The United States has formally condemned China’s declaration of a large-scale “nature reserve” in the South China Sea as a thinly disguised attempt to convert environmental law into a territorial claim. The designation, covering waters that overlap with the exclusive economic zones of the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei, would — if accepted under international law — allow China to restrict foreign vessel access on environmental grounds in areas where it has no recognised sovereign rights. The US statement called the designation “a cynical misuse of conservation frameworks” to advance territorial ambitions. Beijing has not formally responded to the American characterisation.
The received wisdom
The liberal internationalist reading of this episode tends toward a mixture of alarm and proceduralism. The alarm is genuine: China’s salami-slicing in the South China Sea has proceeded for over a decade through artificial island construction, coast guard deployments, and the harassment of Philippine and Vietnamese fishermen, and the “nature reserve” gambit is a new and creative iteration of the same strategy. The proceduralist response — that the matter should be taken to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) arbitral tribunals — has the appeal of rule-following but the disadvantage that China rejected UNCLOS jurisdiction after the Philippines’ successful 2016 arbitration ruling, which found China’s nine-dash line claim to have no legal basis, and Beijing has simply ignored that ruling since.
The mainstream reading also tends to frame this as primarily a US-China bilateral contest, which both misrepresents the stakes and flatters Beijing’s preferred narrative of a hegemonic contest between two superpowers, with smaller claimant states as passive objects rather than subjects with interests and rights of their own.
A different read
Let’s start with the legal innovation at stake, because it is worth understanding precisely. China is not, on the face of it, claiming sovereignty over these waters through the nature reserve designation. It is attempting something subtler: using the conservation obligations that many coastal states have accepted under multilateral environmental frameworks to impose access restrictions that produce the practical effects of sovereignty without triggering the legal tests that a direct sovereignty claim would face. If China can establish that foreign navies conducting freedom of navigation operations are “disturbing protected ecosystems,” it creates a parallel legal track that bypasses UNCLOS entirely.
This is genuinely clever and genuinely dangerous, not because it will work under any rigorous application of international law, but because international law, in practice, is enforced by power and legitimised by consensus — and both of those are precisely what China is attempting to erode. The 2016 UNCLOS ruling was as clear a legal judgment as the system produces. China ignored it. If the nature reserve designation is met with the same combination of verbal condemnation and operational acceptance, the precedent is set: international environmental law can be weaponised to achieve what international maritime law has explicitly prohibited.
The US response deserves credit for naming the game clearly. But American credibility in the South China Sea has an awkward feature: Washington has not itself ratified UNCLOS, which it signed in 1994, because the Senate has never mustered the votes. This is not merely an abstract embarrassment. It means that the US defends the rules-based maritime order on the basis of a treaty it has not formally committed to — a position that sophisticated Chinese diplomats exploit at every multilateral forum and that genuinely complicates coalition-building among Southeast Asian states that have ratified the convention.
The claimant states most directly affected — the Philippines and Vietnam in particular — are the ones whose response matters most. The Philippines under its current government has been notably more assertive than under its predecessor, and Manila’s decision to publicise Chinese coast guard harassment incidents, rather than quietly absorbing them as previous administrations did, has changed the information environment significantly. Vietnam’s response has been more cautious, reflecting its land border with China and its deeper economic entanglement. But both states have legitimate legal standing that the United States, for all its naval power, does not possess in the same direct form.
The broader concern is one of regime integrity. The system of international law governing the seas was painstakingly constructed over decades, primarily to constrain great powers from using raw force to dominate smaller states’ maritime resources. It is not a perfect system. It has its own enforcement gaps and is plainly more effective at regulating the behaviour of rule-following states than of determined revisionists. But it represents the best available alternative to a purely transactional world in which the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must — a Thucydidean world that would be very bad for the Philippines, very bad for Vietnam, and ultimately very bad for the global economy that depends on South China Sea shipping lanes.
What to watch
First: the response of ASEAN as a body. The association’s chronic inability to issue a unified statement on South China Sea disputes — owing to Cambodian and Laotian deference to Beijing — has been its most consistent institutional failure. Whether the nature reserve designation provokes enough regional outrage to force a more unified posture will be an early test.
Second: the Philippines’ legal response. Manila won in 2016 and should be considering whether the nature reserve designation constitutes a fresh violation triggering further arbitral proceedings — even knowing that China will reject the outcome.
Third: whether any third-party states — EU members, Japan, Australia — formally associate themselves with the US statement. Multilateral condemnation is categorically more effective than US-China bilateralism in this context.
Fourth: US Senate movement on UNCLOS ratification. This is perennially moribund, but it is the single step that would most strengthen America’s legal credibility in precisely this kind of confrontation.
— J