Brazil’s presidential election campaign formally opened on Sunday, with incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva launching his bid for a historic fourth term at Vila Euclides football stadium in São Bernardo do Campo — the industrial city where his political career began when, as a 33-year-old union leader, he organised the strikes that helped end Brazil’s military dictatorship in 1979. The 80-year-old president vowed to keep the far-right from power, improve education and healthcare, develop Brazil’s vast rare-earth deposits, and pursue the “rich bosses” of organised crime rather than “the crooks in the favelas.” He told supporters he would not allow the “shameless” right to return. Simultaneously, Flávio Bolsonaro, the 45-year-old senator and son of former president Jair Bolsonaro — who was jailed in 2025 for 27 years after being convicted of plotting to overturn the 2022 election — held his launch event on Rio’s Copacabana beach, wearing a bullet-proof vest beneath a yellow Brazil shirt. Flávio told supporters he would “fight this system.” Polls indicate Lula holds a narrow lead — 43% to Bolsonaro’s 40% — in a projected run-off scheduled for 25 October if, as expected, neither candidate clears 50% in the 4 October first round. The contest has drawn international attention, with analyst André Pagliarini calling it “the single most important electoral contest this year in the world.”
The received wisdom
The standard liberal framing presents this election as a referendum on democratic governance versus authoritarian temptation — with Lula representing, despite his party’s corruption history and his own imprisonment, the continuity of Brazil’s democratic institutions, and Flávio Bolsonaro representing the ghost of his father’s assault on those institutions. The fact that Jair Bolsonaro is behind bars for plotting to overturn an election result is, in this telling, the most important contextual fact: voters would be choosing between a president who accepted his original 2002 victory and then twice accepted defeats before winning a democratic mandate in 2022, and a candidate who is, literally, his imprisoned father’s political proxy. The left sees Flávio’s rally on Copacabana as a deliberate invocation of the mass Bolsonaro mobilisations of 2022 — and notes that the crowds were far smaller. Progressive commentary emphasises Trump’s interference: the US has designated Brazil’s two largest criminal organisations as terrorist groups, Hegseth has threatened military operations against Latin American drug traffickers, and a US State Department video declared “American dominance in the western hemisphere will never be questioned again.”
A different read
The mainstream framing captures something real but flattens a more complicated picture. Begin with Lula himself. At 80, after surviving a 2024 brain haemorrhage that put him in intensive care, Lula is seeking a fourth presidential term. His first two terms, from 2002 to 2010, were broadly successful — he oversaw dramatic poverty reduction, expanded social welfare programmes, and improved Brazil’s global standing. His current third term has been less straightforward. The corruption scandals that blighted his second term have not been fully reckoned with. His Workers’ Party, the PT, remains associated with the Petrobras scandal and the broader institutional rot that gave Bolsonaro his original opening. And Lula’s public framing — promising to go after crime bosses in “penthouses” — is a rhetorical appeal that sounds rousing in a stadium but has not, in three prior presidential terms, translated into a decisive reduction in Brazil’s extraordinary levels of organised crime violence.
The Flávio Bolsonaro phenomenon is worth taking seriously rather than simply dismissing. He is not his father. He has explicitly distanced himself from the Bolsonaro surname at points during his campaign, understanding its toxicity with swing voters. He is younger, more polished, and positioned — crucially — as an ally of Trump at a moment when Washington is projecting considerable hemispheric power. The US designation of Brazil’s Red Command and PCC as terrorist organisations gives Flávio a potential governance tool that Lula cannot easily replicate: a cooperative relationship with Washington that might facilitate joint operations against the crime factions that genuinely terrorise Brazilian cities. Whether Flávio could deliver on that promise is a different question, but it is a real political appeal in a country where organised crime is existential for millions of citizens.
The US interference question is genuinely difficult. The Trump administration’s behaviour in the hemisphere — Maduro’s abduction in January, the Panama Canal rhetoric, the military operations against Caribbean drug traffickers — represents an assertion of Monroe Doctrine maximalism not seen since the Cold War. Some of Lula’s supporters feared, not unreasonably, that the terrorist designation of Brazilian criminal groups could be used as a pretext for intervention. That fear is probably overblown — Brazil is not Venezuela, and its institutions are substantially more robust — but it is not irrational. The State Department’s video declaring American hemispheric dominance is exactly the kind of ham-fisted messaging that drives even pro-American Latin Americans toward anti-Yankee reflexes.
The right-of-centre case for this election’s significance is not that Flávio would be a better president than Lula, but that Brazil’s rare-earth deposits — the world’s second largest after China’s — represent a strategic asset of global importance at a moment of intense competition between Washington and Beijing. Lula’s relationship with China is warmer than Flávio’s. A Brazil that aligns its rare-earth policy with China in exchange for investment is a very different geopolitical outcome from a Brazil that develops those resources in partnership with the West. Neither candidate’s platform has made this a central campaign issue, which is itself notable.
What to watch
Watch the first-round result on 4 October: if Flávio performs significantly above 40%, the run-off arithmetic changes and his momentum narrative could move undecided voters. Watch whether Trump explicitly endorses Flávio, which would likely backfire — American endorsements tend to generate anti-Americanism in Brazilian swing constituencies — or whether the administration maintains a more tactical distance. Watch the crime and security issue in urban Brazil: any major gang-related massacre or political violence before 4 October could shift voter sentiment in directions that are hard to predict. And watch Lula’s health; at 80, after a 2024 brain haemorrhage, any sign of physical decline before polling day would rearrange the race.
— J