The United States and Iran have been locked in a low-grade naval confrontation since the US struck Iranian nuclear facilities in late 2025. Now the confrontation is acquiring a new legal dimension. President Donald Trump said on Friday he intends to declare the Strait of Hormuz — the narrow chokepoint through which roughly 20 percent of the world’s oil supply passes — a United States “territory.” The statement was made in the context of ongoing naval operations in the Persian Gulf and comes as a second US aircraft carrier moves to relieve the long-deployed USS Abraham Lincoln, whose crew have been at sea for more than 250 days. The Strait, 21 miles wide at its narrowest, lies between Iran to the north and Oman and the UAE to the south — none of which are American soil by any recognised legal standard.
The received wisdom
The liberal-internationalist and diplomatic establishment will read this as reckless unilateralism. The Strait of Hormuz is a textbook case of an international strait — governed by Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which guarantees “transit passage” rights to all nations. The US itself, though not formally a party to UNCLOS, has long relied on its customary-law provisions and championed freedom of navigation as a cornerstone of its maritime doctrine. Declaring it American territory, even rhetorically, hands Iran a propaganda victory, alienates Oman — whose coast forms the southern flank of the strait — and could fracture the fragile coalition of Gulf states quietly supportive of the US posture against Tehran. The responsible reading is that this is destabilising and risks turning a manageable confrontation into an unmanageable one.
That critique deserves to be heard. But it also misses something important about what is actually being contested here — and about the strategic logic that may be driving the declaration.
A different read
Start with the military reality. The USS Lincoln has been on station in the Gulf for over 250 days — an unprecedented deployment duration that has raised alarms about crew morale and readiness. A second carrier is now en route. The US is, in effect, maintaining a permanent two-carrier presence in what it regards as contested waters. The gap between that operational reality and the legal fiction that the Strait is simply “international waters” in the conventional sense has been widening for years.
The legal position is more contested than UNCLOS triumphalists admit. Iran has never ratified UNCLOS. Tehran has periodically claimed that the Strait, because it lies within Iranian and Omani territorial waters, is subject to Iranian consent for military passage. This is a maximalist position that the rest of the world rejects — but the underlying point, that the Strait is not simply the high seas, is not frivolous. What the US is doing, in a blunt Trumpian idiom, is asserting that its naval presence constitutes a form of functional sovereignty — the kind of claim that empires have historically advanced over strategic chokepoints.
There are instructive historical parallels. Britain, at the height of its naval supremacy, did not formally claim the Strait of Gibraltar as a “territory” beyond the Rock itself — but it enforced passage rights through a combination of treaty arrangements and overwhelming force. The difference was that 19th-century Britain wrapped its power in the language of international commerce and freedom of trade, not explicit territorial assertion. Trump’s approach is the opposite: baldly declaratory, with the legal underpinning to be determined later, if at all.
This matters because the Hormuz declaration is probably not, at its core, a legal argument. It is a deterrence signal. Trump has always used language as a weapon of psychological warfare, and the message here is aimed at Tehran: the US Navy does not transit the Strait on Iran’s sufferance; it controls it. Seen in that frame, the declaration is of a piece with the “fire and fury” language toward North Korea in 2017 — provocative, legally absurd on its face, but potentially effective in communicating resolve. The North Korea parallel cuts both ways, of course: Pyongyang still has its weapons.
The deeper question is what comes after the declaration. Iran’s response to the USS Lincoln’s extended presence has so far been contained. Tehran knows that a direct confrontation with two American carrier groups would be suicidal. But Iran has proxies, mines, and patience. The risk is not a frontal naval battle; it is a miscalculation — a Houthi missile aimed at a tanker, an Iranian drone straying too close to a US vessel, a nervous lieutenant giving an order he was not authorised to give. Territorial declarations that have no legal standing are not harmless; they create the kind of ambiguity in which accidents happen, because they change the implicit rules of engagement without the explicit legal framework to govern them.
There is also the question of America’s Gulf partners. Oman, which has historically served as a diplomatic back-channel to Iran, is unlikely to welcome a unilateral American assertion of sovereignty over waters that touch its own coast. The UAE and Saudi Arabia have made significant strategic bets on US protection — but they will be watching carefully whether Washington’s maximalism draws them into a conflict they cannot control.
What to watch
- Oman’s official response: Muscat’s reaction will be the most significant regional signal. A formal protest would indicate Washington has overplayed its hand with a key partner.
- Iran’s IRGC naval activity: Watch for Iranian fast-boat harassment operations near US vessels — the classic asymmetric response to American escalatory statements.
- Congressional reaction: Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings or formal questioning of the legal authority behind any territory proclamation would be the domestic check to watch.
- Oil market response: If Brent crude spikes past $120 on the declaration, the administration will face real economic pressure to clarify or walk back the claim.
— J