Iran’s ability to threaten global oil markets by closing the Strait of Hormuz — cited by the office of the Supreme Leader as “the pillar of Iran’s new security order” — is eroding more rapidly than Tehran’s public posture acknowledges, according to an analysis in The Guardian. Iranian analyst Hamid Paktinat, founder of the Forum of Economic Activists, assessed that alternative pipeline construction across Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman will halve the strait’s strategic value within three years and nearly eliminate it within six. Since the war began, daily oil transit through the strait has fallen from a prewar average approaching 20 million barrels per day to roughly six million barrels, according to ship-tracking data from Kpler — less than a third of prewar levels. Meanwhile, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said publicly that “the war must end at some point,” and parliamentary speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf warned that “if people are hungry” and the economy fails, Iran cannot endure regardless of its military capabilities. BBC Business reported that Iran says it is “fully prepared” to counter an imminent new round of US maximum-pressure sanctions. Al Jazeera noted Trump has also signed a separate executive order banning foreign-made equipment in the US energy grid, tightening the overall economic confrontation.
The received wisdom
The progressive and dove-leaning analysis of the Iran situation emphasises the humanitarian cost of maximum-pressure sanctions on ordinary Iranians — who are already suffering from inflation, currency collapse, and constrained oil revenues. In this reading, tightening sanctions further is counterproductive: it punishes a civilian population while hardening the position of the Revolutionary Guard and regime hardliners who benefit from siege economics. The Hormuz threat, far from diminishing, remains a genuine destabilising factor; closing or merely harassment of the strait would spike oil prices globally, harming Europe and Asia alike. The diplomatic track — the June memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran — was the right approach, and Trump’s premature declaration that the ceasefire was over sabotaged a promising opening. Oman’s shuttle diplomacy and Pakistan’s army chief’s visit to Tehran are the serious efforts; the maximum pressure is the distraction.
A different read
The dove reading underestimates a structural shift that the Paktinat analysis makes concrete: Iran’s leverage over global energy is a wasting asset, and the timeline is shorter than Tehran’s strategists want to admit.
Before the current war, roughly 20% of the world’s oil and oil-related products transited the Strait of Hormuz daily. That figure has already been drastically reduced by a combination of US Navy protection, alternative routing through southern Omani waters, and the willingness of state oil companies in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait to absorb the risk of tanker operations themselves. The Guardian’s data shows that between 1 and 19 August, only 112 oil and gas tankers went through the strait — with nearly 79% using unconfirmed or dark routes and only a small fraction using Iran’s preferred northern passage. The economic infrastructure of the Persian Gulf has already begun routing around Iran, not as a future plan but as a present reality.
The pipeline build-out accelerates this. Paktinat projects Saudi Arabia’s dependence on the strait falls from 70% to 15%; the UAE from 50% to 15%; Iraq from 100% to 30%. These are projects already under construction or contracted. Each kilometre of new pipeline permanently diminishes the threat value of a Hormuz closure. Tehran analyst Hamid Asefi put the paradox with memorable clarity: “A threat that is constantly repeated turns from ‘deterrence’ into a political habit; and a political habit, if not accompanied by concrete achievements, sooner or later leads to an inflation of threats.” A gun is less deterrent the more often it is waved without being fired.
There is a historical parallel in the career of other strategic chokepoints. Egypt’s Suez Canal was an instrument of enormous leverage until the Israelis demonstrated in 1967 and 1973 that oil could be rerouted across Sinai, and until supertanker routes around the Cape of Good Hope became economically viable. The moment the bypass becomes credible, the leverage begins to evaporate. That moment for Hormuz is not 2040 — according to the regional pipeline data, it is within this decade.
This structural erosion reframes Iran’s negotiating position. The Tehran hardliners who argue that Iran should hold out — using Hormuz as the ultimate bargaining chip to extract sanctions relief and diplomatic concessions — are in effect arguing that Iran should trade on a depreciating asset. Every year of continued confrontation is a year the Gulf states spend accelerating their bypass infrastructure. The Iranian politicians who want a deal now — Pezeshkian, Ghalibaf — are the ones doing the more accurate strategic arithmetic, though their domestic constraints make acting on it extremely difficult.
The US maximum-pressure strategy, for all its humanitarian costs, is designed precisely to force this arithmetic into the open. Trump’s declaration of “economic D-Day” — a new sanctions wave targeting gold, cryptocurrency, technology, shipping, and aviation — aims to compress the timeline, forcing a decision while Iran’s oil revenues remain constrained and its foreign exchange reserves are depleted. The risk is that it hardens the regime rather than moderating it. But the bet is that internal Iranian debate — already visible in the remarkably candid public statements from the central bank governor — will eventually produce either negotiated compromise or internal political realignment, before the strait can be closed in any strategically meaningful way.
The satellite question, as always with Iran, is nuclear. All the Hormuz pressure and pipeline bypasses become secondary if Iran achieves a nuclear breakout. That is the only strategic trump card whose value does not depreciate with alternative routing.
What to watch
Watch whether the Omani foreign minister’s and Pakistan army chief’s visits to Tehran produce any visible revival of the June memorandum framework — these are the two mediators best positioned to provide face-saving off-ramps. Track regional pipeline construction contracts and completion dates: the UAE’s Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline is already partially operational; Saudi expansion of its East-West Pipeline is the key indicator. Watch for any sign that Iran’s central bank governor’s public warnings about the economy prompt factional shifts inside the Revolutionary Guard, which profits from sanctions-era black-market trade and has structural incentives against normalisation. And watch US oil prices: if they remain stable despite the Hormuz disruption, it is confirmation that the bypass is working — and Tehran’s strategists will have to update their models.
— J