Syria off the terror list: a gamble worth taking

The United States Treasury Department announced on Monday that Syria has been formally removed from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, revoking a designation that had been in place under the Assad regime for decades. Simultaneously, the Treasury revoked the designation of al-Nusrah Front — the organisation formerly led by Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, better known until recently as the leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — as a global terrorist organisation. The move follows Trump’s lifting of broader sanctions on Syria in June 2025 and the US announcement in July of intent to delist, which came after Trump met al-Sharaa on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Ankara. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described it as “in line with President Trump’s promise to deliver sanctions relief to Syria” and said it would “help foster additional investment in Syria to promote political and economic stability.” The delisting removes critical restrictions on US foreign assistance, defence exports, and financial transactions, opening Syria to international investment markets.

The received wisdom

The mainstream progressive and liberal-internationalist objection to this move is coherent: the United States has just formally blessed a government led by a man who spent years commanding what was, until late 2024, al-Qaeda’s official Syrian affiliate. HTS carried out suicide bombings, executed prisoners, and governed parts of northern Syria under a harsh interpretation of Islamic law. Al-Sharaa’s personal transformation — from Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, jihadist commander, to a suit-wearing statesman meeting Macron and Trump at NATO summits — is either a genuine ideological evolution or a sophisticated political performance, and it is not obvious which. Critics on both left and right worry that Washington has been charmed into legitimising an Islamist government without adequate safeguards, and that removing the terrorism designation too quickly removes the only meaningful leverage the US retained over Damascus’s behaviour. Human rights organisations have also noted that significant abuses continue in areas under the new government’s control, and that Syrian minorities — Christians, Alawites, Kurds — have reason to be nervous about the new order. The speed of the delisting, before a new constitutional framework or transparent elections have been established, strikes many analysts as premature.

A different read

These concerns are real. They are also, on balance, outweighed by the strategic logic of engagement — if the engagement is conducted with clear eyes and retained leverage.

Consider first what the alternative looks like. Leaving Syria on the terrorism sponsor list was a policy calibrated for the Assad era: a government actively providing transit routes for Iranian weapons, hosting Hezbollah logistics, and directing attacks on its own civilian population with chemical weapons. That government is gone. The new Syrian administration, whatever its origins, has publicly committed to preventing Syria from being used as a base for terrorist attacks on other countries and has allowed US envoy Tom Barrack to frame it as “a decisive step in Syria’s remarkable journey from isolation to partnership.” Syria’s foreign minister has said the door is open for diplomacy even with Israel. These are not nothing.

The historical precedent most relevant here is not Afghanistan 2001 but rather Libya 2003-2004, when the US and UK removed Muammar Gaddafi’s regime from the terror list after he abandoned his weapons of mass destruction programme and agreed to pay compensation to Lockerbie victims’ families. That deal held for years and successfully ended Libya’s nuclear ambitions. It collapsed eventually — but not because the delisting was wrong; it collapsed because the follow-on strategy of deepening engagement was never adequately implemented. The lesson is not “never delist” but “delisting without a serious long-term strategy produces instability.”

The more pertinent question about Syria is whether Washington has extracted adequate concessions for the enormous diplomatic prize it has just handed Damascus. The terrorism designation and the associated sanctions were the last substantial levers the US held. Al-Sharaa has been running a charm offensive aimed at Western powers, and it has succeeded spectacularly. Syria’s central bank governor called it “a historic step that restores the country to its natural place in the global economic system.” That is a significant statement of gratitude — but gratitude without conditions attached is just goodwill, which evaporates under domestic political pressure.

What the Trump administration has not yet made clear is what al-Sharaa has conceded in return: specific, verifiable commitments on minority rights, on weapons stockpiles, on Iranian influence in Syrian territory, on cooperation with Israeli security concerns. The Golan Heights episode — in which US envoy Barrack accidentally stated the legally accurate position that the Golan is occupied Syrian territory and was immediately made to retract it — suggests the administration is handling the Syria portfolio in a reactive, optics-first mode rather than with a coherent strategic framework.

Still: the counterfactual of continued isolation is bleak. A Syria permanently outside the international financial system is a Syria permanently dependent on Iran and Russia for reconstruction funding and political support. Opening the door to Western investment is the only plausible path toward giving the new government incentives to moderate and toward luring away the external patrons that propped up the old one. Pragmatism sometimes requires dealing with governments whose origins are uncomfortable. The question is always whether the dealing is smart.

What to watch

Track whether the investment flows that Damascus is celebrating actually materialise, and under what governance conditions. Watch whether al-Sharaa’s government moves forward with a credible constitutional process that offers genuine minority protections, or whether it consolidates HTS’s factional control behind a liberal veneer. Keep an eye on Israel’s posture toward Syrian territory — Israeli strikes on Syrian military assets have continued even after the change of government, and a stable Syria-Israel relationship is a prerequisite for the new Damascus to establish sovereign credibility. The gap between the diplomatic ceremony and the strategic substance is wide enough to drive a truck through.

— J