Jared Kushner, President Trump’s son-in-law and senior Middle East envoy, met Hamas leader Khalil al-Hayya in Egypt on Sunday, the first such direct encounter since a ceasefire came into effect on 10 October last year. The meeting, held in Cairo, also included Trump’s Board of Peace envoy Nickolai Mladenov, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and representatives of Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey — the three principal mediators. The talks reportedly focused on Hamas’s weapons decommissioning, the withdrawal of Israeli Defence Forces from Gaza, and humanitarian reconstruction. The meeting followed a joint statement by eight Muslim nations — Egypt, the UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia — condemning Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s rejection last week of Trump’s 15-point Gaza peace plan. That plan, developed under Trump’s Board of Peace, had called for Hamas’s “complete disarmament,” a full IDF withdrawal, and Gaza’s reconstruction under a new civilian Palestinian administration. NPR reported that Kushner and the other envoys were due to meet Netanyahu on Monday to attempt to advance the proposals.
The received wisdom
The standard progressive framing of this episode emphasises Israel’s intransigence and frames Netanyahu’s rejection of the 15-point plan as the central obstacle to peace. From this perspective, Kushner’s shuttle diplomacy represents a genuine — if improbable — effort to break the deadlock, and the endorsement of Trump’s plan by eight Muslim-majority nations is evidence of an unusually broad coalition for Palestinian civilian governance. The argument goes: if even Saudi Arabia and the UAE, not traditionally Hamas sympathisers, back a plan that requires Hamas disarmament and IDF withdrawal, then Israel is the outlier, and the international community should pressure Netanyahu accordingly. The war’s toll — more than 73,000 Palestinians killed, according to Gaza’s health ministry figures cited by the UN as reliable, with 1.9 million people displaced — gives this argument genuine moral weight. No serious observer can look at the humanitarian situation and feel comfortable.
A different read
Grant all of that weight, and then ask the harder question: why is Trump’s plan structured in a way that makes Israeli acceptance almost impossible? And what does the architecture of the Board of Peace actually tell us about the administration’s strategic coherence?
Netanyahu’s stated condition is unambiguous: full Hamas disarmament before any IDF withdrawal. The Israeli prime minister has said, in writing, that the “IDF will not carry out any withdrawal until Hamas is genuinely disarmed.” This is not an unreasonable opening position for a head of government whose country suffered the worst terrorist attack in its history on 7 October 2023. One can disagree with his maximalism while understanding its domestic political logic. Any Israeli leader who agreed to withdraw before Hamas was verifiably disarmed would be politically finished — and probably rightly so, given what happened the last time Israeli forces left Gaza.
Trump’s 15-point plan, as described by the BBC, calls for “complete disarmament” — but the sequencing appears to require Israeli withdrawal in parallel with or prior to verified disarmament, rather than after it. That sequencing is the entire dispute. It is not a minor technical quibble; it is the central question on which every past Gaza diplomacy effort has foundered. Kushner’s genius in 2020 was to redesign the Abraham Accords architecture to work around Hamas entirely; the approach worked precisely because it did not require Hamas’s cooperation. The current framework inverts that logic: it places Hamas at the centre of the table and asks Israel to trust an organisation that killed 1,200 of its citizens to progressively disarm while retaining some operational presence.
The eight Muslim-nation coalition endorsing the plan is genuinely significant and should not be dismissed. These are states with real leverage over Hamas’s political wing. But their endorsement of a plan is not the same as their ability to enforce it. Qatar has hosted Hamas’s political leadership for over a decade without being able to meaningfully constrain its military decisions. Turkey under Erdogan has expressed solidarity with Hamas while simultaneously calling for the Strait of Hormuz to reopen — a country whose strategic interests are complex and whose reliability as an enforcer of Palestinian disarmament is, to put it diplomatically, untested.
There is a version of this process that could work. It would require the sequencing to be reversed: verified Hamas disarmament first — with IAEA-style inspection mechanisms and international guarantees — and then a phased IDF withdrawal tied to compliance benchmarks. It would require the Arab coalition to put real, tangible consequences on the table for Hamas non-compliance, not merely rhetorical condemnation. And it would require Netanyahu, or his successor, to accept that some form of Palestinian civilian administration of Gaza is both necessary and compatible with Israeli security. None of these conditions currently exist.
What we have instead is a process that allows all parties to demonstrate diplomatic busyness while the ceasefire holds nominally and Israeli strikes on “terrorists” in Khan Yunis continue. The Board of Peace’s expansive mandate — it has been tasked with resolving conflicts “worldwide” since its Gaza origins — suggests an administration more interested in the optics of peacemaking than its structural requirements.
What to watch
Watch Monday’s Netanyahu-Kushner meeting: if Netanyahu tables a specific counter-proposal on sequencing, that would be a genuine development. If he simply reiterated the disarmament-first demand without modification, the diplomacy returns to stalemate. Watch whether Hamas’s response to Sunday’s talks — which it had not issued publicly by Sunday evening — signals any flexibility on timelines for weapons decommissioning. Watch whether the eight-nation joint statement translates into any concrete diplomatic pressure on Hamas to accept the sequencing Israel requires; condemnation of Israel’s rejection is easy, enforcement of Hamas compliance is hard. And watch whether the ceasefire holds after the latest IDF strikes in Khan Yunis, which Hamas has characterised as violations.
— J