China's unity law and the slow erasure of Tibet

China implemented a sweeping new “ethnic unity” law on July 1 that mandates Chinese as the primary language for schools and government agencies, prohibits acts deemed to “incite division” among China’s 56 ethnic groups, and requires schools, families, and other institutions to foster patriotism, national unity, and what Beijing calls “a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation.” The law has drawn particular concern regarding its impact on Tibet — officially designated as the Tibet Autonomous Region but tightly controlled by Beijing — where this year marks the 75th anniversary of what China calls the “peaceful liberation” of Xizang. As part of a government-organised visit to Tibet in late July, Associated Press journalists, accompanied by officials throughout and without freedom to report independently, documented both state-mandated ethnic unity messaging and individual Tibetans practicing their language and culture in private. Similar language policies have already been applied to Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Mongolians in Inner Mongolia.

The received wisdom

The Chinese government’s position is that the unity law is a benevolent integration policy — one that improves educational opportunity, ensures equal access for ethnic minorities, and strengthens national cohesion in a multi-ethnic state that faces genuine security threats from separatist movements. This is not merely propaganda; it reflects a coherent statist worldview in which national solidarity is the precondition for economic development and political stability, and in which cultural diversity that exists within the bounds of national loyalty is actively supported. Government-organised tours to Tibet feature Tibetan calligraphy classes, traditional medicine facilities, artisan workshops, and Buddhist temple visits — evidence, Beijing argues, that cultural preservation and political integration are not in conflict. The law, Chinese officials say, only brings “benefits and does not have any negative effects.” In this framing, Western criticism is ideological bias that ignores the material improvements in living standards, literacy, and infrastructure that Beijing has brought to Tibet.

A different read

Benno Weiner, a historian of modern China and Tibet at Carnegie Mellon University, offered the most precise assessment when he told the Associated Press that the unity law “sort of codifies and sort of summarises a trend that’s been going on.” That is exactly right — and it is also exactly why it is more alarming than a discrete policy change would be. What China implemented on July 1 is not a new direction; it is the formalisation of a direction that has been pursued for years and that is now, with this law, given legal teeth and official permanence.

The pattern is well-documented. NPR’s reporting notes that language policies in minority regions have already included expanded Mandarin education for Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the replacement of some Mongolian-language instruction with Mandarin in Inner Mongolia. Tibet is not a special case; it is the latest iteration of a systematic programme. James Leibold from La Trobe University and Tenzin Dorjee from the Tibet Action Institute wrote in Foreign Affairs that “minority communities that seek to maintain their culture will be pushed toward a double life of public conformity and private reservations.” That formulation captures the essential dynamic: a country where cultural identity can only be practised privately, in fear, under official oversight, is one where cultural survival is in serious doubt.

China’s No. 4-ranked Communist Party leader, Wang Huning, toured Tibet the same week as the AP visit and called for implementation of the unity law while urging authorities to “guide Tibetan Buddhism to adapt to socialist society.” The phrase “guide to adapt” is the bureaucratic vocabulary of coercive assimilation. Buddhism is not a hobby that can be administratively adjusted to fit socialist ideology; it is a comprehensive worldview, ethical system, and cultural inheritance. The suggestion that it should be made to “adapt” is a direct challenge to the spiritual autonomy of Tibetan Buddhists — including the question, deeply contentious, of the Dalai Lama’s succession. Beijing insists the selection of the next Dalai Lama must comply with Chinese law and receive government approval. The current Dalai Lama has said his successor could be born outside China and that only his office has the authority to recognise the reincarnation. Both positions cannot be simultaneously true, and China’s determination to control the outcome is among the most concrete expressions of the unity law’s ambition.

There is a tendency in Western commentary to treat the Tibet question as a symbolic cause — sincere but marginal, suitable for celebrity endorsement rather than serious strategic engagement. This is mistaken on two grounds. First, the precedent that China sets in Tibet — that a government can mandate the terms under which a distinct cultural and religious community maintains its identity — is directly relevant to the status of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and eventually any country that falls within Beijing’s sphere of influence. Second, the unity law gives Chinese authorities extraterritorial reach: acts “deemed to incite division” are prohibited even outside China’s borders, a provision with direct implications for Tibetan exile communities and their advocates in democracies. That the world is currently consumed by the Iran war, European migration crises, and the Trump tariff saga creates an unfortunately favourable window for Beijing to cement these arrangements without concerted international response.

The government-organised tour format is itself revealing. Access to Tibet remains tightly restricted for foreign journalists — the AP’s account notes officials accompanied journalists throughout and that reporters were not free to move independently. A country that is confident its policies are genuinely beneficial does not need to arrange and chaperone every foreign visit. The Potala Palace flies the Chinese national flag. There are no public references to the Dalai Lama in his own holiest sites. These are not incidental details; they are the visible surface of a much deeper programme of substitution.

What to watch

Watch how democracies respond — or fail to respond — to the unity law at the United Nations Human Rights Council, where China’s allies have consistently blocked serious scrutiny of its minority policies. Track the Dalai Lama succession question: the current Dalai Lama is in his nineties, and Beijing’s determination to control the selection of his successor will be one of the defining religious-political conflicts of the coming decade. Watch for any signs of cross-community solidarity between Tibetan, Uyghur, and Mongolian advocacy groups — unified international advocacy has historically been more effective than fragmented national campaigns. And monitor whether the extraterritorial provisions of the unity law are used to target diaspora activists in countries like Australia, Canada, or the United Kingdom, which would represent a significant escalation and a test of Western governments’ willingness to respond.

— J