For thirty minutes on Thursday, mobile internet service across Taipei and six other Taiwanese cities and localities slowed to 256 kilobits per second — roughly the speed of a late-1990s dial-up connection, fast enough for text messages but little else. The throttle was deliberate. It was part of the final phase of Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercises, the island’s largest civil-defence and military drills, which this year incorporated civilians, reservists, and local governments more extensively than any previous iteration. Telecom operators had been instructed to cap mobile bandwidth at 256 Kbps to simulate communications conditions under a Chinese blockade or invasion. President Lai Ching-te apologised to the public for the inconvenience and asked for understanding. Metro stations locked their gates for simulated air-raid drills. Hospitals rehearsed relocating critical operations to underground facilities. In the days surrounding the exercise, Taiwan’s Defence Ministry recorded 18 Chinese warplanes and 11 navy ships operating around the island.
The received wisdom
The standard progressive-realist reading is that Taiwan’s defence drills are both necessary and insufficient. Necessary, because China’s military posture is genuinely threatening — coercive exercises, grey-zone incursions, and an accelerating modernisation program all point to a PLA with the capability if not yet the political order to act. Insufficient, because thirty minutes of slow internet and air-raid simulations in metro stations is not serious preparation for the kind of combined-arms assault that a Taiwan Strait contingency would actually involve. What Taiwan really needs, this argument goes, is a much larger standing military, a credible mobilisation system for its 2.3 million reservists (currently undertrained and underequipped), and sustained American security guarantees — none of which are settled matters. The drills are progress, but they risk producing a false sense of readiness that substitutes for harder choices.
The critique is partly right. Taiwan’s reserve system has long been assessed as one of its weakest links, and exercises that involve civilians waiting in metro stations — however earnest — do not substitute for training, equipment procurement, and the political will to sustain a defence budget above 2.5% of GDP.
A different read
But something real is happening in these Han Kuang exercises that deserves more credit than the “nice-but-insufficient” framing allows.
The internet throttle is deceptively significant. Taiwan is not a country famous for tolerating government inconvenience; its civil society is vocal, its media is free, and a thirty-minute internet shutdown in a major city would ordinarily generate immediate political backlash. The fact that it passed without serious protest — a Hong Kong tourist interviewed by AP said he found it “convincing” and that he understood the necessity — suggests something important about the evolution of Taiwanese public opinion on defence. What the military is doing by inserting civilian inconvenience into the exercises is building what strategists call “societal resilience” — the population’s psychological and practical capacity to function under duress. Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland have spent decades on exactly this kind of unglamorous civil-defence infrastructure. Taiwan is arriving late, but it is arriving.
The deliberate decision to make the drills disruptive also represents a departure from a long-standing Taiwanese political equilibrium. For decades, Taiwan’s governments — whether KMT or DPP — managed cross-strait tensions by keeping the defence conversation at an elite level, away from the daily lives of ordinary citizens. The calculus was that visible military preparations might provoke Beijing and alarm the business community. That calculus is being revised. The Lai government’s willingness to shut metro gates and throttle 5G is a signal that Taipei has concluded the cost of complacency now exceeds the cost of visible preparation.
This matters for deterrence theory in a way that goes beyond hardware counts. A population that has rehearsed disruption — that knows what degraded communications feel like, that has thought about how hospitals and metro systems function in a crisis — is genuinely harder to subjugate than one that has not. The Ukrainian experience from 2022 onward is instructive: much of what made Ukrainian resistance surprisingly effective was not just weapons but social cohesion, pre-existing civil-defence habits (maintained from the Soviet era and reinforced since 2014), and a population that had mentally prepared for the possibility of invasion.
Taiwan cannot replicate Ukraine’s advantages — its geography as an island creates different vulnerabilities, particularly regarding supply chains and air cover — but the underlying insight applies. A credible defence includes, and perhaps centrally requires, a population that takes the threat seriously enough to accept inconvenience.
The Chinese military’s ongoing grey-zone operations — 18 warplanes and 11 ships in the two days around the drill — have their own cumulative effect on Taiwanese public opinion. Every incursion that triggers an alarm and disrupts daily life nudges the population toward greater, not lesser, acceptance of defence expenditure and civil preparedness. Beijing’s coercive pressure may be counterproductively educating the very society it seeks to intimidate.
What to watch
Watch Taiwan’s defence budget in the upcoming legislative session — whether it moves above 2.5% of GDP will be a concrete indicator of political will behind the exercise rhetoric. Watch the reservist training programme: legislation passed in 2023 extended mandatory training from five days to two weeks, but implementation has been uneven. Watch Beijing’s official response to the drills — the language will signal whether China views Taiwan’s preparations as destabilising or merely theatrical. And watch the AP’s note that Taiwan’s drills suggest deeper alignment with the US: if Washington is actively co-designing the exercise scenarios, that is a qualitative shift in the security relationship that goes beyond arms sales.
— J