Hegseth's purge and the hollowing of US military command

Daniel Driscoll, the United States Secretary of the Army, submitted his resignation on Monday after reportedly attempting to appeal directly to President Donald Trump about the damage being done to the military’s institutional readiness. Driscoll — a law school colleague of Vice President JD Vance and a serious thinker on how to modernise the Army for drone-and-missile warfare — had been forced out by Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, the latest in a long sequence of firings and forced retirements that has now swept the Joint Chiefs, the service secretaries, and senior intelligence leadership. The same day, Republican Senator Thom Tillis of North Carolina called on Trump to fire Hegseth, writing that he had “never witnessed more inept management of the brave men and women who serve our country.” With the war against Iran entering its seventh month and no end in sight, the timing could not be worse.

The received wisdom

Defenders of Hegseth’s transformation argue that the pre-Hegseth Pentagon had become bloated with ideological priorities — diversity, equity and inclusion programmes that promoted personnel based on demographics rather than merit — and that his purge is restoring a merit-based, lethality-focused institution. On this reading, the generals and admirals who have left were careerists who had absorbed progressive assumptions, and their departure clears the way for officers who think about warfighting rather than bureaucratic advancement. There is also a structural argument: the military has long suffered from a “zero-defect” promotion culture that produces risk-averse flag officers, and a thorough shakeup might, in theory, break that culture. Trump’s supporters add a political dimension: the generals were always a potential institutional check on presidential authority, and neutralising that check is a feature, not a bug.

A different read

The trouble with that defence is that it runs directly into the evidence. The Army Secretary who just resigned was not a DEI hire. Daniel Driscoll was appointed by Trump himself, had the confidence of JD Vance, and by all accounts was genuinely focused on the problem of modernising ground forces for a world where drones and precision missiles dominate the battlefield. He was not a progressive careerist; he was exactly the kind of reformer that a lethality-focused Pentagon should want to retain. His departure — reportedly precipitated by disagreement with Hegseth about the pace and direction of change — illustrates a pattern that has nothing to do with ideology and everything to do with personality: Hegseth, as Senator Tillis put it, is “intimidated by competence.”

The scale of the exodus is genuinely alarming. Among those removed since Hegseth took office: General Charles Q Brown Jr (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs), Admiral Lisa Franchetti (Chief of Naval Operations), General Randy A George (Army Chief of Staff), General David Allvin (Air Force Chief of Staff), Navy Secretary John Phelan, and — as of this week — Army Secretary Driscoll. The head of the Defense Intelligence Agency was fired after his agency reported that US airstrikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities had been less effective than claimed. This is not a healthy institution clearing out dead wood; it is an institution in which inconvenient truths are being punished.

The consequences are not abstract. Jennifer Kavanagh of Defense Priorities has pointed out that the work of service secretaries like Driscoll — planning long-term force modernisation, adapting the Army for drone-dominated warfare — is precisely the kind of institutional knowledge that cannot be easily rebuilt. Every time a new leader arrives with a “new vision,” months of work is discarded. The Iran war, now six months old, has strained munitions stockpiles and exposed critical gaps in the military’s capacity for sustained operations. This is not the moment for a leadership void at the top of the services.

There is also a political irony worth noting. Many conservatives, this columnist included, have historically been sceptical of progressive cultural experiments in the military — the argument that a fighting force should be judged on its capacity to fight, not on its demographic composition, is a serious one. But the answer to one form of identity politics is not another. Firing generals because they were promoted under a different administration, or because they gave the Commander-in-Chief unwelcome operational assessments, is its own form of loyalty test that substitutes for competence rather than restoring it. Senator Tillis, who is not leaving office after this term and has little to gain from the criticism, described Hegseth as “ginning up culture wars instead of soberly attending to the vital work of our national defense.” That phrase deserves to be taken seriously.

A University of Massachusetts poll released on August 31 found that more than two-thirds of Americans disapprove of the administration’s handling of the Iran war. That number will not improve if the institution tasked with fighting that war continues to haemorrhage the officers who understand how.

What to watch

  • Whether Trump responds to Tillis’s public call for Hegseth’s dismissal — the absence of any Republican pushback for months suggests Tillis is either a canary in the coal mine or an outlier on his way out.
  • Who is nominated to fill Driscoll’s vacancy at the Army, and whether the nominee has substantive military-modernisation credentials or is primarily a political loyalist.
  • The November midterm elections and whether Republican losses — which the Iran war is already making more likely — generate sufficient congressional pressure to force a change at the Pentagon.
  • Munitions stockpile data: if official reporting confirms the shortfalls that media reports have described, the political pressure on Hegseth and on Trump’s Iran war management will intensify sharply.

— J