel launched a military incursion into Syria on Sunday amid condemnation from the United Nations, deepening its already substantial military footprint across the Syrian border since the fall of the Assad regime. Simultaneously, Israeli settlers set fire to mosques, cars, and farmland in the West Bank, with Palestinian sources reporting at least two mosques burned in what the BBC described as a major settler attack. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu vowed to attend a UN event in New York City despite an outstanding ICC arrest warrant, signalling that he has either received assurances from the Trump administration or calculated that the domestic political benefit outweighs the legal risk. In a separate development, the Israeli government signalled openness to an international stabilisation force in Gaza, a significant shift in its stated position.

The received wisdom

The standard progressive-liberal framing is that Israel is engaged in a systematic expansion of territorial control — leveraging the US-Iran conflict, the post-Assad Syrian vacuum, and Western distraction to normalise facts on the ground. Settler violence in the West Bank is characterised as state-tolerated, if not state-directed, ethnic cleansing. The Syria incursion is framed as opportunistic land-grabbing in a power vacuum. Netanyahu’s ICC defiance is presented as evidence of impunity underwritten by American exceptionalism. The solution, in this reading, is international accountability: enforce the ICC warrant, press for a Palestinian state, demand Israeli withdrawal from post-Assad Syrian gains.

These concerns are not without foundation. Settler violence has demonstrably escalated in the post-October 2023 period. Israel’s buffer zones in Syria have expanded well beyond what any security doctrine could justify as temporary. And the ICC’s legitimacy — tattered as it already is — suffers measurably every time a sitting head of government visits a member state without being arrested.

A different read

But the strategic logic driving Israel’s behaviour is more coherent than the “impunity” framing suggests, and understanding it matters for thinking clearly about what comes next.

Israel’s fundamental security doctrine since its founding has rested on a simple premise: it cannot afford to lose a single war. Surrounded by states and non-state actors whose stated objective has, at various points, included its elimination, Israel has historically preferred pre-emption and buffer zones to post-facto international guarantees. The Syria incursion fits that template precisely. With the Assad regime gone and its successor — the HTS-aligned Al-Sharaa government — still establishing authority, the southern Syrian border is a potential staging area for Iranian-backed reconstitution of Hezbollah supply lines. From Tel Aviv’s perspective, the choice is between acting now, when Syrian state authority is weak, or waiting until the territory is once again being used for cross-border operations.

This is not a new calculation. Israel occupied southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000, with mixed results. The lesson it drew from that experience was not that buffer zones are futile, but that they require clearer exit conditions. The question is whether the current Syria footprint comes with any such conditions — or whether it is simply the first instalment of an indefinite occupation.

The West Bank settler violence is a more morally unambiguous case. The burning of mosques — documented by multiple sources — is not a security operation. It is communal violence by civilian actors, and the Israeli state’s tolerance of it, including the absence of swift criminal prosecution, is a genuine stain on its democratic credentials. A state that applies rule-of-law norms selectively — rigorously to its own citizens within the Green Line, permissively to settlers who commit violence — is corroding something essential in its own body politic.

The Gaza stabilisation force signal is potentially the most consequential development. An Israeli government that has consistently opposed any international military presence in Gaza — fearing it would constrain IDF operational freedom — is now signalling openness to exactly that. What changed? Most likely a calculation that the Gaza strip, if left without governance, becomes a permanent insurgency problem; that the IDF cannot garrison it indefinitely; and that an international force — however imperfect — is preferable to Hamas reconstitution. Whether that opening leads anywhere depends on who would actually send troops and under what mandate.

What to watch

  • The ICC question: will any NATO or EU member state arrest Netanyahu if he travels to New York for a UN event? The Trump administration almost certainly will not, but the political cost of inaction for European states is rising.
  • Whether the Syria incursion develops defined objectives and an exit framework, or simply expands by incremental logic.
  • The stabilisation force proposal: which countries are being approached, and what mandate would they accept? A force without enforcement authority is a photo-op.
  • Israeli coalition politics: far-right finance minister Ben Gvir and national security minister Smotrich are the political sponsors of settler violence; any reckoning requires political costs that Netanyahu so far has not imposed.

— J