The United States formally removed Syria from its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism on Monday, confirming a decision first announced in July and completing a process that began with Trump lifting broader sanctions on Syria in June 2025. The Treasury Department simultaneously revoked the terrorist designations of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham — the armed group that led the offensive removing Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 — and its predecessor al-Nusra Front, both formerly led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, who is now Syria’s president. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the move would “foster additional investment in Syria to promote political and economic stability.” US envoy Tom Barrack called it “a decisive step in Syria’s remarkable journey from isolation to partnership.” Syria’s central bank governor described it as “a historic step that restores the country to its natural place in the global economic system.”
The received wisdom
The liberal-internationalist critique of this decision has been consistent and is not without merit: al-Sharaa ran an organisation that was formally al-Qaeda’s Syrian franchise. HTS committed atrocities during Syria’s civil war. Removing the terrorist designations and lifting sanctions risks legitimising an Islamist movement that has not demonstrated sustained commitment to minority rights, press freedom or democratic governance. The worry is that Washington, eager for any narrative of Middle East success it can point to, is extending recognition to a government-in-formation before it has done the institutional work to deserve it — and that the consequence will be either embarrassment when al-Sharaa’s authoritarianism becomes undeniable, or a more permissive international environment for jihadi governance experiments more broadly.
There is also the Israeli dimension. Israel has carried out extensive strikes on Syrian military infrastructure since Assad’s fall, and US envoy Barrack had to retract a comment that Syria’s Golan was “occupied” — a slip that suggested the new Syria policy is being improvised at pace without full internal coordination. Syria’s foreign minister has said the door is open for diplomacy with Israel; it is unclear how durable that openness is.
A different read
Acknowledge the critique. Then consider the alternative.
The Syrian designation served its purpose during the Assad era. It was a stick applied to a state that sponsored Hezbollah, hosted Iranian military infrastructure, used chemical weapons against its own population and hosted a civil war that generated the largest refugee crisis Europe had seen since 1945. Assad’s Syria was a genuine state sponsor of terrorism. The designation was justified.
But Assad is gone. The regime that earned the designation no longer exists. The question is not whether al-Sharaa’s movement deserved designation as a terrorist organisation in 2015 — it did — but whether perpetuating that designation against the successor government of a post-Assad Syria serves any constructive strategic purpose in 2026.
The honest realpolitik answer is: not much. Al-Sharaa has conducted a sustained charm offensive aimed at Western powers, meeting Trump on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara in July and similarly engaging Macron. The Syrian state removed an extraordinarily destructive regime that had been a cornerstone of Iranian regional power projection. Whatever al-Sharaa’s origins, his government is currently more useful to American strategic interests than Assad’s was, and the alternative to engaging with it is not a liberal democratic Syria — it is a vacuum into which Iran, Russia and other actors will again project influence.
There is historical precedent for this kind of pragmatic rehabilitation. The United States normalised relations with Mao’s China despite its history of supporting communist insurgencies globally. The Reagan administration engaged Islamist mujahideen in Afghanistan who later became a direct threat. The precedents are uncomfortable. But the underlying logic — that engagement is generally more strategically useful than perpetual isolation — has a track record that pure idealism does not.
The risks are real and should be named. Syria’s minorities — Christians, Alawites, Druze, Kurds — have reason to worry about a Sunni Islamist government that emerged from a jihadist movement. Al-Sharaa’s stated commitment to political pluralism has not been tested under the pressures of governing a shattered state. The removal of economic restrictions will attract investment, but investment in Syria is a high-risk proposition given infrastructure destruction and ongoing security challenges.
The least one can say is that the Trump administration is taking a defensible bet at defensible odds. The Syrians who cheered the designation’s removal were not wrong to do so. Whether al-Sharaa’s government rewards the bet will be answered over years, not weeks.
What to watch
- Al-Sharaa’s treatment of minorities: specific incidents involving Alawite, Christian or Kurdish communities in the coming months will be the most honest test of the government’s pluralist rhetoric.
- Israeli-Syrian diplomacy: Syria’s foreign minister has opened the door; whether back-channel discussions produce any normalisation framework will significantly affect regional stability.
- Investment flows: which countries and companies move first to take economic positions in Syria, and what conditionalities they attach, will shape the incentive environment for Damascus.
- Iranian response: Tehran lost its most important Arab partner in Assad’s fall; the formal US recognition of al-Sharaa’s government further consolidates that loss and will produce a reaction worth monitoring.
— J