The Volkswagen board approved on 4 September 2026 a plan to cut a total of 100,000 jobs across the group by 2030, encompassing the VW, Audi, Porsche, and Skoda brands. The current round of 50,000 cuts follows an earlier tranche already announced, and represents the most sweeping workforce reduction in the company’s post-war history. The announcement lands as Germany’s broader industrial economy faces simultaneous pressure from high energy costs — themselves partly a consequence of the ongoing Iran war driving oil prices toward historic highs — Chinese competition in the EV market, and persistently sluggish domestic demand. For a country that has built its social model, its trade surpluses, and its centre-right political identity around manufacturing excellence, this is not a corporate story. It is a civilisational stress test.
The received wisdom
The progressive and centre-left reading frames the Volkswagen cuts as a failure of capital: a firm that enriched shareholders and executives while under-investing in the transition to electric vehicles, now offloading the cost of its strategic failure onto workers. There is real substance to this critique. VW management was notoriously slow to commit to EV production at scale, in part because German unions — who hold seats on the supervisory board under Germany’s codetermination model — and management both had strong incentives to protect the internal combustion engine supply chain. The solution most often proposed from this vantage point is government intervention: subsidised retraining programmes, accelerated EV purchase incentives, and EU-wide tariffs to protect European manufacturers from Chinese competition. These are not absurd ideas. Germany’s neighbours in France have employed similar logic, with mixed results.
A different read
The codetermination model — Germany’s proudest industrial-relations achievement — is worth scrutinising here, because it may be part of the problem as much as the solution. Under codetermination, worker representatives hold half the supervisory board seats at large German companies. The political result is that painful but necessary restructurings are consistently deferred, negotiated into slow-motion over years rather than executed quickly. The Japanese automotive sector faced an analogous reckoning in the early 2000s, and it was precisely the companies — Nissan under Ghosn being the starkest example — that broke with protected labour arrangements that adapted fastest, at enormous social and personal cost but with genuine competitive recovery.
The deeper problem is that the Volkswagen crisis is not simply about cars. Germany’s entire post-reunification growth model rested on cheap Russian energy, growing Chinese consumption of German premium goods, and an undervalued euro enabling export surpluses. All three pillars have now collapsed or cracked simultaneously. The Iran war has made cheap energy a distant memory: UK petrol prices have hit their highest level since the conflict began, and US diesel has reached an all-time high, reflecting the same upstream pressures on industrial energy costs. China has simultaneously built out domestic EV champions — BYD being the most prominent — that compete directly with VW’s most profitable segments. And the euro, while no longer undervalued, remains hostage to the European Central Bank’s delicate balance between fighting inflation and not strangling peripheral eurozone economies.
The European Union’s response — tariffs on Chinese EVs — has the surface logic of industrial policy but is likely to slow rather than solve the problem. Tariffs protect incumbents; they do not create the underlying engineering and battery-chemistry capabilities that European manufacturers lack. Germany spent the decade after the 2008 financial crisis congratulating itself on its Mittelstand model while failing to build a world-class battery manufacturing base. That window has largely closed.
What the political class on both left and right refuses to say plainly is that Germany is going to have to accept a smaller, more focused industrial economy. The attempt to preserve every job in every legacy sector through subsidy, tariff, and managed decline is fiscally ruinous and delays the creative destruction that would allow genuinely competitive new industries to emerge. Margaret Thatcher was right about British coal — whatever one thinks of the social damage of rapid deindustrialisation — in the narrow sense that prolonging the agony did not change the eventual outcome. Germany faces an analogous reckoning. The question is whether it can manage the transition with more social cushioning than Britain managed in the 1980s, while still accepting that the transition is both necessary and irreversible.
What to watch
- The German federal election and whether any mainstream party is willing to articulate a coherent post-industrial adjustment strategy, as opposed to promising to preserve the automotive sector in amber.
- VW’s EV sales figures over the next two quarters — if the company’s new models gain traction against Chinese competition, the restructuring may stabilise; if not, further cuts are almost certain.
- Whether the IG Metall union accepts the terms being negotiated or calls strikes, which would be the first major VW industrial action in decades and a signal that Germany’s famous industrial peace has cracked.
- European Central Bank policy: if energy-driven inflation re-accelerates, the ECB faces a particularly cruel dilemma between supporting German industry and maintaining price stability.
— J