The double blockade strangling global oil

The threat to global oil shipping has reached its most acute point since the US-Iran war began in February, analysts warned this week, as a new front opened in the Red Sea even as the Strait of Hormuz remains effectively closed. Vessel-tracking firm Kpler reported that only eight ships transited the strait on Sunday, against more than 100 daily before the conflict — a reduction of more than 90 percent. Simultaneously, Yemen’s Houthi militia announced a blockade of Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea ports on 20 July and began attacking tankers on the alternative route that Saudi oil producers had been using since Iran shut Hormuz. The combined effect has pushed the number of crude tankers loading for Asian markets to roughly four per day, the lowest since the war’s start.

Adding to the confusion, President Trump announced on Sunday that he had called off “massive” planned strikes on Iran because new negotiations were imminent — a claim Tehran promptly denied. Iran’s foreign ministry said it was in talks with Oman about reopening the strait for commercial shipping, but flatly stated it was not negotiating with the United States and had no plans to do so. Trump responded on Truth Social that Iran’s leadership was “unbelievably duplicitous” and later told reporters at the White House that “this is the last chance for them to sign a good document.” Oil prices fell 4–5 percent on the possibility of talks, with Brent crude dropping to around $84 a barrel, but the underlying shipping picture remained dire.

The received wisdom

The dominant reading from progressive and establishment media frames the crisis primarily as a consequence of American and Israeli aggression. Iran, on this telling, is a rational actor protecting its sovereignty after being struck first. The Houthis are a predictable downstream consequence — if the US and Israel bomb Iranian-aligned groups repeatedly, those groups fight back. The real solution, the argument goes, is diplomatic: Washington should offer Iran a genuine off-ramp, lift the remaining sanctions, and allow Tehran to save face. Trump’s erratic on-again, off-again threats only make that harder by making the US an unreliable negotiating partner. The deeper problem, critics say, is that Trump launched military action in February without a clear endgame, and is now improvising in ways that impose costs on the entire global economy — including on American consumers paying over $4 a gallon for petrol — while oil company executives pocket record profits.

This reading contains genuine insight. Wars without exit strategies do tend to end badly. Trump’s habit of announcing deals that don’t exist is well-established and does corrode trust. And the humanitarian cost of Hormuz’s closure falls unevenly on developing nations that have no say in the matter.

A different read

But the received wisdom underweights several important realities. Start with the strategic geography: the Strait of Hormuz carries roughly 20 percent of the world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas. Its closure is not a proportionate response to an airstrike; it is an act of economic warfare against the entire international community. Iran has “repeatedly closed off the strait since the US and Israel started attacks” — meaning Tehran has weaponised a global commons as deliberate policy, not in a moment of panic. The Houthi extension of that blockade to the Red Sea compounds the effect: Matthew Wright of Kpler described it as “a problem stacked on top of a problem,” with the alternative shipping lane now also under threat.

The pattern deserves historical comparison. In 1973, Arab OPEC members imposed an oil embargo primarily against the United States and Netherlands after the Yom Kippur War. The embargo lasted five months, caused a quadrupling of global oil prices, and triggered a recession in the West. What distinguishes the current situation is that the closure is indefinite and affects not just Western consumers but Japan, South Korea, India, and every other oil-importing economy. Kpler data shows crude tanker loadings for Asia at their lowest point since the war started — just four ships per day — which means the stress is building in Tokyo, Seoul, and Delhi, not only in Washington.

The diplomatic picture is deliberately obscured. Iran’s foreign ministry says it is talking to Oman, not the US. Trump says talks are “going on right now.” Kpler’s Wright observed that any deal would need US involvement to be credible, and that current negotiations risk being a “false start.” What this signals is a classic two-level game: Iran’s negotiating posture is partly designed for a domestic audience that includes hardline elements in the IRGC who would regard any concession to Washington as surrender. This does not make Tehran’s position more sympathetic — it makes diplomacy harder. A regime that must manage hardline factions by publicly denying the talks it is privately conducting is a regime that cannot easily deliver a durable agreement.

The Houthi dimension adds a further complication that the dovish reading tends to minimise. The UK Maritime Trade Operations agency has recorded several attacks on Saudi tankers in the past week. Tim Wilkins of Intertanko, the tanker owners’ trade association, warned of “a broadening, deteriorating, and increasingly complex security situation” that now extends from the Gulf into the Red Sea. Even if a Hormuz deal were struck tomorrow, Hapag-Lloyd estimates that restoring normal cargo flows would take “three to four months” given that shipping services have been suspended and vessels redeployed. The global economy, in other words, cannot be switched back on quickly even when the shooting stops.

None of this means escalation is wise. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve is already at its lowest level since 1983. Trump’s domestic political problem is real — one Reuters/Ipsos poll found only a third of Americans support the conflict, the lowest since it began. But acknowledging the difficulty of the situation does not require pretending that Iran’s weaponisation of global shipping lanes is a defensible act. The 1973 embargo was also understandable in its own terms; that did not make it any less damaging.

What to watch

  • Oman mediation: Whether Muscat can broker a temporary arrangement on Hormuz independent of US involvement — and whether Tehran’s domestic hardliners will tolerate it.
  • Asian diplomatic pressure: Japan, South Korea, and India all depend heavily on Gulf crude; watch for quiet diplomatic pressure from Tokyo and Seoul on both Tehran and Washington.
  • Red Sea tanker data: Kpler’s daily vessel count through Bab el-Mandeb is the most sensitive early indicator of whether the double blockade is tightening or easing.
  • US midterms calculus: With November approaching and only a third of Americans supporting the war, watch whether Republican Senate incumbents in competitive states begin distancing themselves from the conflict.

— J