Meta in court and the platform regulation reckoning

A landmark federal trial opened this week pitting forty-one state attorneys-general against Meta Platforms, alleging that Facebook and Instagram were deliberately engineered to addict children and teenagers. Opening statements from the states painted a portrait of a company that internally documented the harms its products caused to young users and chose profit over protection. Meta knew it was hooking children on Facebook and Instagram, a BBC report found, citing testimony from the first day of proceedings in federal court. Separately, NPR reported that prosecutors opened with the blunt charge: “Profits won.” The trial is expected to last months and could produce the largest corporate-liability judgment in the history of American consumer-protection law.

The received wisdom

The progressive and mainstream centre framing is straightforward and not unreasonable: Big Tech companies have spent a decade deploying behavioural-science tricks — infinite scroll, algorithmic amplification, notification nudges — to maximise the time users spend on their platforms, and they knowingly extended these techniques to minors. Internal documents leaked from Meta over the past several years appear to confirm that the company’s own researchers raised red flags about Instagram’s effect on teenage girls’ mental health, and that executives weighed those concerns against commercial interests and largely continued as before. The state attorneys-general, drawn from both parties, argue that this constitutes a systematic violation of consumer-protection and product-liability law. From this vantage point, the trial is overdue accountability. Congress has failed for years to pass meaningful children’s online-safety legislation, paralysed by First Amendment concerns and lobbying, so the courts must step in. The trial, in this telling, is the moment the regulatory rubber finally meets the road.

A different read

There is a lot in that framing that is correct. Meta’s internal research did document harms, and the gap between what the company said publicly and what it knew privately is difficult to defend. But the trial also illustrates something the progressive accountability narrative tends to elide: why did it take nearly twenty years and forty-one separate state litigants to get here, rather than a coherent federal regulatory framework enacted by Congress?

The answer is partly structural. The United States has no dedicated digital-platform regulator with the mandate and technical capacity that, say, the UK’s Ofcom now possesses under the Online Safety Act 2023. The Federal Trade Commission, understaffed and perpetually outgunned by Silicon Valley’s legal firepower, has been the de facto regulator by default — and its tools were designed for a pre-smartphone world. Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, passed in 1996 when the web was a novelty, immunises platforms from liability for third-party content; the litigation is carefully constructed around product design rather than content to get around this shield, but the underlying legislative gap remains.

There is also a question about what “winning” actually achieves. Tobacco litigation in the 1990s produced enormous settlements and a legal architecture that constrained the industry, but it did not end smoking — it shifted costs, created a settlement fund, and eventually prompted regulatory action. The states are asking for sweeping structural changes to Instagram and Facebook, including algorithmic transparency, default safety settings for minors, and independent auditing. These are reasonable demands. But courts are poorly suited to write and enforce real-time platform-design standards; that is legislature and regulator work.

The deeper problem is one of institutional design. The European Union passed the Digital Services Act in 2022, creating enforceable obligations around algorithmic recommendation, advertising targeting at children, and systemic risk. The UK followed with its own framework. The United States has produced neither, in large part because any serious federal children’s-online-safety bill collides almost immediately with a tech lobby that frames every content or design restriction as a First Amendment issue — a claim that courts have occasionally, and not always persuasively, upheld.

There is also a historical irony worth noting. The same progressive coalition that is now cheering the states’ trial was, in the late 2010s, broadly enthusiastic about social media as a democratising, mobilising force. The platforms that now stand accused of radicalising teenagers were also credited with powering the Arab Spring, Black Lives Matter, and every organising effort that required mass instant communication. The technology was the same; the enthusiasm shifted when the costs became undeniable and the political valence changed. This does not exculpate Meta. But it should prompt some humility about whether the current political class has the institutional attention span to build a durable regulatory framework rather than simply extract a large cheque and move on.

The right lesson from this trial, whatever its verdict, is not that litigation is sufficient — it is that Congress needs to create a dedicated children’s digital-safety regulator with real teeth, real technical staff, and a mandate that survives the news cycle. The states are, essentially, doing Congress’s job for it. That should embarrass everyone in Washington.

What to watch

  • Whether the federal judge allows the states’ product-design theory to proceed without hitting Section 230 barriers — a ruling that would set a major precedent for future platform litigation.
  • Whether Meta settles before a verdict, as the tobacco companies eventually did, or fights to the end. A settlement would probably produce design concessions that matter more than a damages award.
  • Congressional reaction: does the trial finally break the legislative deadlock on children’s online-safety bills that have stalled for three consecutive sessions?
  • How other platforms — TikTok, YouTube, Snapchat — position themselves relative to this litigation, given that their exposure under similar product-liability theories is substantial.

— J