Russia bans Yabloko and ends the pretence

A Moscow court ruled on Monday that Yabloko — Russia’s only registered liberal, anti-war party — cannot participate in next month’s parliamentary elections. The case was brought by Rodina, a pro-Kremlin nationalist party, on grounds that Yabloko had published material supportive of the “international LGBT movement,” which Russia’s Supreme Court designated as extremist in 2023, and that a senior party member had quoted Soviet-era song lyrics without authorisation. Russia’s financial monitoring service additionally alleged that Yabloko received money from Germany and the United States. Hundreds of people — described as mostly young — gathered outside the Moscow courthouse to support the party, singing songs and waving flags. When the verdict was announced, many chanted “Shame!” Yabloko had campaigned under the slogan “For peace and freedom! For a life without fear!” All other ten parties permitted in the election either support the war in Ukraine or decline to criticise it openly. Al Jazeera also reported on the decision, noting United Russia’s ratings have fallen to 33 percent.

The received wisdom

The progressive-liberal framing of this story is, in outline, entirely correct: Russia is a declining autocracy that has cannibalized its own civic institutions, and the exclusion of Yabloko is the latest act in a long purge of genuine political opposition that accelerated after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and intensified dramatically after February 2022. Navalny is dead. Dissidents are imprisoned. Independent media is closed. Civil society has been systematically defunded and criminalised. The Yabloko ruling is, on this reading, simply another brick in an already-complete wall. The people singing outside the courthouse are brave, and their bravery deserves acknowledgment. International condemnation is the appropriate response.

There is also the structural argument: elections in authoritarian systems serve functions different from elections in democracies. They are not designed to produce accountability; they are designed to produce legitimacy, to demonstrate the impotence of opposition, and to gather data about the geographic distribution of discontent. Yabloko’s inclusion might, as observers noted, have allowed the Kremlin to use the party’s low results as evidence that anti-war sentiment in Russia is negligible. The fact that the Kremlin has apparently changed this calculation, choosing exclusion rather than theatrical defeat, is itself informative.

A different read

What makes the Yabloko ruling genuinely significant is precisely what it reveals about the Kremlin’s current calculation — and the information that calculation contains.

Autocracies are not static. They are systems of political management that must adapt continuously to changing threat environments. The decision to permit Yabloko to contest elections would have been, in the Kremlin’s political logic, a signal of confidence: we can afford to let them run because they will lose anyway, and their losing will be useful. The decision to ban them is a signal of anxiety: we are no longer confident that losing is guaranteed.

BBC reporting confirms that United Russia’s ratings have dropped to 33 percent, “amid inflation, internet blackouts and drone strikes.” Yabloko’s support had been surging. The party had been deepening its resonance among precisely the demographic — young, urban — most represented in the crowd outside the courthouse on Monday. To use a term from authoritarian politics literature, the Kremlin appears to have judged that the risk of electoral “activation” — of a credible opposition forcing into view the real scale of anti-war sentiment — outweighed the legitimacy benefit of letting Yabloko fail.

This matters for the West’s strategic picture in several ways. First, it suggests that the internal cost of the Ukraine war is reaching levels that concern the Kremlin at the level of domestic politics — not just economic strain but actual political mobilisation. Russia’s previous elections since 2022 had been managed with relatively low drama. The decision to deploy Rodina as a legal instrument against Yabloko, and to suppress the party under ludicrous pretexts (a copyright infringement claim over Soviet-era song lyrics is not a serious legal argument even by Russian standards), suggests something more urgent is in play.

Second, the Yabloko decision illuminates a recurring dynamic in authoritarian systems under stress: the tendency to foreclose political escape valves precisely when the pressure is highest. The Kremlin has previously used the existence of nominal opposition parties to absorb dissent into controllable channels. Shutting those channels in response to mounting pressure is historically associated with brittleness, not stability. The Soviet Union in its final decade managed the Gorbachev moment precisely because glasnost created an outlet. Putin’s Russia is moving in the opposite direction.

Third, the demographics of the courthouse crowd matter. Young Russians — those who grew up after the Soviet collapse — are the generation least invested in the narrative of imperial restoration. Their presence, singing songs in public support of a banned party, represents a form of political expression that carries genuine personal risk in wartime Russia. The fact that they showed up anyway is not a revolution; it is a data point. But it is the kind of data point that intelligence analysts and military planners on both sides of the conflict will be reading carefully.

For Western policy, the Yabloko decision should reinforce a conclusion that some establishments have resisted: this war ends in one of two ways. Either Putin reaches a negotiated settlement that he can sell domestically, or his government faces political pressures that eventually destabilise his grip on power. The exclusion of Yabloko makes the second scenario marginally more plausible, because it signals that the Kremlin itself believes the stability they have manufactured is becoming harder to maintain.

What to watch

  • Turnout figures in September’s parliamentary elections — a low-turnout result, especially in urban centres, will be read as passive protest and will be noted by both Russian liberals and Western governments.
  • Whether any Yabloko candidates attempt to stand as independents, and whether the regime prosecutes them.
  • The trajectory of United Russia’s approval ratings through the winter, when the energy-price and inflation pressures on the Russian household will intensify.
  • Any further moves against young Russians who were publicly visible in support of Yabloko — surveillance and selective prosecution of protest participants has been a consistent Kremlin tool.

— J