President Donald Trump threatened on Monday to bomb Oman — a neutral Gulf state and longstanding US partner — if it “gets in the way” of Washington’s own diplomacy with Iran. The threat, reported by Fox News correspondent Trey Yingst, came as the sixty-day US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding formally expired, and as Iranian officials announced they had separately reached a preliminary understanding with Muscat over transit routes through the Strait of Hormuz. Trump declined to extend the MoU, telling reporters simply: “No.” His son-in-law and envoy Jared Kushner, meanwhile, held talks with both Hamas and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu that produced no breakthrough on Gaza. The simultaneity of these events — a collapsing diplomatic framework, a threat against an ally, and a stalled peace mission — offers a useful window into the architecture of an American foreign policy built almost entirely around personal leverage.
The received wisdom
The dominant reading of Trump’s maximum-pressure approach is that it works, at least in part, because its unpredictability keeps adversaries off-balance. The theory holds that conventional diplomatic signalling is too legible: enemies know exactly how far they can push before triggering a response, and they exploit that predictability. Trump, the argument goes, breaks that calculus. His willingness to threaten Oman — a country that shares a border with Iran and has maintained relationships with both Washington and Tehran precisely because of its value as a back-channel — can be read as a message to all parties that the US president will not be outmanoeuvred by diplomatic triangulation. Proponents of this view point to the fact that Iran remains under extraordinary economic stress after six months of partial Hormuz closure, and argue that the MoU’s collapse does not mean negotiations have failed; it may simply mean that Tehran has not yet conceded enough. If Oman is offering Iran a softer exit, neutralising that alternative forces Iran back to the harder American terms. The logic is internally coherent.
A different read
It is internally coherent — and strategically ruinous. The history of maximum-pressure campaigns against regional powers is not encouraging for the proposition that threatening intermediaries accelerates resolution. When the United States leaned on Pakistan to limit its role as a conduit between Washington and the Taliban in the early 2010s, it discovered that the leverage it had on Islamabad was finite, and that eliminating the back-channel did not bring the Taliban to terms faster — it simply removed an information link. The Oman situation is structurally analogous. Muscat’s value as a diplomatic interlocutor is a function of its perceived neutrality. Trump’s threat, even if never acted upon, partially destroys that neutrality by associating it publicly with US pressure. Al Jazeera’s reporting on the war’s Phase II progress notes that Iran is now offering a $30,000 bounty on US soldiers — a sign that Tehran is escalating in parallel with Oman’s peace overtures, not in spite of them. Far from being squeezed, Iran appears to be diversifying its pressure tools while Oman works the diplomatic flank.
There is also a domestic political dimension that the foreign-policy community underweights. A new poll published Monday finds Trump’s approval rating at 33 percent, with a majority of Americans now expressing concern about the Iran war. Maximum pressure requires domestic political durability that is beginning to erode. Lyndon Johnson discovered in 1968, Richard Nixon would discover with Watergate, and George W. Bush confirmed after Fallujah that a president conducting an unpopular war cannot simultaneously exhaust his political capital on other fronts. Trump has been doing both: picking fights with South Korea, threatening Oman, declining to extend a ceasefire framework, and watching his approval floor crack. The Hormuz strait carries approximately a fifth of the world’s oil and LNG supply. Six months of even partial closure is not a manageable inconvenience for American consumers; it is a sustained economic wound. The political cost of that wound accumulates whether or not the president appears strong.
The deeper problem with the Oman threat is what it reveals about decision-making architecture. Historical precedents for successful coercive diplomacy — Eisenhower’s 1956 Suez intervention, Nixon’s tilt toward Pakistan in 1971, Reagan’s arms-for-hostages negotiating (however scandalous its execution) — share a common feature: they were backed by coherent strategic concepts, however amoral. Trump’s approach lacks a coherent end-state. The MoU expired without extension, Kushner’s Gaza mission produced no breakthrough, and the backchannel with the IRGC that Trump claimed on Monday was promptly denied by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard. An IRGC spokesman told the semi-official Tasnim News Agency that Trump’s claim was “fantasies caused by the delusions and nightmares he has suffered as a result of defeat and desperation.” Whether that denial is accurate or not, the spectacle of the US president announcing backchannel talks that the alleged interlocutor publicly repudiates is not an advertisement for American diplomatic credibility.
The right instinct — applying pressure on Iran’s nuclear programme while seeking a comprehensive deal — is not wrong. But coercive diplomacy requires credible threats, not incoherent ones. Threatening Oman is not a credible threat; it is a public tantrum that undermines the one ally whose cooperation is irreplaceable for any diplomatic off-ramp. The smart move would have been to privately warn Muscat against offering Iran terms that diverge too sharply from Washington’s, while publicly maintaining that the US supports all efforts to reopen the strait. Instead, Trump chose a Fox News phone-in to announce a bombing threat against a country hosting the American airbase at Thumrait. That is the foreign policy of a man who has mistaken volume for strategy.
What to watch
- Whether Oman’s parallel talks with Iran produce a formal joint statement on transit routes before Washington can counter-offer — if they do, the US is effectively outmanoeuvred on Hormuz.
- Trump’s approval rating trajectory: if it continues below 35 percent through September, the domestic coalition for sustained military pressure begins to dissolve.
- The Kushner Gaza mission’s second phase: Netanyahu’s insistence on Hamas disarmament before reconstruction funds flow remains the central obstacle, and no creative formula has yet emerged.
- Any signal from the IRGC backchannel — if one genuinely exists — that Iran is willing to accept a nuclear framework; that would be the one development that could reorder the entire board.
— J