The United States and Iran observed a second consecutive day of mutual strike pauses on Sunday, with both sides holding back offensive military operations as negotiations toward an interim ceasefire continued. Washington’s pause came after a parallel announcement from Tehran, suggesting back-channel coordination — likely through Omani or Qatari intermediaries — was bearing some fruit. Al Jazeera reported that Iran’s economy faces mounting pressure as the scope of the US campaign has extended beyond the Strait of Hormuz, targeting inland infrastructure. Oil prices, which hit $100 a barrel last week, showed some softening on the ceasefire reports. Whether the pause holds — and what any resulting agreement would look like — remains entirely unclear.
The received wisdom
The progressive-liberal reading of a US-Iran ceasefire is essentially this: the war was unnecessary, a product of Trump administration hawkishness and Israeli pressure, and any diplomatic off-ramp is preferable to continued fighting. The human cost in Iran has been severe; the economic disruption to oil markets has hurt ordinary consumers worldwide; and the risk of escalation into a broader regional conflagration — drawing in Hezbollah, Gulf states, and potentially even triggering Chinese or Russian opportunism elsewhere — makes a negotiated end imperative.
This is not wrong. Wars always extract costs that were not fully priced in at their inception. The humanitarian argument for stopping is real. And the record of US military campaigns in the Middle East — from Iraq to Libya — offers little comfort that a degraded Iran translates into a more stable region. The nuclear programme, moreover, cannot be bombed out of existence permanently: technical knowledge does not disappear with centrifuges.
A different read
But the case for a ceasefire is considerably more complicated than it appears, and the framing of “any exit is a good exit” has historically produced outcomes nearly as bad as the original conflict.
The central question is: what has actually been achieved? If Iran’s nuclear enrichment infrastructure has been set back by several years, that is meaningful — but only if it is followed by a credible verification regime. If the Hormuz chokepoint is reopened but Iranian-backed proxies in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon simply reconstitute their supply lines in a year or two, the “victory” is cosmetic. History offers instructive precedents. The 1991 Gulf War ended with Saddam Hussein still in power; twelve years of sanctions and no-fly zones later, a second war was deemed necessary. The 2015 JCPOA froze Iran’s programme but did not dismantle it, setting up the 2018 withdrawal crisis.
There is also the question of Iranian domestic politics. A ceasefire that allows the Islamic Republic to survive — battered but intact, with its internal security apparatus untouched — may hand the regime a narrative: it withstood the Great Satan, it endured, it survived. Regimes that can claim to have survived military pressure from a superpower often emerge more consolidated domestically, not less. Whether that dynamic applies here depends partly on the severity of infrastructure damage and partly on whether the pause leads to a political process that actually addresses Iran’s regional behaviour or merely its nuclear programme.
The most worrying scenario is the one that looks most like success: a ceasefire that ends the shooting, reopens Hormuz, reduces oil prices, and declares some form of nuclear “rollback” — while leaving unaddressed Iran’s support for Houthi operations in Saudi Arabia, its proxy networks across the Levant, and the fundamental tension between the Islamic Republic’s ideology and regional stability. Western capitals, exhausted and facing domestic economic pressures, will be tempted to take the exit and declare a win. A Trump administration, attuned to stock markets and poll numbers, may be especially susceptible to that temptation.
A truly durable outcome would require something that looks more like the framework that ended the Libyan nuclear programme in 2003 — comprehensive, verified, and linked to behavioural change — rather than the on-off pattern of the JCPOA era. The odds of achieving that through a ceasefire driven by economic exhaustion on both sides are, to put it gently, not high.
What to watch
- Whether the ceasefire leads to direct or indirect US-Iran talks with a clear agenda, or simply a freeze that allows both sides to rearm and regroup.
- The role of Gulf states: Saudi Arabia and the UAE have their own interests in Iranian containment that do not map neatly onto Washington’s priorities.
- Iran’s domestic signalling: if Supreme Leader Khamenei frames the pause as a strategic victory, the room for a genuine deal narrows significantly.
- Oil market reaction: a sustained drop below $90 would signal markets believe the pause is durable; any spike back toward $100 suggests traders are not convinced.
— J