The United States economy grew at an annualised rate of 1.5 percent in the second quarter of 2026, below market forecasts of approximately 2 percent and down from 2.1 percent in the first quarter, according to Commerce Department advance figures. The slowdown was driven by lower government spending, reduced investment, and weaker exports, even as consumer spending accelerated to 3.2 percent. The Personal Consumption Expenditures Price Index — the Federal Reserve’s preferred inflation gauge — rose to 3.7 percent, well above the Fed’s 2 percent target. Separately, the Bank of England held its base rate at 3.75 percent for the fifth consecutive meeting, but governor Andrew Bailey stated plainly that if oil prices remain above $100 per barrel as the US-Iran conflict continues, “the odds are that interest rates will have to go up higher.” Three members of the Bank’s nine-person Monetary Policy Committee voted for an immediate hike to 4 percent, one more than at the previous meeting.
The received wisdom
The mainstream economic view holds that the current inflationary pressure is essentially exogenous — a war shock that policymakers can do little about except wait for geopolitical resolution. The Federal Reserve and Bank of England, on this reading, are doing the right thing by holding rates steady and signalling patience, rather than hiking into an already slowing economy and producing demand destruction on top of supply-side price increases. Kevin Warsh, the new Fed chairman, said there was no “magic wand” to tackle rising prices, and that the economy was expanding at a “solid pace despite uncertainty.” The argument from the centre-left goes further: higher rates now would punish ordinary borrowers — homeowners on variable mortgages, small businesses on credit lines — for an oil shock caused by a foreign-policy choice that those same borrowers had no voice in making. The 30-year US fixed-rate mortgage has already reached 6.66 percent, its highest in a year.
This is a coherent position with real human stakes, and the Bank of England’s communication — explicit about the conditional nature of its hold — deserves credit for transparency over the false reassurance of unconditional dovishness.
A different read
The problem is that the “wait and see” posture, while appropriate as crisis management, is also obscuring a more persistent structural problem: the Western economies entered this conflict with inflation already above target and debt levels already at historic highs. The UK ran a budget deficit during this period that a think tank has assessed as leaving Burnham’s government with no scope to increase borrowing. The US PCE at 3.7 percent is not an oil-price anomaly sitting on an otherwise well-anchored inflation baseline — it reflects an economy that never fully returned to the Federal Reserve’s 2 percent target after the post-pandemic surge, and which had been relying on above-trend consumer spending to mask structurally weak investment and productivity growth.
The GDP figures tell a revealing story. Consumer spending rose 3.2 percent in the second quarter, driven by vehicles, furniture, and pharmaceuticals, while investment and exports fell. This is the signature of an economy in which household balance sheets are still drawing down pandemic-era savings and credit card borrowing is absorbing energy price increases — the American consumer as last resort. Oxford Economics’ Michael Pearce described the headline figure as understating underlying strength; Capital Economics’ Bradley Saunders called it “seriously underselling a healthy economy.” These are professional optimists doing their professional jobs. The honest reading is that the data shows consumers absorbing an oil shock that will — if it persists — eventually overwhelm spending capacity.
The historical comparison that should worry central bankers is 1974, not 2021. The post-October war oil embargo created a similar pattern: consumer spending held up for several quarters as households ran down savings and took on debt, then collapsed when credit exhausted and real wages finally fell. Arthur Burns at the Federal Reserve infamously accommodated what he called “exogenous” price increases, repeatedly declaring inflation transitory when it was not. The lesson was that central banks which lose credibility on the upside have to overcorrect painfully to recover it — as Volcker demonstrated between 1979 and 1982.
Bailey’s explicit warning that rates “will have to go up higher” if oil stays above $100 is the correct doctrinal message, regardless of whether it is acted upon. But three MPC dissenters voting for a hike already suggests the Bank’s internal consensus is more fragile than the headline “hold” implies. And Megan Greene’s citation of the Red Sea as a second chokepoint — Houthi rebels attacking oil tankers near Bab al-Mandeb simultaneously with the Hormuz disruption — points to a scenario in which multiple supply chain shocks compound rather than cancel each other. A “super El Niño” agricultural shock on top of energy inflation is not a tail risk; it is the current forecast central scenario for several commodity analysts.
The fiscal picture is perhaps the most underappreciated element. Shell’s profits doubled on the oil price spike, as they did in 1974. Energy majors’ windfall does not translate into government revenue under current tax structures with sufficient speed to offset the welfare and benefit costs of higher inflation for lower-income households. Governments that entered this period fiscally exposed — as the UK did under the Starmer-to-Burnham transition — will face the worst of both worlds: rising debt costs and rising demand for state support simultaneously.
What to watch
- Whether Brent crude sustains above $90 through August — the Bank of England’s stated threshold for near-certain rate hikes is $100; the $90–$100 range is the zone of maximum policy uncertainty.
- The Fed’s next meeting: Warsh’s “solid pace” language suggests no September hike is currently priced in, but PCE at 3.7 percent leaves the FOMC with very little margin for comfort.
- UK mortgage market: the fixed-rate reset cycle means hundreds of thousands of homeowners will be repricing their deals in the second half of 2026; higher-for-longer directly translates into political pressure on the Burnham government.
- Whether the Burnham government’s pledge to give regional mayors a share of income tax — announced Thursday — represents the kind of fiscal decentralisation that adds efficiency, or the kind that creates new spending commitments without matching revenue authority.
— J