War without exit: US-Iran escalation deepens

The United States military carried out what it called a “heavy wave” of strikes against Iran on Wednesday night into Thursday, targeting dozens of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps facilities including military command centres, missile and drone sites, and maritime installations. The strikes, which Centcom said lasted about an hour, were a direct response to Iran’s firing of ballistic missiles at US bases in Jordan and attacks on oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz earlier in the week. Iranian state media reported that three members of a family — including a two-year-old child — were killed in Qeshm island. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, in a parallel development, announced the formation of a 14-nation Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance to secure the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait — a corridor carrying roughly 10–12 percent of global maritime trade.

The received wisdom

The consensus view in Western policy circles holds that the Biden-era failure to clinch a durable nuclear agreement left the United States with no good options, and that Trump’s military campaign — whatever its tactical effectiveness — is creating a humanitarian catastrophe while doing nothing to eliminate Iran’s long-term capacity to enrich uranium or project regional influence. Critics on the centre-left point out that strikes have been ongoing since the ceasefire of April collapsed in June, that more than 600 US service members have been injured since the war began in February, and that oil prices hovering near $90–$91 per barrel are feeding inflation across Western economies. The argument runs: America has demonstrated that it can destroy Iranian military infrastructure indefinitely, but it cannot destroy the Iranian state’s will to resist, and every escalatory cycle simply postpones a reckoning with what the endgame actually looks like.

This is a serious argument and should be granted its full weight. Wars of attrition rarely end on the terms the stronger party imagines. And the human cost — on both sides, civilian and military — is real and accumulating.

A different read

And yet the received wisdom has a significant analytical problem: it treats deterrence failure as a symptom of excessive American force, when the historical record suggests the opposite. The Islamic Republic’s forty-year playbook has been predicated on the assumption that the United States will not sustain escalation — that domestic politics, oil price anxiety, and casualty sensitivity will eventually produce an American negotiating retreat. Every American withdrawal or accommodation since 1979 has ratified that assumption. The current US-Saudi joint strikes on Iranian proxies in Iraq — the first publicly announced such operation — represent something genuinely new: the beginning of a coalition approach to rolling back Iran’s proxy network simultaneously with targeting its homeland capabilities.

The Saudi maritime alliance is analytically underrated. Riyadh has long positioned itself as a free rider on American security guarantees, but the formation of a 14-nation coalition that includes Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan suggests a regional architecture that does not depend entirely on the United States. Saudi Arabia’s Eastern-to-Yanbu pipeline insulates its oil exports from Hormuz closure; the Bab al-Mandeb alliance is about securing the alternative route. This is not bandwagoning behind Washington — it is hedging, the kind of realpolitik calculation that marks serious states seriously worried about their own survival.

The historical parallel that comes to mind is not Vietnam — the standard left-liberal frame — but the tanker wars of the 1980s. Then, too, the United States and its Gulf partners faced an Iran that used proxy violence and maritime harassment to coerce. Then, too, international shipping was disrupted and oil prices volatile. The resolution came not through negotiation from a position of American restraint, but through Operation Praying Mantis in April 1988, when the US Navy destroyed half of Iran’s operational fleet in a single day. Iran’s acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598 — the ceasefire that ended the Iran-Iraq War — followed within months. Ayatollah Khomeini, in his famous phrase, described it as drinking “a chalice of poison.”

The lesson is not that America should seek a Praying Mantis repeat. The strategic environment is vastly more complex: Iran has nuclear latency it lacked in 1988, its proxies are embedded in multiple sovereign states, and the domestic political costs for the Trump administration of a prolonged campaign may prove higher than for Reagan in the pre-social-media era. But the lesson is that the Iranian leadership has, historically, modified its behaviour when — and only when — the costs of persistence unambiguously exceeded the costs of accommodation. The question is not whether pressure works. It is whether the current application of pressure is sufficiently coherent to produce a genuine negotiating moment, rather than simply the next round of mutual attrition.

What troubles this analysis is the Egyptian episode: a drone strike on a port in a US-allied country not previously directly attacked suggests Iran is expanding its geographic targeting rather than contracting it. That is consistent with a leadership calculating that widening the conflict raises the costs of American engagement rather than its own — a strategic bet on American exhaustion rather than Iranian capitulation. If that bet is being placed deliberately, the next several weeks will be decisive in testing it.

What to watch

  • Whether the Saudi maritime alliance moves from announcement to operational deployment, and whether the UAE and Oman — notably absent from the signatories — eventually join or resist.
  • Oil price trajectory: Brent crude at ~$91 is the key economic pressure point; a return above $100 would significantly raise the probability of a Bank of England rate hike and would amplify inflationary pressures across the G7.
  • Whether the Trump administration’s reported outreach through the Saudis — Axios citing an unnamed US official on Saudi Arabia’s de-escalation message — produces any back-channel signal from Tehran in the coming 72 hours.
  • The fate of the reported “very friendly negotiations” Trump mentioned: Tehran has denied any talks are occurring, which may itself be a negotiating signal intended to preserve domestic credibility.

— J