China’s foreign ministry has advised its citizens to leave Eswatini, the southern African kingdom formerly known as Swaziland, citing “rampant cyber fraud and criminal activities associated with gambling” as among its security concerns. The advisory, issued this week, urged Chinese nationals to relocate to “relatively safer” countries — specifically naming neighbouring South Africa — and warned that those who remain will face “extremely high security risks” with reduced consular assistance. The stated justification is partly factual: the Times of Eswatini reported that 40 Chinese nationals have been in detention since March, arrested during raids on alleged illegal online gambling centres in the capital Mbabane and surrounding areas. The geopolitical context, however, is unmistakable. Eswatini is one of only 12 countries worldwide that maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, and the only such country on the African continent. In April, Beijing pressured nearby countries to revoke overflight permits that would have allowed Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te to travel to Eswatini for official ceremonies, forcing cancellation of the visit. Lai eventually reached Eswatini in May via undisclosed routing; Beijing responded by saying he had become “an international laughing stock.”
The received wisdom
The mainstream framing treats this as a straightforward extension of Beijing’s decades-old campaign to shrink Taiwan’s diplomatic space: a campaign that has already reduced Taipei’s formal allies from over thirty countries in the 1990s to twelve today. On this reading, the travel advisory is a transparent coercive tool — China is weaponising the welfare of its own citizens abroad to punish a small country for maintaining ties with Taiwan, just as it previously scrapped tariff benefits for all African nations except Eswatini. The progressive human-rights framing would add that Eswatini is an absolute monarchy under King Mswati III with a troubled human rights record, making it an awkward symbol of democratic values, but that the principle at stake — sovereign countries maintaining their own diplomatic choices without being bullied by great powers — transcends the specifics of the Swazi case. Both readings have merit. Beijing’s campaign is real, systematic, and has been effective: of the fifteen countries that recognised Taiwan when Xi Jinping took office in 2012, more than half have since switched recognition to Beijing, most under evident economic or political pressure.
A different read
What is worth examining more carefully is the mechanism China is deploying here — and why it is becoming a preferred instrument of statecraft.
The travel advisory is, in strategic terms, almost costless. China is not blockading Eswatini, not imposing trade sanctions (beyond the existing tariff exclusion), not threatening military action. It is simply telling its own citizens — whose safety it genuinely has some obligation to protect, and whose presence in Eswatini is largely connected to economic activities of uncertain legality — to leave. If this produces pressure on Eswatini’s economy, which depends on Chinese commercial activity, that is Beijing’s gain. If it produces a diplomatic incident, Beijing can point to the gambling arrests and claim a purely consular motivation. The deniability is close to complete.
This pattern — using the safety-of-nationals framing as a foreign policy lever — is not unique to China. The British government used a version of it in the early stages of the Ukraine crisis; so have France and the United States in Africa. But China deploys it with particular consistency as part of a broader toolkit that includes investment conditions, debt structures, and market access preferences, all calibrated to produce alignment without formal coercion. The Chinese Communist Party is not the first great power to play this game, but it has refined the playbook in important ways: the Belt and Road Initiative created a network of economic dependencies that make the threat of commercial withdrawal credible; the scale of Chinese domestic tourism and business travel gives the travel advisory tool genuine bite in countries that are economically integrated with China.
The Eswatini case is marginal in strategic terms — Eswatini has a population of roughly 1.1 million, no strategic minerals of note, and minimal military significance. But that is precisely why it is instructive. China earlier this year scrapped tariffs for all African countries except Eswatini — a targeted economic punishment that signals to every other African government what the price of continued Taiwan recognition would be. The travel advisory adds another layer to this signal at essentially zero cost. The cumulative effect is to make the economic and political burden of maintaining Taiwan ties progressively heavier, one small country at a time.
Taiwan’s countermeasure — President Lai’s personal visits, maintained even when Beijing disrupted overflight permissions — is a form of diplomatic resilience, but it operates in a different register. Lai’s visit to Eswatini in May demonstrated that the relationship can survive Chinese pressure; it did not demonstrate that it can survive indefinitely if that pressure continues to intensify. The twelve remaining Taiwan allies are almost uniformly small, poor, and economically vulnerable — Pacific island nations, Central American states, the Vatican, and now a single African monarchy. They are not natural coalition partners. The question for Taipei’s foreign ministry is whether the diplomatic cost of maintaining these relationships — absorbing the Chinese pressure that comes with them — is worth the signal value they provide, or whether Taiwan’s strategic interests would be better served by concentrating resources on informal relationships with larger economies where formal recognition is not on the table.
Beijing, for its part, appears to have concluded that there is no downside to continuing the squeeze. The travel advisory costs nothing, signals resolve, and keeps Eswatini’s government in a state of ongoing pressure. That is exactly the kind of asymmetric leverage that great powers prize and small countries dread.
What to watch
- Whether the Eswatini government responds to the advisory with concessions to China, with enhanced ties to Taiwan, or with the studied silence it has so far maintained.
- Whether Taiwan uses the incident to draw attention to the pattern — framing the travel advisory explicitly as coercion in its public diplomacy and in multilateral forums where it has observer status.
- Whether other African governments read the Eswatini tariff exclusion and travel advisory as a template signal — i.e., whether Beijing has succeeded in communicating the cost of Taiwan ties to the broader African diplomatic community.
- Ahead of planned Trump-Xi talks next month, whether the Taiwan recognition campaign is raised as a bilateral irritant — and whether Washington has any leverage to offer Eswatini in exchange for absorbing continued Chinese pressure.
— J