The United States national debt passed $40 trillion this week, having doubled in a decade. At the same time, US borrowing costs have risen again after brief relief earlier this year, as bond markets push yields back up. The convergence is not coincidental. Analysts and the BBC’s economics correspondents have been warning for weeks that the US economy is sending alarm bells — not of imminent crash, but of structural pressures that have no obvious political resolution. Consumer retrenchment is visible: Walmart has reported sales under strain as US shoppers pull back, a bellwether that typically signals softer demand to come. Meanwhile tariff-driven inflation expectations are keeping the Federal Reserve cautious about cuts.
The received wisdom
The dominant Keynesian-adjacent reading of this moment holds that the $40 trillion number, while alarming in isolation, needs context: the US debt-to-GDP ratio, while elevated, is not uniquely catastrophic among developed economies; Japan’s is considerably higher. The United States benefits from the dollar’s reserve currency status, meaning it can service its debt at rates other countries could not sustain. The real problem, this argument goes, is political dysfunction — the refusal to raise revenues sufficiently — rather than a fundamental insolvency risk. And the short-term priority should be protecting the safety net, not austerity that would tip a slowing economy into recession.
There is also a legitimate point about the composition of the recent debt expansion: the COVID response, infrastructure investment, and the CHIPS Act represent investments in productive capacity, not pure consumption spending. Not all debt is equal.
A different read
The “Japan comparison” has been doing significant work in centre-left fiscal commentary for a decade, and it is worth interrogating its limits. Japan’s debt is overwhelmingly domestically held; American debt is internationally distributed. Japan has decades of creditor-nation savings surpluses backstopping its fiscal position. The United States has a structurally negative current account and depends on continued foreign appetite for Treasuries. Those are different situations.
More importantly, the doubling of US national debt in a decade — from roughly $20 trillion in 2016 to $40 trillion today — occurred across two Republican and one Democratic administration, which means it cannot be explained by partisanship alone. The structural explanation is straightforward and largely bipartisan in its causes: mandatory spending (primarily Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) grows faster than revenues in normal economic conditions. Interest payments, which were manageable when rates were near zero, have now become a significant budget line in themselves. The Congressional Budget Office has projected for years that interest costs alone will crowd out discretionary spending in the medium term.
What is striking about the current political environment is that neither party has a credible fiscal consolidation plan. The Trump administration has pursued tariff revenue as a partial substitute for income tax cuts, but tariffs are consumption taxes that hit lower-income households harder proportionally and generate trade retaliation that reduces growth. The Democrats’ preferred route — tax hikes on high earners and corporations — would meaningfully reduce deficits only if paired with entitlement reform, which remains politically radioactive on the left. The result is a collective action failure on a generational scale.
The historical parallel that should unsettle us is not Japan but the United Kingdom after the Second World War — a period in which accumulated debt was not resolved by austerity or default, but by the combination of inflation, financial repression (keeping interest rates below inflation to erode real debt values), and sustained growth. Two of those three routes — inflation and financial repression — are available to the United States and would represent a massive covert transfer from savers and creditors to the state. The bond market’s recent resistance to rate cuts looks, in this light, like rational self-defence.
For ordinary Americans, the mechanism is simple: higher interest rates mean higher mortgage rates, higher credit card rates, and higher auto loan rates. The Walmart consumer pullback is partly a direct consequence of two years of elevated rates transmitted through the household balance sheet. The debt trajectory and the living standards trajectory are not separate stories.
What to watch
- The Federal Reserve’s September meeting: whether Chairman Powell signals rate cuts despite sticky inflation expectations, and how bond markets respond.
- Congressional budget negotiations: the current fiscal year deadline and whether the administration’s tariff revenue assumptions hold.
- Walmart and major retailers’ forward guidance through the autumn: consumer confidence numbers will tell us whether the pullback is cyclical or structural.
- The Treasury’s quarterly refunding announcements, which have become a subtle canary in the coal mine for foreign appetite for US debt.
— J