Venezuela's oil deal and sovereignty theatre

Donald Trump announced on Friday what he called “the biggest oil deal in world history” — an agreement in which the United States will take control of 65 billion barrels of Venezuelan oil reserves across 17 strategic oilfields, according to the BBC. Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodríguez, who came to power after US special forces seized then-President Nicolás Maduro in January, described it as a deal with “endless” benefits for her country’s revival. Under the terms reported by CBS News and confirmed by US officials, Washington will retain 55% control of a joint venture with a private operator, Rodríguez granted a 100-year concession to operate the fields, and the arrangement is projected to generate more than $209 billion in taxes for Venezuela. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called it “a huge win for both the American and Venezuelan people.” Trump simultaneously framed the deal as a tool to lower domestic gasoline prices — spiked by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz since the Iran war began in February — and to fill depleted Strategic National Reserves.

The received wisdom

The progressive and liberal internationalist case for scepticism is legitimate and worth stating fully. Venezuela’s democratic opposition has been marginalised. Rodríguez assumed power not through elections but through US-backed replacement of a government whose 2024 election the opposition believes it won. María Corina Machado and the democratic opposition have been sidelined throughout the negotiations. Critics from both Venezuela’s left and its democratic right describe the arrangement as neocolonial. Rafael Ramírez, the former head of state oil company PDVSA, accused the Rodríguez government of “driving a dagger straight into the heart of the homeland,” adding: “They are handing over 65 billion barrels of our reserves to the United States. That has never happened in Venezuela, and I think nowhere else in the world.” Left-wing protesters marched in Caracas on Saturday with banners reading “We are neither a colony, nor a back yard.” The opposition’s Juan Pablo Guanipa warned that without free elections and rule of law, the energy deal was like “a skyscraper built on pillars of clay.” These are not fringe objections; they go to the heart of the deal’s legitimacy.

A different read

That critique is largely correct — and yet it does not fully explain what is happening here, or what the alternatives actually were.

Start with Venezuela’s structural predicament. The country holds the world’s largest proven crude oil reserves — an estimated 303 billion barrels, ahead of Saudi Arabia’s 268 billion and Iran’s 208 billion, per BBC reporting — but production has collapsed from its late-1990s peak due to the progressive nationalisation of PDVSA under Hugo Chávez, mismanagement, underinvestment, and sanctions. An oil bonanza that should have produced the wealthiest state in Latin America instead produced one of the hemisphere’s worst peacetime economic catastrophes. The irony that Rodríguez spent years denouncing US attempts to “snatch” Venezuelan oil while now actively handing Washington a 55% stake in a joint venture with a 100-year concession is not lost on anyone — including, presumably, Rodríguez herself.

The deal’s sceptics are right that it will not quickly lower American gasoline prices. Venezuela’s oil is “heavy, sour” crude — useful for making diesel and asphalt, not the light, sweet crude that goes into petrol. As energy consultant David Goldwyn told Reuters, there is “no precedent” for the US government entering a lease to operate Venezuelan oil fields, and it remains unclear whether such an arrangement would violate Venezuela’s constitution or its hydrocarbons law. Rachel Ziemba of the Center for New American Security told BBC News that the deal was “unlikely to have any material impact on global oil supplies in the next month or even the next year.”

But the critics miss a more uncomfortable question: what is the realistic alternative? For decades, Venezuela’s oil wealth was nominally “sovereign” while the country’s population suffered one of the world’s sharpest peacetime economic declines. Democratic opposition leaders spent years arguing that Washington should force out Maduro and install a clean democratic transition — a position that found warm words but little action from multiple US administrations. The Trump administration took a more direct path, with all of the moral complications that entails.

The historical parallel that comes to mind is not Iraq 2003, which the BBC invokes, but something closer to the British and French management of Middle Eastern oil concessions in the first half of the twentieth century — arrangements that were simultaneously exploitative and the only mechanism through which oil-producing economies could attract the capital and technology to extract their resources at all. Those concessions produced real development, even as they also produced real resentment that fuelled nationalisation movements for decades. The lesson of that history is not that resource deals are inherently virtuous or inherently wicked; it is that their long-term effects depend entirely on whether they are accompanied by institutional development and political legitimacy.

On that score, the deal as currently structured fails the test. The Venezuelan opposition is right that a 100-year concession negotiated by an unelected government — one that came to power through US military action and that has deflected every question about holding elections — cannot claim democratic legitimacy, regardless of the development dollars it promises. Trump has reportedly said Venezuela is “not really ready” for elections. That posture trades Venezuela’s democratic future for an oil supply arrangement that, by the candid assessment of energy analysts, will take years to yield meaningful production increases.

The deal’s defenders point to the coercive context: Rodríguez was told by Trump, hours after Maduro’s capture, that she would face “a very big price” if she did not comply. Coercion is not consent. A 100-year concession extracted under those conditions will face the same nationalist backlash that ended every previous era of foreign oil control in Latin America — not in a year, but perhaps in a decade, when a successor government arrives with a democratic mandate and an interest in renegotiating.

What to watch

  • Whether the full text of the agreement is published, which would allow constitutional lawyers in Venezuela to assess its legality under Venezuelan hydrocarbons law.
  • The position of Venezuela’s democratic opposition, particularly Machado and Guanipa, on whether they will commit to honouring the deal if they reach power through elections.
  • Chevron and Halliburton’s formal investment announcements, which the Wall Street Journal reported were nearing completion — these would mark the moment the arrangement moves from political theatre to operational reality.
  • The September 15-16 Federal Reserve meeting, where higher oil prices from the Hormuz closure remain a significant input into any rate decision that could further pressure the Venezuelan economy.

— J