Colombia's right turn and the day-one test

Colombia inaugurated its new right-wing president this week, and within hours the country received two signals simultaneously: the United States pledged $1 billion in security assistance as the incoming president pledged an aggressive anti-narcotics crackdown, while a car bomb attack shook the country in what analysts attributed to armed groups signalling their resistance to the new security posture. The BBC separately reported the $1 billion offer was extended on the president’s first day in office. The ELN guerrilla group, Colombia’s largest remaining insurgency, has been reported to be preparing for a return to full-scale war following the collapse of peace talks under the previous administration.

The received wisdom

The progressive critique of this configuration is coherent and should be heard. The United States has a long and not always distinguished record of backing right-wing Latin American governments with security assistance that ends up funding human rights abuses, militarising civil society, and entrenching corruption under the banner of the “war on drugs.” Plan Colombia, launched in 2000, did produce measurable reductions in coca cultivation and FARC strength — but it also killed civilians, created displacement, and has not resolved the underlying political economy of narcotics. The argument that the US is once again enabling a hardline government to prosecute a war that will primarily be felt by poor rural communities, while the structural drivers of the drug trade (demand in American cities, money-laundering in the US financial system) go unaddressed, is not a fringe argument. It is the view of substantial bodies of development literature and regional human rights organisations.

The peace-process school would add that the previous government’s talks with the ELN, however flawed and halting, represented the only framework that had a chance of addressing the political roots of the insurgency. Abandoning that framework on inauguration day, they would argue, guarantees renewed violence.

A different read

There is another reading — less comfortable but not less honest.

The peace-process model in Colombia has a two-decade record. The FARC demobilisation agreement of 2016 was a genuine achievement; it also produced a generation of former combatants who were subsequently abandoned by the state, re-recruited into dissident factions, and returned to arms. The Colombian state’s failure to consolidate territorial control in demilitarised areas — a failure of the centre-left governments that succeeded the peace agreement, not only of the armed groups — meant that the coca economy simply reasserted itself in the vacuum. The notion that another negotiation with the ELN would produce a different result, without the state capacity to actually govern the territory that becomes available, is a proposition that the evidence does not strongly support.

The harder question is whether the right-wing hardline model has a better track record. It does not, clearly, in the long run. Álvaro Uribe’s “democratic security” policy produced real security gains in the 2000s that were real and measurable — homicide rates fell, FARC combat capacity was degraded, cities became liveable. It also produced the “false positives” scandal, in which army units killed civilians and dressed them as guerrillas to inflate body counts, a scandal that remains one of the most serious military human rights cases in Latin American history. The hardline model creates its own pathologies.

What the billion-dollar commitment does accomplish, immediately, is signal to the new government that Washington is back as an engaged partner after the relative estrangement of the previous years. The Trump administration’s foreign policy in Latin America has been transactional and focused on migration and narcotics — both of which the new Colombian president has aligned himself with. The $1 billion is not philanthropy; it comes with conditions, interoperability requirements, and the quiet expectation of cooperation on deportation and extradition. Whether that transaction is ultimately good for Colombians — as opposed to good for American domestic political messaging on border security and fentanyl — is the question that the celebration of the “alliance” tends to paper over.

The car bomb on inauguration day is a data point, not a verdict. Armed groups routinely use early displays of force against new governments to establish the terms of negotiation or intimidation. The FARC used similar tactics on multiple occasions. The question is whether the Colombian state — under this government, with this level of US support — can establish enough territorial and institutional dominance to make the escalation costly for the insurgents rather than costly for the civilian population. That is an empirical question that cannot be answered in the first week of an administration. History suggests caution.

What to watch

First: the conditions attached to the $1 billion in US security aid. Congressional human rights requirements (the Leahy Law standards) technically constrain which units can receive US assistance. Whether those constraints are applied rigorously or waived will reveal whether the bilateral relationship is genuinely rules-based.

Second: the ELN’s operational tempo in the first 60 days. If attacks escalate significantly, it will indicate that the guerrilla leadership calculates they can impose costs on the government faster than US assistance can be operationalised. If attacks plateau, it may signal a return to covert negotiation.

Third: coca eradication data. The new president has pledged aggressive eradication; historically this drives cultivation to new areas and stresses border relations with Venezuela and Ecuador, both of which have their own relationships with armed groups.

Fourth: the fate of any demobilised FARC combatants under the 2016 agreement. Their treatment — whether their legal protections are maintained or suspended — will signal whether this government respects inherited international commitments or treats them as the previous administration’s mistakes.

— J