Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan on Monday, their first encounter since May. Xi told Putin that bilateral ties had grown “more solid,” and that “even brighter” prospects lay ahead despite what he described as increased “uncertainty and unpredictability in the international order.” Putin agreed that “cooperation is successfully developing on all fronts.” The two-day SCO summit marks the bloc’s 25th anniversary and draws over a dozen heads of state, including Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a dialogue partner. The meeting takes place four-and-a-half years into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and six months into the US-Iran war.
The received wisdom
For Western commentators, the Bishkek summit represents the consolidation of an anti-Western axis: a coalition of sanctioned, revisionist, and disaffected states coalescing around shared grievances and mutual support. The argument is coherent. Russia depends on Chinese trade to survive Western sanctions; Iran supplies Moscow with drones that sustain its Ukraine campaign; the SCO’s expansion to include Belarus, Iran, and dialogue partners across the Global South signals a genuine rival framework to the Western-led order. From this perspective, Washington and Brussels should treat the SCO not as a talking shop but as a strategic competitor — a multilateral architecture deliberately designed to erode the norms and institutions the West spent seventy years constructing.
The progressive gloss adds a layer of post-colonial legitimacy: these nations represent populations tired of Western double standards, hectoring, and selective application of international law. The SCO is, on this reading, less a threat than a correction.
A different read
The problem with the axis narrative is that it flatters an alliance that is, in practice, a collection of rivalries held together by a shared dislike of the existing order — and by varying degrees of dependence on Beijing.
Consider the summit’s actual dynamics. Xi and Putin met. But Putin also met Modi, whose India has spent five years pursuing a multi-alignment strategy that includes buying Russian oil at a discount, maintaining ties with Washington, and refusing to endorse Moscow’s Ukraine narrative at the United Nations. Modi told Putin that New Delhi was ready to work for “an end to the conflict in Ukraine” — hardly an endorsement of Russian policy. Turkey, another SCO dialogue partner, is a NATO member that has sold drones to Ukraine. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, listed among the bloc’s dialogue partners, are Gulf monarchies whose security ultimately depends on American military presence.
The SCO now claims to represent “some 40 percent of the world’s population and 25 percent of global GDP,” but those figures include India and China — two countries that are, by any honest accounting, engaged in strategic competition with each other along the Himalayan border. The bloc that is supposed to present a unified front to the West cannot agree on whether Himalayan river diversion projects constitute aggression.
There is a more historically literate frame for understanding what Bishkek actually shows. The warm language between Xi and Putin is real, but it reflects dependence more than strength. Russia’s economy has, since 2022, become increasingly tethered to China’s goodwill. Beijing has been careful not to supply weapons to Moscow directly — the risk of secondary US sanctions is too high — but has provided the economic oxygen that keeps the Russian war machine running. That is a patron-client relationship, not a peer alliance. Xi does not need Putin; Putin needs Xi.
The model here is less the Axis Powers of the 1930s — which had genuine military coordination and ideological convergence — and more the Non-Aligned Movement of the 1950s and 1960s: a forum that gave middle powers a stage, generated communiqués, and ultimately dissolved into the gravitational pull of great-power competition. The SCO’s internal contradictions — India vs. China, Iran vs. the Gulf states, Russia’s European ambitions vs. Chinese Eurasian ones — are not managed by shared values. They are deferred by shared convenience.
What is genuinely notable about Bishkek is the presence of Pezeshkian, who met with Putin on the same day that US and Iranian forces were exchanging fire in the Strait of Hormuz. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov indicated that Ukraine was discussed only “in passing” — which suggests that even in Moscow’s preferred multilateral forum, the war in Ukraine has become a secondary agenda item. The dominant preoccupation, for everyone at the table, is the US-Iran conflict and what it means for energy markets, sanctions regimes, and regional stability. That is not a sign of a confident rising coalition. It is a sign of a world navigating multiple simultaneous crises without an adequate architecture to manage them.
What to watch
- Joint SCO communiqué language on Iran: Whether the final Bishkek communiqué explicitly endorses Iran’s position in the Hormuz conflict will test whether the bloc’s rhetoric matches its stated solidarity.
- India’s vote at the UN Security Council: New Delhi’s next Security Council procedural vote on Iran or Ukraine will indicate how far Modi intends to push multi-alignment.
- Chinese secondary sanctions exposure: If the US broadens secondary sanctions following Monday’s Larak strike, Beijing will face a harder choice between its Russia relationship and its access to Western financial markets.
- Russia-Ukraine peace talks: Reports last week suggested CIA Director Ratcliffe visited Moscow. Whether Bishkek produced any quiet diplomatic signal on Ukraine will become clearer within days.
— J