Abandoning the Peshmerga is a strategic error

The Trump administration is planning to allow a security assistance agreement with Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government to expire on September 30, effectively cutting off military aid to the Peshmerga — the Kurdish security forces that fought alongside US and coalition troops to defeat the Islamic State group, according to four sources familiar with the matter who spoke to the BBC. The memorandum of understanding between the Pentagon and the KRG, first signed in 2016 and renewed in 2022, provides approximately $61 million annually in weapons, training, and stipends through the Pentagon’s counter-IS programme. The proposed cut accompanies a broader withdrawal of the last remaining US troops from Iraq on October 1, the date set under a 2024 agreement between Washington and Baghdad. The Peshmerga commands approximately 180,000 troops in Iraqi Kurdistan and has been on the receiving end of 158 Iranian missile and drone attacks inside the region since the US-Iran war began in February. Both the KRG and the US State Department declined to comment.

The received wisdom

The case for the cut rests on several premises, none of them trivial. The counter-IS mission is, at least formally, complete — the jihadist group no longer controls the swaths of Iraq and Syria it held in 2014. The Pentagon’s fiscal year 2027 budget request reflects a judgment that the $61 million is better reallocated now that the stated objective has been achieved. The broader troop withdrawal represents the kind of reduction in foreign military entanglement that Trump promised voters in both of his campaigns and that a significant portion of the American public genuinely supports. There is also a realist case: the KRG has its own political ambitions and its own complicated relationship with Baghdad, and the US has historically over-invested in local partners whose interests only partially overlap with Washington’s. Forty-seven hundred American troops died in Iraq; the bar for re-entangling in that country’s internal security politics should be high.

A different read

The problem with the realist case is that it is not, in this instance, particularly realistic.

The $61 million question is not really about the counter-IS mission, whatever the Pentagon’s budget justification says. It is about who fills the security vacuum in Iraqi Kurdistan when US military presence disappears and financial support evaporates. The answer, under current conditions, is Iran — and Iran is already at war with the United States.

“The US would be cutting off the Kurds, who shed so much blood to help the Americans achieve their goals in Iraq and the wider Middle East,” Yerevan Saeed of the Global Kurdish Initiative for Peace at American University told the BBC. “This is going to be a big win for Iran, China, and Russia if the Kurds are left so exposed.” This is not coalition-boilerplate; it is a straightforward description of the strategic geometry. Iran has already fired 158 missiles and drones into Iraqi Kurdistan since February. Ending the Peshmerga’s security assistance while Tehran’s missiles are still landing is not restraint — it is a gift to the adversary the administration has spent six months bombing.

The historical parallel is uncomfortable but unavoidable. When US combat troops withdrew from Iraq in 2011, they left behind a security architecture that the Iraqi government could not sustain and that the Islamic State subsequently exploited. The IS offensive of 2014 — which the Peshmerga bore the brunt of containing, at enormous cost to the Kurdish population — was in part a consequence of that vacuum. James Jeffrey, who led the global coalition against IS during Trump’s first term, said it plainly: “It’s money well spent, as we found out when the Islamic State rolled into northern Iraq.” Jeffrey is a former ambassador to both Iraq and Turkey, appointed by a Democratic president; his endorsement of continued Peshmerga funding is not a partisan or sentimental argument.

The $800 million US consulate opened in Irbil just last December — the largest American consulate in the world — makes the funding cut look less like a strategic retrenchment and more like a contradiction. The consulate was explicitly described at its ribbon-cutting as “a testament to the value of the relationship between the United States and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.” That relationship apparently has a nine-month shelf life.

There is also the munitions dimension. The US-Iran war has already drawn down American missile stockpiles to levels that raise questions about the sustainability of high-tempo air campaigns. In that context, the Peshmerga’s 180,000-strong ground presence in Iraqi Kurdistan represents a force that can contest Iranian influence with American equipment at a cost of $61 million — roughly what the US military spends in a few hours of operations. The cost-benefit calculus, from a pure national interest standpoint, strongly favours continuation.

The administration’s stated rationale — that IS is defeated so the counter-IS programme should end — conflates the legal vehicle for the funding with the strategic rationale for it. The Peshmerga’s value to US interests was never solely about IS. It was about maintaining a capable, pro-American force in a country where the alternative is Iranian-backed militias and a government in Baghdad that has been moving steadily closer to Tehran for years.

What to watch

Watch the September 30 deadline: the BBC reports that a final decision has not been made and that the US is “considering ways to maintain some security support” after the troop withdrawal. Diplomatic pressure from Capitol Hill — where there is bipartisan support for the Kurds — may yet alter the outcome. Watch the KRG’s own diplomatic outreach: Kurdish leaders have historically been effective lobbyists in Washington and Brussels, and they will not accept this quietly. Watch Iran’s behaviour in Iraqi Kurdistan in October: the pace and intensity of attacks after the troop withdrawal will be an early indicator of whether the absence of US forces emboldens Tehran. And watch the broader Iraqi political calculus, as Baghdad navigates between its American security relationship and the Iranian pressure that surrounds it on all sides.

— J