Venezuela's oil and the new Monroe doctrine

The Trump administration is in advanced talks to claim a direct stake in more than a dozen Venezuelan oilfields containing an estimated 90 billion barrels of crude — nearly a third of the country’s total reserves, which at 303 billion barrels are the largest in the world, exceeding Saudi Arabia and Iran, according to reporting by the Wall Street Journal, Reuters, Axios, and Bloomberg. One proposal under discussion involves a 100-year lease on several oilfields in the Orinoco Belt and Lake Maracaibo regions. The negotiations follow Venezuela’s transformation since January, when US special forces abducted then-President Nicolás Maduro; the country has since been governed by interim President Delcy Rodríguez, formerly Maduro’s vice-president. Venezuela’s democratic opposition — led by exiled politician María Corina Machado, whose movement is widely believed to have won the 2024 presidential election — has been sidelined. No date has been set for new elections. The Trump administration has framed the broader policy as the “Donroe Doctrine,” a 21st-century adaptation of the Monroe Doctrine aimed at countering Chinese influence in Latin America.

The received wisdom

The progressive critique writes itself and is, on its own terms, largely correct. Venezuela’s constitution and its oil law reserve subsoil resources to the state. A deal negotiated by an unelected interim government — itself installed following a US military operation — has no democratic legitimacy and questionable legal standing. The Venezuelan opposition figures who are furious about these reports are not making a narrow procedural complaint; they are pointing to the fundamental contradiction between the administration’s stated goal of restoring democracy to Venezuela and a policy that in practice locks in the current arrangement indefinitely. Ricardo Hausmann, the exiled Venezuelan economist and former minister, put it plainly: “An illegitimate interim government with an illegitimate hydrocarbons law has no legitimacy to strike this unconstitutional deal.” The 100-year lease framing would bind future Venezuelan governments — democratic or otherwise — to an arrangement negotiated under conditions of duress. Energy historian Gregory Brew’s comparison to Anglo-Persian Oil’s 1901 Iranian concession is not hyperbole; it is history.

A different read

But the progressive critique, while accurate about the ethics, tends to miss the geopolitical logic — and understanding that logic is necessary to actually engaging with it.

The Trump administration’s Venezuelan strategy, for all its crudeness, is solving a real problem: China’s footprint in Latin American energy assets has expanded significantly over the past two decades. Chinese state-owned enterprises hold substantial positions in Venezuelan oil infrastructure, built up during the Chávez and Maduro years in exchange for loans that Venezuela is structurally unable to repay. From Washington’s standpoint, a post-Maduro Venezuela that does not have its energy sector captured by Chinese capital is a strategic priority — and the quickest way to achieve that, in the administration’s logic, is to substitute American capital for Chinese capital. The “Donroe Doctrine” is not merely rhetorical; it reflects a coherent, if aggressive, attempt to reassert the Monroe Doctrine’s original premise: that the Western Hemisphere should be an American sphere of influence, not a competitive arena for external powers.

The historical irony is sharp. The Monroe Doctrine was formulated in 1823 by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams and announced by President Monroe precisely to prevent European powers from reasserting colonial control over newly independent Latin American republics. It was, in its original conception, anti-colonial. The current variant — securing a 100-year lease on oilfields from a government installed by US special forces — inverts that logic entirely.

Energy historian Gregory Brew told the Guardian that the deal reminded him specifically of Anglo-Persian’s 1901 concession from the Shah: sweeping rights granted in exchange for what amounted to a bribe, with the company retaining virtually all profits. That concession was nationalised by Mohammed Mossadegh in 1951, triggering the CIA coup of 1953, which produced decades of Iranian anti-American resentment that arguably culminated in 1979. The lesson of Anglo-Persian is not that oil concessions fail immediately; it is that they create the political conditions for their own eventual reversal at enormous cost.

The Venezuelan opposition’s calculation is worth understanding. These are people who have spent years in exile or prison, who have watched Maduro destroy their country and steal their election. They are not reflexive anti-Americans. When María Corina Machado’s allies describe the oil deal as “revolting” and “mafioso,” it is because they understand that a 100-year American oil lease, negotiated by their tormentors’ former colleagues under duress, will be the political gift that sustains Venezuelan nationalism for a generation. Every future Venezuelan government — democratic or populist — will have a ready-made grievance. The next Chávez will not have to manufacture outrage; it will be served ready-made.

The administration’s framing that Venezuela is “not really ready” for elections — a quote from Trump last month — while simultaneously seeking a 100-year oil lease is a tell. If the goal were genuinely democratic transition, locking in resource extraction agreements before any election would be counterproductive: a newly elected democratic government would face immediate pressure to repudiate or renegotiate the deal, creating exactly the instability the administration claims it wants to avoid. The logic only makes sense if the goal is resource control, with democracy as a secondary consideration at best.

The US does have legitimate interests in Venezuelan stability and in preventing the country from becoming a Chinese or Russian client state. Those interests are real and do not require apology. But they are best served by a Venezuelan state with democratic legitimacy, economic reform capacity, and the political mandate to renegotiate its relationships with foreign energy companies through transparent contract processes — not by a 100-year lease that poisons the well for any future democratic government.

What to watch

Watch the Venezuelan national assembly’s response: Francisco Rodríguez and other opposition economists have already called on the assembly to reject the deal; whether it actually does so — given the assembly’s limited independence from the Rodríguez government — will signal how much institutional resistance remains. Watch María Corina Machado’s public statements: she has so far been careful not to directly confront Washington, but the deal’s terms may force her hand. Watch China’s reaction: Beijing has substantial existing Venezuelan oil exposure and will not accept being simply displaced without a response. And watch whether any US Congress members — Republican fiscal hawks who might object to a 100-year treaty commitment, or foreign affairs committee members on either side — raise formal objections to an agreement of this magnitude being conducted outside the treaty process.

— J