Joshua Wong's second guilty plea and the NSL's expanding reach

Joshua Wong, one of Hong Kong’s most internationally recognised pro-democracy activists, pleaded guilty on Wednesday to conspiring to seek foreign sanctions against Hong Kong and China — a charge under the national security law that carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Wong, 29, has been imprisoned continuously since November 2020 and had been due for release in January 2027. Prosecutors allege that he worked with exiled activist Nathan Law to lobby foreign governments and politicians for sanctions, blockades, or other hostile measures against China, and that he continued posting about these meetings on social media after the NSL came into force. Supporters who queued overnight to attend the hearing described the proceedings as a “forced reality” under a “compromised judicial system.” The sentence has not yet been handed down.

The received wisdom

The official framing from Hong Kong’s authorities — and the implicit framing of much commentary that accepts the legal structure as given — is that Wong has repeatedly broken laws that exist to protect Hong Kong’s stability and China’s national security. On this reading, his 2022 guilty plea for conspiracy to commit subversion established a clear precedent, and the current charge is a natural legal consequence of activities that continued after he was fully aware of the NSL’s reach. The argument that his advocacy for foreign sanctions constitutes “collusion with foreign forces” is not arbitrary: the law explicitly prohibits requesting foreign governments to impose sanctions on China, and Wong’s lobbying activities are not disputed. His decision to plead guilty, his defenders acknowledge, likely reflects advice that a trial would produce the same outcome with a harsher sentence.

A different read

The legal tidiness of that account should not obscure what is actually happening. Wong’s case is, as Human Rights Watch Asia Director Elaine Pearson has put it, a matter of “stacking one charge after another against Joshua Wong” to ensure that the democracy icon remains behind bars. But the more troubling precedent is the retroactive dimension. Supporters and legal observers have argued that the prosecution heavily relies on advocacy conducted before the NSL was enacted in June 2020. The court has heard that Wong met foreign politicians and lobbied for sanctions — activities that were, at the time they were carried out, entirely legal. The NSL’s application to pre-enactment conduct is not a quirk or an edge case; it is a deliberate feature that serves a specific purpose: ensuring that anyone who was politically active before 2020 can be prosecuted at the authorities’ discretion.

This is not, in principle, a uniquely Hong Kong problem. Retroactive criminal liability has been a tool of authoritarian governments throughout modern history — the Soviet Union’s Decree on Counterrevolutionary Activities, applied to conduct predating its enactment, is the most prominent twentieth-century example. What makes Hong Kong distinctive is that it was, until 2020, a common-law jurisdiction with genuine judicial independence, a functioning civil society, and the international standing of a global financial centre. The NSL did not merely add new crimes; it fundamentally altered the nature of the legal system by subordinating the common-law tradition to a political determination about what constitutes a national security threat.

Wong’s position — the only activist in Hong Kong to be prosecuted twice under the NSL — makes him a precise indicator of the law’s trajectory. The first prosecution, for subversion, concerned his role in an unofficial primary election. The second, for seeking sanctions, concerns his international advocacy. The logical endpoint of this pattern is the criminalisation of any form of organised political opposition to Beijing’s authority, regardless of whether it involves violence, sedition in the classical sense, or simply the use of diplomatic channels that are standard practice for political movements everywhere else in the world.

The former Conservative leader Iain Duncan Smith urged the UK government this week to raise Wong’s case with Beijing. The Burnham government’s response to that request will be an early test of whether its promised “reset” of relations with China translates into any willingness to pay a diplomatic cost for the rule-of-law principles it nominally upholds.

What to watch

  • The sentencing hearing: whether Wong receives a sentence at the lower end (three to ten years, potentially reduced for his guilty plea) or whether the court deems the offence “of a grave nature,” which would open the door to a life sentence.
  • International response: whether the UK, US, and EU issue specific diplomatic representations, or whether Wong’s case is absorbed into the general background noise of China-West friction.
  • The fate of Nathan Law, who remains in exile: the prosecution of Wong for activities allegedly coordinated with Law implies that Hong Kong authorities regard Law’s international lobbying as an ongoing security threat, which may affect Law’s access to foreign governments.
  • Whether other activists in Hong Kong custody face similar “second prosecution” charges — the pattern with Wong may be a template rather than an exception.

— J