Hormuz deal signals exhaustion, not resolution

Iran announced on Wednesday that it has reached an agreement with Oman on the geographical coordinates of a shipping route through the Strait of Hormuz, which Tehran has largely blocked since the US and Israel attacked Iran in late February. According to Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baqaei, the agreement is “in the final stages,” though no specific coordinates have been released publicly. Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi told state media the route would be temporary — valid for two to four months. The US and Oman have not commented. Oil prices, which have fluctuated wildly since the blockade began, fell on the news. The Strait of Hormuz carries roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas, making its reopening one of the most consequential diplomatic questions of the year.

The received wisdom

The liberal internationalist interpretation of this development is broadly optimistic: Oman’s role as a trusted back-channel between Washington and Tehran, tested in the lead-up to the 2015 JCPOA and again now, shows that diplomacy works even in the worst circumstances. A temporary route through Hormuz, the argument goes, is a confidence-building measure that reduces the risk of catastrophic escalation, lowers energy prices for consumers globally, and buys time for a broader negotiated settlement. On Tuesday, US President Donald Trump had warned Iran it would be “hit very hard” if the strait did not open “very soon,” according to BBC reporting — and the apparent Iranian response, even a partial one mediated by Muscat, looks like evidence that pressure-plus-diplomacy can yield results. The pragmatist left would add that this is precisely what restraint-oriented foreign policy looks like in practice: coercion calibrated to produce a negotiated off-ramp, not a wider war.

A different read

It is worth recalling where we were two months ago. In June, Iran and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at halting fighting, reopening Hormuz, and reaching a comprehensive settlement within sixty days. That deal “quickly fell through, as did diplomatic talks, with tit-for-tat attacks resuming just days after the MoU was signed,” the BBC reported. The current Oman arrangement is structurally similar: a partial, temporary, unverified measure announced by one side, with the other side (the US) staying silent and Iran simultaneously insisting it is not negotiating with Washington at all. Gharibabadi’s framing — two to four months, geography agreed, no fee question resolved — reads less like a peace deal and more like a tactical breathing space that preserves all of Tehran’s leverage while letting global oil markets exhale briefly.

The critical detail buried in Baqaei’s statement is revealing. He said the factors “making the Strait of Hormuz insecure still exist on the part of the United States, particularly the naval blockade and other aggressive and threatening actions.” In other words, Iran is opening a route through a strait it claims is still under hostile occupation. That is not a resolution of the underlying conflict; it is a pressure valve. And pressure valves can be closed again.

History counsels caution about reading too much into Omani mediation. Oman’s Sultan Haitham has played this role faithfully, but his country’s leverage is ultimately limited. During the 2019-2020 Gulf tensions, backchannel communications between Washington and Tehran frequently created optimism that evaporated within days. The June MoU collapse should have recalibrated expectations sharply downward. It did not, at least not in oil markets or in Washington commentary, both of which are once again pricing in a durable normalisation.

There is also the question of what Iran gets from a two-to-four month window. The Al Jazeera reporting on the Hormuz talks is published alongside a separate story noting that Iran has been using any ceasefire periods for “maximum use” — boosting military strength while talks proceed. Tehran is a rational actor, and a temporary respite that allows it to reconstitute missile stocks, consolidate domestic political messaging around the “naval blockade” narrative, and avoid another US strike while doing so is a highly rational move. The opening is real; the durability is not guaranteed.

For Western consumers and allied governments watching oil prices, the instinct to welcome any Hormuz development is understandable. Energy prices have been hammered since February, and political leaders in Europe and Asia are under enormous domestic pressure to show that the worst is passing. But policymakers who declare victory prematurely will find themselves particularly exposed when — if — the arrangement breaks down in October or November, closer to heating season in the northern hemisphere. The June MoU collapse offers the precise cautionary template, and it is only ten weeks old.

The more uncomfortable question, which neither Washington nor its allies have answered publicly, is what a durable Hormuz settlement actually requires. Iran has maintained throughout that a US naval blockade of its ports remains in place. The US has neither confirmed the full scope of that blockade nor offered to lift it in exchange for permanent Hormuz access. Until those two positions are reconciled, every interim arrangement is a pause in a conflict that has not structurally resolved.

What to watch

The next forty-eight hours will clarify whether the Oman framework is real or rhetorical: watch for the first commercial vessel to transit the new route, and whether Iran interdicts or taxes it. The fee question — Iran’s insistence on charging vessels — has not been resolved and remains a potential spoiler. Track whether the US officially acknowledges the Oman agreement or maintains studied silence, and whether Trump’s “very soon” ultimatum is quietly shelved or repeated. Finally, watch the Houthi blockade of Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea ports, imposed since July 20 according to BBC reporting, which remains separately in place and is not addressed by the Hormuz arrangement at all — a reminder that even a genuine Hormuz reopening leaves global energy flows severely constrained.

— J