Assad sentenced to death: justice or theatre?

A Syrian court on Tuesday sentenced former President Bashar al-Assad — currently living in exile in Russia — to death in absentia, along with his cousin Atef Najib and other regime officials. The BBC reported the sentence was for “crimes against humanity and war crimes” committed during Syria’s fourteen-year civil war, which killed an estimated half a million people and displaced more than half the country’s population. Al Jazeera’s footage captured Syrians responding with the words “justice at last.” NPR noted the court also sentenced Assad’s brother along with other senior officials. Assad has been in Moscow since the fall of his government in late 2024, and Russia has given no indication it will extradite him.

The received wisdom

The dominant progressive framing — and it is a fair one — holds that this sentence represents a necessary milestone in Syria’s transitional justice process. The logic: accountability matters, even symbolically, even in absentia. The Nuremberg trials established the principle that heads of state can be held criminally responsible for atrocities, and subsequent decades of international jurisprudence have built on that foundation through the International Criminal Court, ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and hybrid courts like the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. In this reading, Syria’s new government is doing something admirable: asserting the rule of law, creating a formal record, providing a measure of acknowledgment to survivors, and laying the groundwork for Assad’s eventual prosecution — however distant that prospect may seem — should the geopolitical winds shift. Human rights organisations and many Syrian diaspora communities understandably see this as a meaningful step, however incomplete.

A different read

The question a sceptic must honestly raise is not whether Assad deserves to die for what he did — the chemical attacks on Ghouta, the barrel bombs on Aleppo’s hospitals, the industrial-scale torture in Saydnaya prison are as well-documented as any atrocity in modern history. The question is whether an in-absentia death sentence by a transitional government whose own institutional legitimacy is still being contested advances, retards, or simply bypasses the difficult work of genuine accountability.

History offers cautionary examples. The trials of former officials following Iraq’s 2003 transition produced sentences — including Saddam Hussein’s hanging — that satisfied an understandable hunger for vengeance but did little to build the civic institutions Iraq needed. The trials were perceived by Sunni communities as victor’s justice, deepened sectarian mistrust, and created martyrdom narratives that fed the insurgency. The concern with Syria’s proceedings is not that Assad is innocent but that trials conducted in the absence of the defendant, without the due process standards required by international law, risk producing records that future governments — or defence lawyers with time and resources — can challenge as legally defective.

There is also the question of Russia. Assad is sitting in Moscow, and Moscow is not a signatory to the ICC in any meaningful sense. Unless Russia’s strategic calculus changes — which would require either a comprehensive normalisation of the Kremlin’s international position or a dramatic shift in Russian domestic politics — the sentence is unenforceable. The danger is that it becomes, over time, a trophy on the wall rather than a stepping stone to genuine extradition. Syria’s new government will be under pressure to show results; each year that Assad lives comfortably in Russian exile while a death sentence hangs on paper will erode public trust in the institutions issuing it.

The right framing here is transitional justice’s hardest lesson: the objective is not punishment alone but truth and sustainable governance. Hybrid courts like the ECCC in Cambodia, for all their slowness, at least produced evidentiary records that Cambodians largely accept as legitimate. The faster track — victor’s tribunal, in-absentia sentence, maximum penalty — can satisfy an immediate emotional need while undermining the longer-term project. Syria’s new authorities should be commended for attempting accountability at all; they should be pressed to ensure the legal architecture beneath it can bear the weight of history.

What to watch

  • Whether Russia signals any willingness to discuss extradition as part of a broader normalisation with the new Syrian government — and what price Assad’s head would command on the diplomatic market.
  • The ICC’s response: does the court treat this as complementary to its own proceedings, or does the death penalty (which the ICC cannot impose) create a jurisdictional tension?
  • How Sunni, Alawi, and Christian communities within Syria respond to the sentence — a fractured reception would signal unhealed wounds that transitional justice has not yet reached.
  • The status of Atef Najib, Maher al-Assad, and other named defendants who have scattered to different third countries: each presents a different extradition challenge.

— J